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2 
to create new products that will later ‘pay-back’ the investment made into R&D. This 
payback is reached if successful innovations can be developed. Much literature – 
partly contradictory – exists about the success factors of innovations and yet this 
mosaic of success factors has not been deciphered entirely.  
Due to rapid changes in customer tastes, technology, and competition, companies 
should develop new products on a regular basis (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). Yet, in 
the last decades costs have become an increasingly important aspect for innovations, 
especially as a trade-off between development time and costs can be found (Rothwell, 
1994). The management of manufactured products cost is fundamental to long-term 
profitability for any firm operating in a competitive market (Hax and Majluf, 1982). 
Since the 1970’s research on innovation (constantly) finds that the efficiency of 
development is an important factor in the success of innovations (Zirger and 
Maidique, 1990). Yet, companies are faced with a tension between a need for 
innovation of products with competitive functionality and costs coupled with a fast 
time-to-market (Davila and Wouters, 2004). The best new product developments meet 
the market with specifications that are needed and desired by the customer. 
Furthermore, these developments should be completed faster than the one of the 
competition. Then the company has either more time to react on changing market 
needs and new technologies and/or they are ahead of the competition and reap the 
benefits of being able to sell first (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).  
The overall aim of innovation in the private sector is to develop products that are 
successful in the market. Companies follow aims of growth and profitability. 
Innovations are one way to increase profitability and the market position of a 
company. Yet, empirical studies found this effect small in total, but significant, and it 
might take several years to yield (Geroski, 1995). Companies are, however, also 
budget restricted in innovations (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972; Srinivasan et al., 1997; 
Werner, 1997; Bösch, 2008). That also applies to pre-development (Cooper, 1988; 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1992), as it is expensive to let new product development 
ideas through screens, just to kill them later (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Vice 
versa badly executed pre-development phases can lead to budget escalation problems 
in later development phases (Kim and Wilemon, 2002). 
Developments also face other challenges: There could be a mismatch between the 
development of the company and the actual wish from the external environment. Or 
there is a mismatch in the organization, e.g. that engineering designs something 
production cannot manufacture on quality and costs (Werner, 1997). Furthermore the 
product should be unique and distinct to give a lasting competitive advantage. 
Additionally there can be technical problems and organizational difficulties in 
budgeting and organizational policies. Furthermore, companies want to utilize their 
resources most efficiently, improve the return on existing assets and capitalize on 
earlier R&D investments (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).  
3 
For quite some time, one potential success factor for innovations has been identified: 
To correctly judge the viability of new product development ideas and to select the 
most promising ones (Zirger and Maidique, 1990).  
Wheelwright and Clark (1992, p. 165) state:  
“Great products and processes are much more than a clever design, novel 
technical solution, distinctive package, catchy promotion, or advanced 
equipment. Outstanding development requires effective action from all of the 
major functions in the business. From engineering one needs good designs, 
well-executed tests, and high-quality prototypes; from marketing, thoughtful 
product positioning, solid customer analysis, and well-thought-out product 
plans; from manufacturing, capable processes, precise cost estimates, and 
skillfull pilot production and ramp-up”  
The different company parts have to play well together to reinforce each other. A 
large assembly of different aspects – just like the different musical instruments in an 
orchestra – leads to the overall success of new product developments. This thesis 
focuses on one part (one instrument) of the big picture – cost information collection 
and analysis during pre-development.  
1.1 Pre-development and product cost 
If executives of companies could predict new product development success, these 
executives would direct their effort straight to successful endeavors. They would stop 
pursuing any other new product developments in order to not waste efforts on 
developments that are unsuccessful on the market. However, that would require that 
companies would know in advance which kind of development endeavors would be 
successful. Similarly, investors could direct their efforts towards developments that 
are ‘certified’ to be successful. Even though this state will probably never be reached; 
the basic and underlying assumption of this thesis is that a sophisticated management 
of innovation will increase the probability that an innovation will be successful or that 
it is stopped early enough if its chances of success do not satisfy the required level.  
In order to achieve continual new product development success, researchers started 
treating new product development like a (production) process that should effectively 
be aided by tools and concepts similar to other processes that have been previously 
optimized (Cooper, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; 
Cusumano and Nobeoka, 1992). Much has been researched since these ground 
breaking publications, but it seems that one spot has been mostly skipped by research 
so far: The product cost analysis during pre-development.  
So why is this work focusing on product cost? Competitive pricing is a success factor; 
non-competitive costs are a failure factor for innovations (Mishra et al. 1996). One 
success factor of innovations is to develop products with superior performance-to-cost 
ratio (Cooper, 1988). According to Hax and Majluf (1982) product cost should not be 
4 
viewed as the simple accumulation of direct and allocated expenses for its 
manufacture and sale. Instead they should also be seen as an indicator of the ability of 
a company to manage its resources. Some – not well run – companies still cultivate 
the picture of the opposite of creativity and cost-effectiveness, leading to a camp 
mentality between employees from technology and business (Jens, 1999). Yet, the 
fruitful combination of both is crucial to success (Hauber and Schmid, 1999). 
Following the paradigm of ‘one can only manage what can be measured’ (Gassmann 
and Kobe, 1999), the cost analysis is seen as an important contribution for the 
management of innovation.  
So why is this work focusing on pre-development? It is in the early phases of 
innovation, in which pivotal decisions under high levels of uncertainty are made for 
both the market and technology (Lindemann, 2008). Also, it is the phase with the 
highest leverage for successful strategy alignment in innovation (Jens, 1999). Studies 
found that pre-development activities play a significant role for the success of new 
product developments (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1986; Dwyer and Mellor, 1991). 
Yet, pre-development routines are sometimes not well implemented in business 
(Cooper, 1988). Also, Shields and Young (1994, p. 177) cite an R&D manager:  
“The key to R&D workers’ cost management is to realize that the R&D costs 
they cause are relatively small compared to the downstream costs they cause. 
The big dollars come later and they are determined by R&D decisions.” 
Thus an extensive view of the flow of innovation costs downstream and eventually to 
the final customer is important. Shields and Young (1994) name this view the global 
cost consciousness. The Hilti group refers to it as controlling in terms of business 
development (Bösch, 2008). The focus of this research is part of this global cost 
consciousness. It looks at future product cost analysis during pre-development and 
how companies use it. Thus this thesis looks at one part needed for successful 
innovations.  
 
Figure 3: Focal point of this thesis 
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So far an articulated solution was to use target costing during the development stage. 
However, only lately the center of attention has been broadened to look around the 
main target costing practices. Davila and Wouters (2004) have widened the scope by 
investigating how cost information processing can contribute to efficient innovations. 
Most of the cost management literature has analyzed how the costs are managed 
‘inside’ of development teams (Davila and Wouters, 2004). This is shown as the 
circle in quadrant IV in Figure 3. Contrary to that, Davila and Wouters (2004) have 
investigated how alternative practices ‘around’ the development teams can facilitate 
cost information processing and cost management (the circle in quadrant II in Figure 
3). They have described several practices that bring cost criteria from outside of the 
development team into the development stage.  
This thesis goes one step further and explores the possibilities of cost information 
collection and analysis during innovations, by looking at how cost information 
processing and cost management can be brought to innovation phases prior to the 
actual development phase (see the bold circle in Figure 3).  
Koen et al. (2001) state their view that the new product development process starting 
from development kick-off is nowadays optimized in many companies. The interest 
for the research lies rather in the phases before this well-organized new product 
development process. However, good development processes should be beneficial 
right from the start. ‘Better homework’ is one of the identified improvement 
possibilities for more successful innovation revealed by Cooper (1990) and according 
to him need improvement (Cooper, 1990, p. 49):  
“Of all the activities in the new product process, predevelopment activities 
were the ones most weakly executed in greatest need of improvement”  
This thesis takes the same point of view as Wheelwright and Clark (1992) and Franz 
(1992) that prevention and pre-diagnosis are better than ‘after-the-fact’ problem 
solving, i.e. treatment and healing once a problem has occurred. It can be disastrous 
for a new product development to find out that the production costs are much larger 
than planned and accepted by the market, ultimately leading to a development that is 
not profitable. Some academics even argue that ‘cost’ itself is a quality feature, and 
that an additional cost reduction project or redesign can actually be seen as a quality 
defect (Carr and Tyson, 1992; Anderson and Sedatole, 1998; Davila and Wouters, 
2004). 
Figu
Mai
whe
thro
case
imp
the 
of i
thro
imp
prop
‘dec
dev
dev
Kle
dev
redu
prom
in in
a lif
new
emp
this 
The
line
inno
beco
has 
new
cost
NPD
re 4: Timing
n managem
n the abili
ugh lock-in
, change 
lemented. T
developme
nnovation 
ugh this lo
rove the ov
osals and d
ision on b
elopment s
elopment p
inschmidt, 
elopment c
ce new p
ising ones
vestment” 
e of their o
 product d
loyees (Va
research lie
 frontier of
 in this th
vation. Ac
ming unde
turned tow
 product de
ing has rec
 literature
 and impact 
ent attentio
ty to influe
s (Wheelw
is difficul
hus, the m
nt. This typ
activities 
ck-in effec
erall innov
esigns. In 
usiness cas
tage. Coop
roject can
1993). A
osts rise gr
roduct dev
. The produ
(Kotler and
wn (Coope
evelopmen
rila and Si
s before th
 cost manag
esis. It is m
cording to 
rstood and
ards the fir
velopment
eived very 
, analyses o
of managem
Cla
n might be
nce the de
right and C
t and ine
anagement 
ical activit
in general 
t, the pre-
ation effec
his model C
e’ and gate
er claims t
 be killed 
lso Kotler
eatly in lat
elopment 
ct develop
 Armstron
r, 1996). C
t projects
evanen, 20
e developm
ement rese
oved to i
Koen et a
 well docu
st phase. A
 process an
little attent
f costs are 
6 
ent attention
rk (1992, p. 
 dedicated 
velopment 
lark, 1992
fficient, a
is merely f
y scheme h
(Cooper a
developmen
tiveness as 
ooper (199
 3. He des
hat this is 
before hi
 and Arm
er stages. T
ideas early
ment stage 
g, 2008, p. 
ompanies m
in fear of
05). These
ent start.  
arch is mo
ts early ph
l. (2001) th
mented in 
dditionally,
d later stage
ion in the a
reduced to
 and influenc
33) 
to a develo
has already
), as can b
s decision
ixing the de
as also bee
nd Kleins
t phase pr
ideas can b
0) labels th
cribes it as
the position
gh expend
strong (2
hus in the
 and proc
is the one t
259). Also
ight hesita
losing cus
are further
ved further
ases, starti
e later pha
literature an
 compared 
s, e.g. man
ccounting 
 feasibility 
e according 
pment proj
 gone dram
e seen in F
s have be
sign, rathe
n found fo
chmidt, 19
ovides the 
e turned in
e developm
 the final 
 at which 
iture incur
008) state
ir view a c
eed only 
hat “calls f
, some proj
te to stop w
tomers an
 reasons wh
 along the i
ng with th
ses of the 
d thus the
to research
ufacturing 
literature. S
studies, wh
Wheelwright
ect too late
atically d
igure 4. In
en made 
r than direc
r the execu
86). Howe
opportunit
to high-qu
ent start as
gate before
a new pro
s (Cooper 
 that pro
ompany sh
with the m
or a large j
ects tend to
ell establi
d demotiva
y the focu
nnovation 
e front en
innovation
 research fo
 on costs in
costs, front
imilarly, in
ich are usu
 
 and 
, i.e. 
own 
 this 
and 
ting 
tion 
ver, 
y to 
ality 
 the 
 the 
duct 
and 
duct 
ould 
ost 
ump 
 get 
shed 
ting 
s of 
time 
d of 
 are 
cus 
 the 
 end 
 the 
ally 
7 
far away from the preciseness that cost management tools could offer. The motivation 
for the research underlying this thesis is to understand how and when cost information 
is collected and processed in pre-development (Fields I & III in Figure 3). 
As in any other field of business, managers working in the field of innovation 
management need accurate information for correct decision making. The area of cost 
management could aid this decision making process by providing information that 
enables companies to avoid unnecessary cost through the right selection and 
modification of new product development ideas during innovation phases (Voigt and 
Sturm, 2001). However, according to a study of the Institute of Management 
Accountants, 80 percent of the interviewed managers said that management 
accounting information is important “but only 23 percent [of these interviewed 
managers] are satisfied with their decision support information” (Clinton and Van der 
Merwe, 2006 ,p. 14). Fast and easy models could help practitioners, while other 
instruments might consume too many resources and time (Delgado-Arvelo et al., 
2002; Davila and Wouters, 2004).  
Summarizing, one can say that the theoretical background of this thesis is based on 
several concepts and notions: 
1. New product developments experience lock-ins through decisions that are 
costly to be reversed  
2. There is a trade-off between newness, performance increase, time-to-market, 
and cost 
3. The right cost information has to be available and used for decision making as 
soon as possible 
There are several calls for research that this thesis rejoins. In a call for research, 
Deszca et al. (1999) points out that it is difficult to develop breakthrough products, 
and a call for research on how companies can assess technologies and new product 
development ideas for breakthrough products. This work aims at exposing approaches 
that assist accomplishing these difficult tasks. 
This goes hand in hand with the call for research of Shields and Young (1994). They 
would like to see further studies on what R&D professionals base decisions on that 
affect product life-cycle and target costs. 
More generally, Foster and Young (1997) call for finding relatively unexplored areas 
in management accounting. This thesis analyzes the cost information gathering and 
analysis of different companies during pre-development. It presents timelines that 
demonstrates when which kind of cost information analysis and cost management 
tools are used during pre-development.  
As Zimmerman (2001) states, the empirical managerial accounting literature has not 
so far created a substantive cumulative body of knowledge. Most of it focuses on 
describing the current accounting practice. According to Zimmermann, managerial 
8 
accounting research still has to go the way other accounting research areas have 
already traveled – from mere description to the development of theories. He argues 
that one major reason for that is the lack of publicly available data, which is also a 
challenge to this thesis. Thus the cases and theorizing findings presented here aim also 
at filling a gap in the body of knowledge. 
1.2 Research questions  
The motivation for the research underlying this thesis is to understand how and when 
cost information is collected and processed in early innovation stages. This thesis and 
its findings aim to contribute to scientific and also practical use.  
 
Descriptive part: 
RQ I: How is product cost analysis done during pre-development?  
 
Theorizing part: 
RQ II: Why is the product cost analysis during pre-development done the way it 
is?  
 
The purpose of this study is to identify, classify and describe how new product 
development ideas can be analyzed with cost information gathered in pre-
development phases. The first research question calls for an analysis with a 
descriptive nature, while the second research question is the base for the theorizing 
part of this thesis.  
1.3 Key definitions  
This thesis is dealing with future product cost analysis during pre-development and 
before starting the discussion, some key concepts should be clear and defined. 
Pre-development 
Pre-development is the time phase that lies before the actual development start of 
physically developing a specific new product. This definition is in line with Cooper 
(1990) and Griffin (1997). A further discussion of the different contents of pre-
development can be found in subsection 2.3.1. 
Tool 
This work follows the definition of Brady et al. (1997) that a tool is a document, a 
framework, procedure, system or method which enables companies to achieve or 
clarify particular objectives.  
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Lock-in effects 
In literature it is claimed that usually a large share of all the costs a product will occur 
in its life are determined already in the development phase, even though the costs 
arise at a later stage (e.g. Boothroyd, 1988). This effect is called lock-in and it is 
experienced when a new product development proceeds. Academic authors also state 
that it is costly and time consuming to change earlier decisions (e.g. Blanchard, 1978; 
Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). Thus making wrong decisions up-front in 
development can lead to sub-optimal situations. A detailed discussion about cost lock-
ins can be found in subsection 2.4.3.3. 
Cost management 
Cost management focuses on cost reduction, continuous improvement and change. 
This work follows the definition of Horngren et al. (1994, p. 5) that cost management 
is “actions by managers to satisfy customers while continuously reducing and 
controlling costs”. More about cost management and how product cost can be 
influenced through correct cost appreciation and managerial decisions can be found in 
subsection 2.4.2. 
1.4 The cost view of this thesis 
Cost can be seen from two different angles. It is important to point out that this thesis 
looks at one of these two angles:  
The view on costs taken in this thesis is that of future product costs per product 
unit once new developments are launched in the market (view A).  
The view is not on the actual (or budgeted) development costs that occurred 
between idea generation and market launch of a new product development (view 
B).  
Even so, view B is an important and interesting issue; this budget cost view is not 
dealt with in this thesis. This is done as the research on future product cost 
management (view A) before development start is a nearly blank spot in literature 
so far. Contrary to that, a large number of publications in the field of cost 
management deal with the cost control of development projects – thus the actual (or 
budgeted) development costs (view B). E.g. Shields and Young (1994) call view A 
the global cost consciousness and view B the local cost consciousness. They focus 
mostly on development cost budgets (i.e. the local cost consciousness; view B) in 
their study of cost consciousness behavior of R&D professionals. Also Völker (1999) 
uses view B in his study on controlling of development cost budgets to steer R&D 
efforts to generate product portfolios with the highest net present value. Also, project 
management literature focusing on product development project costs usually takes 
the view B of costs as spending for the development project (e.g. Turner, 1998). 
Baldwin (1991) even arguments that control through the use of budgets (view B) are 
counterproductive to innovation and company performance.  
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looking outside of the company. When the analysis is looking inside, the new product 
development idea itself is analyzed. When the analysis is looking outside, the 
situation of the market and competition is examined. This thesis studies how 
information can be provided for correct decision making. It does not study the 
decision making process itself. Thus this thesis deliberately examines only on one part 
of cost management – the analysis. 
To 3.) See subsection 1.4. 
To 4.) The focus is on product innovations and its forerunner – the new product 
development project. If not stated otherwise, this thesis deliberately focuses mainly on 
product and industrial service related developments, rather than e.g. process 
improvements. Products can be seen as a compound of different components that 
deliver a certain customer benefit for a certain price (Baum et al. 2004). However, 
many things stated here will be analogous, and applicable to other developments than 
products.  
To 5.) The scope of this thesis is restricted to pre-development. The development 
activities that start with development kick-off are not studied. It is acknowledged that 
many presented tools could also be used in later phases of the product life cycle. 
However analyzing how tools and/or information gathered during pre-development 
could be used later would go beyond the focus of this thesis. 
To 6.) Detailed handling and technical implementation of the analysis is not 
exhaustively reported here. Even though the actual technical implementation was 
discussed with the case companies, a comprehensive description of the actual 
realization in these companies lies out of the scope of this thesis. E.g. if information is 
stored in the intranet, it is not reported whether this is done via a specific program or 
rather an MS-Excel form. This would lead to an overload of presented data that would 
distract the reader from the essential research questions. 
1.6 Thesis structure  
This thesis consists of seven chapters that are arranged as follows. Chapter 1 is an 
introduction to the thesis. Its aim is to raise the interest of the reader and to present the 
research questions and scope of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the innovation and cost 
management literature relevant to this thesis. Chapter 3 presents a methodological 
discussion about several ways of conducting research. It concludes with a choice that 
structures the rest of this thesis by following the chosen methodology. Through that, 
the basis is built for the seven company case study. Chapter 4 concentrates on the 
within-case analysis, while the chapters 5, and 6 focus on the cross-case analysis. 
Consequently in chapter 7, the different findings of the case studies are reflected 
against literature and the research questions are answered. Furthermore, the chapter 
concludes this thesis with a discussion of validity and limitations. An overview of the 
structure of this work is shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Overview of the structure of this work 
Chapter 1:
Introduction
Chapter 2:
Literature review 
Chapter 6:
Companies and pattern focused
cross-case analysis 
Chapter 7:
Discussion of findings, 
validity and contribution
Chapter 3:
Methodology
Chapter 4:
Within-case analysis
Chapter 5:
Descriptive cross-case
analysis of tool use
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2 Literature review  
Section 1.5 above illustrates the location of the research of this work in the academics 
parent discipline. The research lies at the intersection of cost management and pre-
development. This chapter reviews main concepts on this intersection of innovation as 
well as cost management as the relevant part of management accounting.  
It starts with selected innovation concepts that can be used for classification purposes. 
These concepts are reviewed and presented in the following. Consequently, this 
chapter presents other important aspects concerning cost analysis during pre-
development, before some literature case studies are presented. 
2.1 Innovations 
One major key concept of this thesis is the expression of innovation. Innovation is 
discussed for quite some time in academic literature and over the years many 
definitions of innovation have been made by different authors. In 1939, the economist 
Schumpeter (1939, p. 87) describes and defines innovation as follows: 
“We will now define innovation more rigorously by means of the production 
function previously introduced. As we know, this function describes the way in 
which quantity of product varies if quantities of factors vary. If, instead of 
quantities of factors, we vary the form of the function, we have an innovation. 
But this not only limits us, at first blush at least, to the case in which the 
innovation consists in producing the same kind of product that had been used 
before, but also raises more delicate questions. Therefore, we will simply 
define innovation as the setting up of a new production function. This covers 
the case of a new commodity, as well as those of a new form of organization 
such as a merger, of the opening up of new markets, and so on.” 
In the 1960s Becker and Whisler (1967) already find many definitions. Innovation is 
often distinguished in facets between new-to-the-world and new-to-a-business-unit. 
This work deliberately follows the definition of Tushman and Nadler (1986, p. 75) 
that “innovation is the creation of any product, service, or process which is new to 
a business unit.” Thus, innovation can apply to various fields. This thesis 
intentionally narrows its focus further down to the development of products. It takes a 
product development perspective, i.e. focusing on product innovations rather than on 
innovations of services or organizational structures as a whole. Tushman and Nadler 
(1986) also distinguish product and process innovation. The first deals with changes 
in the product offering of a company. The second deals with changes in the way a 
product is made. This work focuses on the first type, product innovation.  
The term invention has to be distinguished from innovation. An invention or idea 
becomes an innovation “only when it can be replicated reliably on a meaningful scale 
at practical costs” (Senge, 1990, p. 6). For example in 1903 the first flight aircraft of 
the Wright brothers proved that powered flight was possible. Yet it took over 30 years 
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that the innovation of a commercial aircraft reached the market. Introduced in 1935, 
the McDonnel Douglas DC-3 “was the first plane that supported itself economically 
as well as aerodynamically” (Senge, 1990, p. 6). The planes built before “were not 
reliable and cost effective on an appropriate scale” (Senge, 1990, p. 6). 
Innovations differ from each other and one can distinguish different types of 
innovation. In the academic literature differences between types of innovations have 
been strongly emphasized in the past (Damanpour, 1991). E.g. one difference is their 
origin, whether they come from a market need or rather from a new technology 
development. Another difference is the newness that the innovation presents to a 
company or a market. This section also looks at the classification of innovation types 
according to newness, so that it is better understandable what kind of innovations are 
looked at in the different cases. 
2.1.1 Innovation character  
Innovations can be very dissimilar and several character traits of innovations can be 
distinguished in literature. These are usually attached to the idea source, the idea 
focus or the extent of change connected to an idea.  
 
Figure 8: Different innovation character types 
Figure 8 shows different classes of innovation character types together with a 
selection of literature references that found this distinction important and relevant for 
innovation. One can distinguish product and process innovation. The first deals with 
changes in the product offering of a company. The second deals with changes in the 
way a product is made (Tushman and Nadler, 1986; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
Type Classes Relevant to innovation according
Processing focus • Product innovation
• Process innovation
Tushman & Nadler, 1986; 
Wheelwright & Clark, 1992
Final offering • Product 
• Service
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000
Origin • Market driven
• Technology driven
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000
Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007
Origin • Company internal
• Company external
Gemünden& Littkemann, 2007
Kotler & Armstrong, 2008
Zaltman et al., 1973
Initiative • Innovation by chance
• Institutionalized innovation
• Customer led innovation
• Idea suggestion
• Improvement & recycling search
Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007
Modularity • Platform driven
• Without platform
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000
Manufacturing
type
• Assembled
• Non-assembled
Parish & Moore, 1996;
Ulrich & Eppinger, 2000
System 
complexity 
• Innovative system components
• Innovative systems 
• Innovative integrated systems 
Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007
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Additionally product and service innovations can be distinguished (Ulrich and 
Eppinger, 2000).  
Further innovation types can be distinguished according to origin. The first distinction 
is whether an innovation is market or technology driven (Ulrich and Eppinger, 
2000; Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). Technology driven innovations focus on new 
product developments in the area of technology. Technological and production 
aspects are in the center of attention. On the contrary, market driven innovations focus 
on new product developments in the area of marketing. 
Also, company internal and external sources for innovations can be distinguished 
(Zaltman et al., 1973; Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). External sources can be 
customers, competitors, distributors, suppliers, and others. For company internal and 
external innovation sources Gemünden and Littkemann (2007) point out several 
paradigms that explain initiatives for innovations in companies. One paradigm is the 
planning paradigm. It is a top-down approach to innovation. It investigates changes in 
society and uses roadmapping of technology and market developments to derive 
attractive and lucrative opportunities. A second is the entrepreneurial paradigm. It 
focuses on pro-active and self-responsible efforts with a fast execution. A third is the 
barrier paradigm focusing on managers and employees in lower or middle 
management. These managers should spot needs for innovations and their 
possibilities. The innovation activities should increase if these managers get more 
freedom and support. However, with increasing freedom the absolute value of these 
measures decreases, while the screening costs and frustration are increased linearly. A 
fourth paradigm is the network paradigm. Its primary mission is to acquire innovation 
initiatives from outside of the company. 
Innovations can also be distinguished according to the initiative from which they 
come to a company (Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). There can be innovation by 
chance. This is completely the opposite of institutionalized innovation, which follows 
an intentional, rational and structured search for new product development ideas. 
Customer led innovation can also be distinguished were impulses come from wishes 
and needs of either the direct customer or the final customer. Another very important 
source of innovation is idea suggestions. They usually come from employees and can 
be collected continuously or based on idea competitions. Idea suggestions systems 
were already used in 1909 at Bayer (Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). Thus idea 
suggestions systems are already used in companies for over 100 years. Finally, 
product improvement and the search to use by products can also lead to innovations.  
Similar innovations of assembled vs. non-assembled products can be distinguished. 
The latter is severely restricted by the production process, as this process cannot be 
changed easily (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000).  
Furthermore, one can distinguish platform driven innovations from normal ones. If 
a company assumes that new products can be derived from established technological 
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subsystems (platforms), it might choose this type of innovation or customize existing 
products (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000).  
Moreover, the degree of system complexity can be distinguished. Innovative system 
components are parts that improve an existing product (e.g. airbag for a car). 
Innovative systems are new products or processes that are newly developed and 
constructed from scratch (e.g. the Smart car). Innovative integrated systems are 
networks of several separate and innovative systems to a new entity (e.g. new 
motorway toll system in Germany) (Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). 
2.1.2 Newness  
Innovation newness is measured in several degrees from incremental innovations to 
highly radical innovations. Innovations can then be classified according to those 
degrees. Thus when researching innovations, it is helpful to be able to classify 
different types of innovations. However, many different notions for those degrees are 
used today in business and academic worlds and thus several classification schemes 
are proposed in literature.  
 
Figure 9: Innovation types according to Garcia and Calantone (2002) 
The classical distinction is between incremental and radical innovations (Shenhar 
and Dvir, 1996; Tatikonda and Stock, 2003). Yet, in their literature review, Garcia 
and Calantone (2002) found out that many terms that should indicate the degree of 
newness in innovations are used. Some of the terms used are ‘radical’, ‘really-new’, 
‘discontinuous’, ‘incremental’ and ‘imitative’ (see also Figure 9). Incremental 
innovations are defined as “products that provide new features, benefits, or 
improvements to the existing technology in the existing market” (Garcia and 
Calantone, 2002, p. 123). Furthermore they define ‘really new innovations’ as a 
moderately innovative result positioned between radical and incremental innovation. 
However, there are also two types of innovation categories that lie between the three 
mentioned above – discontinuous and imitative innovations. Discontinuous 
innovations may either be a radical or a really new innovation, depending on which 
level (micro / macro) they affect and if market and technology are both changed or if 
one is kept (Garcia and Calantone, 2002). Similar imitative innovations can either be 
really new or incremental innovations, depending on their technological and market 
innovativeness degree (Garcia and Calantone, 2002). 
Another newness classification is based on the type of innovation and its newness in 
different areas – four in total (Gemünden and Littkemann, 2007). The first area is the 
Radical innovations Incremental innovationsReally new innovations
Discontinuous innovations Imitative innovations
Innovativeness LowHigh
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market. The market related newness increases with the amount of customers affected 
if a new product development has a significant value increase. The second area is the 
technology. The technology related newness augments with the increase in 
functionality and performance. The third area is the organization. The organization 
related newness increases with the degree of changes in the organization. These can 
be changes in the strategy, formal structures, processes, competences, culture, and 
reward systems. The fourth area targets the changes in the environment of the 
innovating company. The environmental related newness depends on the amount of 
different organizations and parties that are involved in complex competition and 
cooperation relationships, as well as the degree of market regulation.  
2.1.2.1 Market based distinctions  
A further distinction in literature is made between pioneering and incremental 
innovations (Crawford, 1992; Ali et al., 1993; Barczak, 1995). The benefit of 
pioneering innovations is seen through proprietary learning, the small possibilities of 
imitation and a long head start. In this case pioneering innovations can work out a cost 
advantage that leads to higher profits compared to following innovations (Lieberman, 
1987). On the contrary, postponing a pioneering innovation by waiting and being an 
early follower has the benefit that a dominant design could have emerged that 
facilitates product, process and infrastructure development with the benefit of a higher 
efficiency (Deszca et al., 1999). However, companies that have always covered 
pioneering innovations can experience difficulties handling incremental innovations 
and vice versa (Dougherty and Corse, 1995). 
Another innovation classification is the binary distinction of Christensen (1997). 
Focusing on a longer time scale, Christensen (1997) defines two categories of 
technology innovations pending on the performance of the new product development. 
The first category is called sustaining innovations. These are innovations, which 
improve the performance of a product. They can be discontinuous and radical or 
incremental. The second category is called disruptive innovations. These are 
innovations which reduce the performance of a product category, at least in the near 
outlook. They have a different value proposition than the existing technologies, which 
might not look appealing to the users of the established technology. However, the 
technology might be cheaper, simpler or create smaller products, which will in the 
long turn replace the established technology (Christensen, 1997). That is why they 
might also be called competence destroying technologies (Geroski, 2003).  
Similar to Christensen (1997), Tidd (2001) also uses the concept of a more than 
radical innovation that completely changes business rules and names this innovation 
type ‘disruptive’ (see Figure 10).  
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Figure 10: Newness type of innovation and its associated competitive advantage according Tidd 
(2001) 
The next type of innovation in the scheme of Tidd (2001) is called ‘radical’. 
According to Tidd (2001) a radical innovation offers a very new or unique product 
that allows a premium pricing on the market. The third type is the complex 
innovation that is characterized by market entry barriers due to complex technology 
knowledge. The forth and last type is the continuous incremental innovation that is a 
response to the permanent cost / performance pressures of the markets. However, a 
radical change in a component or subsystem may result in only an incremental 
performance change of an end product (Tidd, 1995).  
2.1.2.2 Technology based distinctions 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) also developed an innovation classification focused on 
where in an organization and to which extend an innovation is carried out. These four 
different types of development projects are shown in Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11: Four types of product / process developments according Wheelwright and Clark 
(1992) 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) distinguish four different types of development 
projects. The first type is research or advanced development projects. The scope of 
these projects is to invent and capture new science and know-how, so that this gained 
information can then be used in specific new product development projects. The 
second type is breakthrough development projects. These projects develop entirely 
new products and processes using core concepts and technologies that are completely 
Type of innovation Competitive advantage
Disruptive Re-writing rules of the competitive game, creating a new ‘value proposition’
Radical Offering a highly novel or unique product or service, premium pricing
Complex Difficulty of learning about the technology keeps entry barriers high
Continuous incremental Continuousmovement of the cost/performance frontier
Process changes
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new to the developing organization. The third type is platform or generational 
development projects. These concepts are aimed at creating platforms and basic 
architectures on which several follow-up generations can be built on. Last but not 
least, the fourth type is derivative development projects. They refine and improve 
selected performance dimensions to better meet the needs of specific market segments 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992).  
Roy et al. (2005) take up this point that many new product developments are actually 
a mix of conventional and new technologies. Thus they distinguish four types: 
1. New to the company content type 
2. New with similar attributes to a specified design 
3. Modified redesigned from an existing stated design 
4. Exactly the same as an existing stated design (carry over) 
 
Figure 12: Project characteristics and level of technological uncertainty according to Shenhar 
and Dvir (1996) 
A, low-tech B, medium-tech C, high-tech D, super high-tech
Technology No new technology Some new technology Integrating new, but 
existing, technologies
Key technologies do 
not exist at project’s 
initiation
Typical 
industries
Construction, 
production, utilities, 
public works
Mechanical, electrical, 
chemical, aerospace, 
some electronics
High-tech and 
technology-based
industries; e.g. 
computers, aerospace, 
electronics
Advanced, high-tech 
and leading industries, 
electronics, aerospace, 
computer
Type of 
products
Buildings, bridges, 
telephone 
installation, build to 
print
Additional, non-
revolutionary models, 
derivatives or 
improvements of  a 
product
New military system; 
new, f irst of  its kind 
family of  products, 
within state-of -the-art
New, non-proven 
concept, beyond 
existing state-of -the-art
Development 
and testing
No development, 
no testing
Limited development, 
some testing
Considerable 
development and 
testing. Prototypes 
usually used during 
development process
Must develop key 
technologies together 
with product. Usually 
develop an 
intermediate prototype 
to test concept and 
new technologies
Design cycles 
and design 
freeze
Only one cycle. 
Design f reeze prior 
to project’s 
execution phase
One to two cycles. 
Early design f reeze, 
no later than f irst 
quarter of  execution 
phase
At least two cycles. 
Design f reeze usually 
during f irst or second 
quarter
Two to four cycles. 
Late design f reeze, 
usually during second 
or third quarter
Communication 
and interaction
Mostly formal 
communication at 
predetermined low 
rate meetings
Increased f requency 
of  communication, 
some information 
interaction
High levels of  
communication through 
multiple channels;
informal interaction is 
common
Extensive number of  
channels; management 
facilitates informal
interaction
Project 
manager and 
type of workers
Manager has good 
administrative
skills. Mostly semi-
skilled workers; a 
few academicians
Manager must 
possess some 
technical skills. About 
half  of  the workers 
are academicians
Good technical skills of  
manager. Many 
professionals and 
academicians on the 
project
Project manager is an 
exceptional technical 
leader. Highly skilled 
professionals and high 
rate of  academicians
Management 
style and 
attitude
Firm style. 
Management sticks 
to the initial plan
Moderately f irm style. 
Ready to accept 
some changes
Moderately f lexible
style. Expecting many 
changes
Highly f lexible style. 
Living with continuous 
change and ‘looking for 
trouble’
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Development teams have to manage the uncertainty connected to the demand, 
technology and competition in order to develop new products successfully (Zhang and 
Doll, 2001). Shenhar and Dvir (1996) are using a technological uncertainty and 
newness classification with four categories from ‘A, low-tech’ to ‘D, super high-
tech’ for innovation (see Figure 12). One should point out that the provided definition 
sets itself clearly apart from other literature due to its compromising and well 
reflected description. 
2.1.2.3 Organization and knowledge based distinctions 
Another area is pointed out by Tushman and Nadler (1986). They distinguish three 
degrees of innovation with increasing learning requirements – incremental, 
synthetic and discontinuous. Incremental innovations are mostly based on learning by 
doing. Synthetic innovations are based on major process improvements and finally 
discontinuous innovations are a complete change of underlying technology, e.g. the 
change from steam to diesel locomotives (Tushman and Nadler, 1986). 
A further classification scheme is presented by Murmann and Frencken (2006). It also 
has a four type distinction and looks at the degree in which new knowledge is needed 
and simultaneously at the extent of performance improvement that an innovation 
brings.  
 
Figure 13: Types of radical innovations according to Murmann and Frencken (2006) 
Figure 13 demonstrates how a change of two parameters – the needed knowledge and 
the performance improvement – change the nature of innovations. If both parameters 
stay similar one can speak of an incremental innovation. However, if one parameter is 
significantly changed, the radicalness of innovation rises. Furthermore, the radicalness 
is the highest if both parameters are changed. In this case, the authors are speaking of 
a radical-square (r²) innovation. They distinguish between an innovation that is 
radical because its high performance improvement (sense 1) and because of its large 
scope of required new knowledge (sense 2) (Murmann and Frencken, 2006). 
2.1.2.4 Effects, implications and changing newness over time 
According to Garcia and Calantone (2002) radical innovations are innovations that 
result in discontinuities on macro and micro level of economic systems. A radical 
innovation will cause a discontinuity on a world, industry or market level and through 
that, automatically cause a discontinuity on a company and customer level.  
Low 
performance 
improvement
High 
performance 
improvement
Small scope of 
new knowledge
Incremental
innovation
Radical 
innovation, 
sense 1
Large scope of 
new knowledge
Radical 
innovation, 
sense 2
Radical-square 
(r²) innovation
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Radical technology and product innovations need a different management as 
incremental developments occur (Gassmann and Kobe, 1999). Yet both types of new 
developments have high importance. On one hand, new incremental developments 
need to be managed well within the existing core competences in the short run. On the 
other hand, new technologies are needed to jump from one technology S-curve to the 
next in the long run (Gassmann and Kobe, 1999). 
Yet, whole industries might be more prone for radical developments than others 
(Pavitt et al., 1989). Also, companies of industries with large technological 
opportunities face higher potential threats of technological entry from outside than 
other industries. According to Pavitt et al. (1989) this may explain the notion that 
radical innovations are often made by newcomers to a market. 
Established companies spend 80-90 percent of their technology budgets on 
incremental innovation. Only a minor fraction is spend on more radical innovations, 
as managerial understanding for them is weaker and success is rare (Roberts, 2007). 
However, radical innovations are more willingly adopted and implemented in times of 
crisis and external threat. This is as uncertainty and worries created by the crisis make 
managers open to adopt new structures that show promise of relieving the situation 
(Shepard, 1967).  
One characteristic of new product developments is environmental uncertainty (Ax et 
al. 2008), which is reduced from stage to stage the further a new product development 
goes towards market launch (Cooper, 1996). Thus uncertainty can be seen as a 
contingency factor for innovation (Damanpour, 1991). Less radical innovations with 
lower uncertainty will also lead to lower cost in regard to the search for solutions in 
the new product development process (Zaltman et al., 1973). 
Uncertainty can also be regarded as a subjective phenomena, rather than physical 
realities (Ax et al. 2008). Thus the perceived uncertainty can also play a role for the 
cost analysis during pre-development.  
Last but not least it has to be kept in mind that the innovation type and its radicalness 
can change over time for the (re-)developments connected to a new product 
development idea. According to Kash and Auger (2005) this happened with the diesel 
fuel injection systems of Bosch. They went through several development phases, 
starting from the fundamental breakthrough innovation before World War II. 
However, what followed were first some more incremental innovations, before there 
was another wave of major re-developments in the 60s. This wave was followed by 
another major re-developments phase in the 80s, before the innovations again became 
more incremental. Thus it is not said that there is a mere movement from radical to 
incremental innovations, but it can also move back to more radical innovations.  
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2.1.2.5 Summary on newness classifications  
Summarizing, one can say that there are many different innovation newness 
classifications in literature. In general, newness of innovations is assessed in a 
spectrum from incremental innovations, with little change to product and needed 
knowledge, to radical innovations, with more change to product and needed 
knowledge. Figure 14 shows an overview of the introduced concepts of different 
authors. 
 
Figure 14: Overview of newness classifications  
Also, several definitions of ‘radical innovations’ exist. Garcia and Calantone (2002) 
and Christensen (1997) look at the discontinuity of existing offerings; Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992) look at the novelty of product and process; and finally Murmann and 
Frencken (2006) look at the additionally needed knowledge and the extent of 
performance improvement.  
Furthermore, it should be noticed that there might be a bias in academic research 
due to study perspective and newness. Verworn et al. (2008) point out that literature 
Type Focus Classes Authors
Normative 
newness 
definitions
General 
• Radical 
• Discontinuous
• Really-new
• Imitative
• Incremental
Garcia & Calantone
(2002)
Newness for 
different areas General 
• Market 
• Technology
• Organization
• Environment 
Gemünden& 
Littkemann, 2007
Market entry Market • Pioneering • Incremental 
Crawford, 1992; Ali et al., 
1993; Barczak, 1995
Newness and 
performance 
changes
Market • Disruptive • Sustaining Christensen, 1997
Newness and 
performance 
changes
Market 
• Disruptive
• Radical
• Complex 
• Continuous incremental 
Tidd, 2001
Newness and 
process 
changes
Technology 
• Research /advanced development
• Breakthrough
• Platform or generational
• Derivative 
Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992
Newness and 
performance 
changes
Technology 
• New to the company 
• New with similar attributes 
• Modified redesigned 
• Carry over
Roy et al., 2005
Newness and 
uncertainty Technology 
• D, super high-tech
• C, high-tech
• B, medium-tech
• A, low-tech
Shenhar & Dvir (1996) 
Newness and 
performance 
changes
Organization 
• Radical-square
• Radical
• Incremental 
Murmann & Frencken, 
2006
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has taken two different perspectives when analyzing incremental and radical 
innovations. The studies focusing on incremental innovations usually take a micro 
perspective of adoption of a company. On the contrary, studies focusing on radical 
innovations usually take a macro perspective based on factors outside of companies, 
such as newness to the world (Verworn et al., 2008). This work focuses on the 
company focused, micro perspective, independently of the newness of the studied 
new product development ideas. 
2.1.3 Successful vs. unsuccessful  
Innovations have to create additional value. Resources are needed and are primarily 
sponsored by investors and banks. If a company cannot deliver successful innovations 
it risks it’s refinancing and endangers the workplace of its employees (Schindler, 
1999). While companies like Apple placed successful innovations like the iPod and 
the iPhone on the market, other companies are less successful. E.g. Texas Instrument 
lost 660 million USD before leaving the home computer segment (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2008). Thus, one can also differentiate successful and unsuccessful 
innovation endeavors. Naturally, companies are trying to have all of their 
developments successful, but for research purposes, failed new product developments 
are also interesting. Reality also shows that not all innovations are successful (Cooper, 
1979; Stevens and Burley, 1997; Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000; Kotler and Armstrong, 
2008).  
Furthermore, it is actually complex to differentiate the successfulness of an 
innovation, as there is a multitude of possible innovation success measures (Dwyer 
and Mellor, 1991). These measures can either be a pre-indicator of the financial 
success or be a result of the financial success. Often the success of an innovation is 
measured in commercial success and expressed in financial figures, e.g. turnover, 
profit and market share gained through an innovation (see e.g. the rational plan 
perspective in Brown and Eisenhardt, 1995; Cooper, 1996; Poolton and Barclay, 
1998; Ernst, 2002). That is also why finance is often setting the ground rules for 
evaluating and monitoring innovation programs and projects (Pavitt, 1990). A study 
of Griffin and Page (1996) indicates that companies do measure the success of an 
innovation with parameters that are in line with the strategic priorities of a company. 
E.g. if the time to market is valued very highly in a company, managers of that 
company will use measures that express the timeliness of an innovation. Thus it has to 
be kept in mind that not all innovations try to be profitable and sometimes the 
development aims are those other than financial success.  
New product development can be seen as the challenge that companies must develop 
new products, but the odds stand profoundly in opposition to success (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2008). It is not in the prime focus of this work to give an overall recipe 
for successful innovations, as the success of an idea depends on much more than what 
is examined in that work. However, the future product cost analysis during pre-
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development phases described in this work, can be a step that helps to develop ideas 
further into successful innovations as, in general, excellence matters in the innovation 
process.  
Wheelwright and Clark (1992) have found that companies with superior development 
capabilities have a more comprehensive development strategy framework that 
provides a more secure foundation for individual development projects – in the front 
end as also in the back-end. Product cost analysis during pre-development can help to 
increase the odds for success. 
2.2 Pre-development in the innovation process  
According Van de Ven (1992), researchers should distinguish three main types of 
processes. The first process type is an input-process-output model that uses process 
logic to explain causal relationships between observed input variables and dependent 
variables for variance theoretical explanations. This input-process-output model is 
often a black box. The second process type uses process as one category of several 
concepts that are not directly examined. The third process type is a developmental 
sequence of events or activities that describe the process over time. This thesis looks 
at the third type of processes. 
In general, the innovation process is characterized by connected tasks, uncertain 
results and feedback loops (Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). Several models are 
constructed to show how innovation should ideally be developed. In the following 
three classes of models are distinguished. The first model class uses several phases 
and selection gates in between and is named here the stage-gate view. The second 
model class looks at the amount of ideas and describes a narrowing funnel effect. It is 
named the funnel view in this work. A third, more abstract class compels models that 
take the view that more and more information has to be collected during the 
innovation process. It is named the information acquisition view in the following. 
2.2.1 The stage-gate view  
Some process models view new product development as a sequence of steps with 
intermediate checks and reviews. This subsection focuses on these kinds of models. 
Several of these models are proposed in literature; each focusing on different main 
aspects. 
Implementing a stage-gate process is a significant investment. Yet, the benefits are 
multiple. Firstly, it shortens the time to market for new product developments. 
Secondly, it improves the development quality, as fewer mistakes and less rework are 
required. Furthermore, it also leads to a higher success rate (Cooper, 1990). However, 
in real business settings there is much iteration in and over the different stages that 
can limit the usability of stage-gate models (Varila and Sievanen, 2005). Yet, the 
idealized stage-gate models are well suited as a base construct for research. 
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Figure 16 presents a five-stage model often used in practice according to Vinkemeier 
and von Franz (2007). This process starts with the definition of the innovation 
strategy. This strategy is the basis and guideline for the other phases, starting with the 
idea generation. After the idea generation comes the research and development, 
before ideas are handed over to production and finally released to the market 
(Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007).  
2.2.1.3 An organization focused stage-gate model 
Summarizing some models in literature, Zaltman, Duncan and Holbek (1973) present 
their (organizational) model. It consists of two main stages (‘Initiation stage’ and 
‘implementation stage’) that are further divided into sub-stages (see Figure 17).  
 
Figure 17: The organizational oriented model of the innovation process according to Zaltman, 
Duncan and Holbek (1973) 
Zaltman et al. (1973) take the view of an individual adoption unit (i.e. in a business 
unit) and subdivide the innovation process into two stages that are named ‘initiation’ 
and ‘implementation’. The initiation is the point where either a new idea has become 
approved by the stake-holders in a company and/or the decision has been made to 
implement a new idea. Following that, the implementation stage compromises the 
actual mechanics of managing the changes that innovation may imply (Zaltman et al., 
1973).  
The first sub-stage in the model is the ‘Knowledge-awareness sub-stage’. The authors 
see the knowledge of the innovation as a crucial first sub-stage in the initiation stage. 
The unit of adoption (i.e. the employees of a business as potential adopters) must be 
aware that the innovation exists and that there is an opportunity to exploit the new 
idea in the organization. This can be triggered by the company searching for ways to 
improve its business and then discovering a new idea (pull) or by getting to know a 
new idea and identifying it as a potential new business (push). The second sub-stage 
in the model is the ‘formation of attitudes toward the innovation’. It comprises the 
openness to the innovation and the potential of the innovation. The third sub-stage is 
the ‘decision sub-stage’ where the information concerning the potential innovation is 
evaluated. At this point the organization needs to process a good amount of 
information and have effective channels of communication (Zaltman et al., 1973). If 
the relevant decision makers are then favorable to the new idea and motivated to 
innovate, the idea will proceed into the implementation stage.  
I. Initiation stage
1. Knowledge-awareness substage
2. Formation of attitudes toward the innovation substage
3. Decision substage
II. Implementation stage
1. Initial implementation substage
2. Continued-sustained implementation substage
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This implementation stage is divided by Zaltman et al. (1973) into two sub-stages. 
The first of these is the ‘initial implementation sub-stage’, where the first trial of the 
particular innovation is made. The second sub-stage is the ‘continued-sustained 
implementation sub-stage’, where the innovation is rolled-out if the trials were 
perceived as successful. However, the authors acknowledge that a multitude of 
possible strategies and sequences exist in the implementation stage (Zaltman et al., 
1973).  
Overall one can say that the model of Zaltman et al. (1973) takes the view of how 
innovations are processed in organizations and focuses less on special new product 
developments. 
2.2.1.4 An innovation activity focused stage-gate model 
Another time sequenced classification of the innovation process is presented by 
Ulrich and Eppinger (2000), who have segmented the product innovation process into 
six different phases. It can be seen as an ‘innovation activity focused’ classification 
concept of innovation and is shown in Figure 18. 
 
Figure 18: Ulrich and Eppinger’s (2000) different phases and main activities of a product 
development process 
The research for this thesis is focusing on the stages 0 to parts of 1. The initial phase 
(planning) starts with strategy formulation and assessments of technology 
developments and market aims. The following phase (concept development) deals 
with the identification of needs of the target market. In this phase different product 
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product development idea stated in meaningful consumer terms (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2008). Concept development is followed by concept testing. Concept 
testing is the evaluation of new product concepts with a group of target consumers to 
find out if the concepts have strong consumer appeal (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). 
The fourth stage in the process model is marketing strategy development. The purpose 
of this stage is to design an initial marketing strategy for a new product based on the 
product concept (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). Part of marketing strategy 
development is a marketing strategy statement. In their view the marketing strategy 
statement consists of three parts. The first part describes the target market, the 
planned production positioning, and the sales, market share and profit goals for the 
first few years. The second part outlines the product’s planned price, distribution and 
marking budget for the first year. The third part describes the planned long-run sales, 
profit goals and marketing mix strategy (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). 
The fifth stage is business analysis. It is a review of the sales, costs and profit 
projections for a new product development idea to find out whether these factors 
satisfy the company’s objectives (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). Only if these criteria 
are satisfactory, can the new product development idea move to the next stage. 
The sixth stage is the product development stage. The aim of this stage is to develop 
the product concept into a physical product in order to ensure that the product idea 
can be turned into a workable product (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). In their view, 
R&D or engineering develops the product concept into a physical product.  
After the product development stage are the test marketing and commercialization 
stages. Test marketing is the stage in which the product and marketing program are 
tested in more realistic market settings. Finally, the commercialization is the stage in 
which a new product is introduced into the market (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). 
2.2.1.6 Summing up on different stage-gate views 
Many companies use stage-gate process models that are a sequence of steps with in-
between assessments (Cooper, 2009). However, there is a multitude of models 
proposed in literature. 
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Figure 20: Overview of stage-gate models 
Figure 20 shows an overview of the different stage-gate models described above. The 
model proposed by Zaltman et al. (1973) is distinct to the others, as it focuses on 
organizational adoption of innovation, while the other models focus on the movement 
of new product development ideas through a series of stages.  
In the respect of clarifying the different decision making gates of the innovation 
process, the overview articulated by Cooper (1990) is well suited to structure this 
research. It provides the flexibility and utility of a flexible shell that fits best to the 
analysis. 
2.2.2 The funnel view  
The innovation process can also be seen as a sequential reduction of options. Over 
time, more and more new product development ideas get screened out and stopped. In 
the funnel view the new product development process starts with a multitude of 
possible concepts and step-by-step condenses this multitude down to one or few 
specific new product developments (Srinivasan et al. 1997; Slack and Lewis, 2008). 
This subsection reviews literature that focuses on this notion. 
2.2.2.1 The generic funnel view 
Many ideas are sorted out during the innovation process. It has been claimed that it 
takes about 3000 raw ideas in the initial stage to come up with one commercially 
successful product (Stevens and Burley, 1997). 
Authors Focus Characteristic
Cooper (1990) General • Universal approach
• Focus on gates as a regular review mechanism
• Different innovation phases are clear cut
Vinkemeier & von 
Franz (2007)
Strategy • Starts with the definition of the strategy
• Strategy is the basis and guideline of innovation 
Zaltman, Duncan 
& Holbek (1973) 
Organization • Focus on organizational adoption 
• Two main stages: Initiation and implementation
• View of how innovations are processed in organizations 
Ulrich & Eppinger
(2000)
Innovation 
activity
• Product development as a systematic project execution
• Focus on tasks in different stages
Kotler& 
Armstrong (2008) 
Marketing • Focus on consumer
• Creativity as a base and marketing as main selecting criteria
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Figure 21: Many ideas are needed for one successful development according to Stevens and 
Burley (1997) 
Figure 21 shows a general pattern for the several screening stages an idea goes 
through, independent on the analyzed product type. In a self-screening process R&D 
employees pick ideas, interesting and potentially feasible in their eyes, to do some 
simple experiments or discuss them with management. Through that the amount is 
reduced to 300 followed-up ideas according to Stevens and Burley (1997). Less than 
half of these are then leading to small projects which might result in a patent filing. 
Subsequently only nine of these lead to larger projects and only the half of that are 
enlarged to major development efforts. After that only 1,7 of the original ideas are 
commercially launched and on average only 59% of these ideas turn out to be 
successful (Stevens and Burley, 1997). So even if the number of raw ideas needed to 
get one product successfully launched might be lower in some industries, the 
demonstration still shows that many suggestions are needed for a successful 
innovation (see Figure 21). 
 
Figure 22: The development funnel preferred by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) 
Another generic funnel with several phases is described by Wheelwright and Clark 
(1992). In the front-end, the new product idea generation and the concept 
development is taking place. In the following phase, the proposed project is detailed 
3000 original ideas
300 ideas after first screen
<150 lead to actual small projects
9 lead to initial development projects
4 get larger development projects
1,7 get launched on the market
1 gets a successful idea
Screen 1
Screen 2
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and the required knowledge is identified and acquired. The screen positioned between 
them has two major functions; to check for completeness and to identify similar ideas 
that can be grouped together, but not to make go/no-go decisions. The reviews of 
screen one are done at consistant time intervals and preferably by a mid-level group of 
managers. The point where go/no-go decisions are made is screen two. At this point, 
senior management steps in, evaluates the possible product development options and 
selects the ideas that should be pursued further in new product development projects. 
Wheelwright and Clark (1992, p. 111) define the operation logic of the development 
funnel as follows:  
“A variety of different product and process ideas enter the funnel for 
investigation, but only a fraction become part of a full-fledged development 
project. Those that do, are examined carefully before entering the narrow 
neck of the funnel, where significant resources are expended in transforming 
them into a commercial product and/or process.”  
Figure 22 shows a development funnel that is seen as optimal by Wheelwright and 
Clark (1992).  
2.2.2.2 Specific funnels found in practice 
The model shown in Figure 22 has developed out of the two funnel approaches found 
in reality by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) (shown in Figure 23). 
 
Figure 23: Two funnel types found in industry by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) 
These two innovation funnel types are on the one hand what Wheelwright and Clark 
(1992) call a ‘survival of the fittest’ approach (left hand side in Figure 23) and on the 
‘Survival of the fittest’ ‘Few big bets’
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other hand a ‘few big bets’ approach that bets on a single or few projects (right hand 
side in Figure 23).  
According to Wheelwright and Clark (1992) the first one is found in R&D driven 
companies and they characterize it as a grass roots or bubble up approach. The 
essence of the survival of the fittest approach is that of hundreds of good ideas, only 
quite a small number ever become successful products. Firstly, carrying a new 
product development idea all the way from research through to market introduction is 
very expensive. Secondly, a company can generate a lot more ideas than it could ever 
sustain financially until market launch and could ever be absorbed by the market 
place. Thus at each screen the new product development ideas are reviewed 
systematically, based on current information and knowledge. Consequently, only the 
most promising ideas are approved for the next phases where additional effort will be 
invested to prepare these ideas for the next screen and to develop them further for 
eventual market introduction (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
On the contrary, the second funnel type is usually found in smaller companies or 
entrepreneurial start-ups and they characterize it as a top down model. The few big 
bets funnel type stands for taking an idea and backing it all the way to successful 
product introduction. While entrepreneurial start-ups use this funnel approach to bring 
a new product quite fast to the market, mature firms take more time than their smaller 
counterparts (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
2.2.2.3 Further considerations from literature 
The funnel approach is also a crucial part of the stage-gate model. Unprofitable new 
product development ideas really need to get killed during the gate evaluations; 
otherwise the funnel becomes a tunnel (Cooper, 1996).  
Yet, screened out new product development ideas do not need to be unprofitable or 
lacking in value proposition to leave the funnel. Sometimes they just do not fit the 
company. In that case, promising new product development ideas can be externalized 
in corporate ventures (Gemünden and Littkemann, 2007). 
Furthermore, also sub-stages can look like a funnel by itself. E.g. the continuous 
design freeze can be displayed like a funnel. In that case, it is not new product 
development ideas that are selected or discarded, but for one idea, design degrees of 
freedom are reduced by freezing product aspects (Mascitelli, 2002). 
2.2.3 Screening of new product development ideas  
Many companies have to continually evaluate and select ideas aimed at expansion and 
diversification of the product line, ranging from minor changes to the introduction of 
an entirely new product (Hart, 1966; De Brentani and Droege, 1988). The above 
described funnel shape results from screening and reducing the amount of new 
product development ideas. Well-executed screening of new product development 
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ideas is one of the most important factors for successful innovations (Dwyer and 
Mellor, 1991; Mishra et al. 1996).  
2.2.3.1 Concept 
In business, most new development projects have an initial screening. E.g. Cooper 
and Kleinschmidt (1986) found initial screening in 90% of the studied 252 new 
product development projects. Yet, it was rated as the weakest activity and the one 
most greatly in need of improvement in that study.  
Companies with high new product performance undertake more idea generation and 
idea screening than their lower performing competitors (Barczak, 1995). Also Dwyer 
and Mellor (1991) found that initial screening contributed to a higher new product 
development performance regarding both profitability and sales in the studied 95 new 
product development projects in Australia. 
The preliminary assessment can vary extremely in practice. Academics have found 
that it often takes only several days (Bösch, 2008). Yet in other cases the preliminary 
assessment can take years (Nixon, 1998). 
Stevens and Burley (1997) analyzed and documented, amongst other things, the time 
spent on the screening process of venture capitalists. They found out that raw ideas of 
inventors are given only around 20 minutes of consideration each in the first 
evaluation. Only if they pass this first evaluation they are considered longer (around 4 
hours). In the next step the ideas are looked at further with an analysis of the market 
need, business plan and management team checks. If an idea also survives that gate, 
further in-depth analyses are made before the venture capitalists submit an offer. 
Unfortunately, Stevens and Burley (1997) do not describe the tool use of the analysis 
process of these venture capitalists in their case study of 10 major venturing 
companies.  
During innovations, top management faces high uncertainties related to position, 
continuation and stop of development projects (Jens, 1999). One general question at 
the first gate is whether it is uniquely the evaluating company that could succeed with 
this new product development idea (Bösch, 2008). Also, strategic alignment and 
availability of necessary competences is often checked at the first gate (Bösch, 2008). 
Screening should be like a quality control check at the gates, but that was found only 
at one third of the studied companies (Cooper, 2009).  
The earlier an ineffective new product development idea can be eliminated, the more 
resources can be saved (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972). Thus Schmitt-Grohe (1972) indicates a 
two gate approach of screening ideas in pre-development. The first gate is a coarse 
screen of new product development ideas to eliminate ineffective new product 
development idea as soon as possible. The second gate is an economical analysis that 
should select the most promising ones from the remaining new product development 
ideas.  
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When go/no-go decisions for individual new product development ideas are made, 
innovation portfolio considerations also often play a significant role (Bösch, 2008). 
Screening of new product development ideas is often done by steering groups (Bösch, 
2008) or top management (Cooper, 1990). 
Furthermore, the completeness degree of new product development ideas is varying. 
Through this the information also becomes more complete and may even change 
through new knowledge (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972; Voigt and Sturm, 2001; Bösch, 2008). 
This notion of innovation as information acquisition process is picked up in 
subsection 2.2.4 further down. The completeness variation depends, besides other 
things, on the stage in which a new product development idea is and on its degree of 
newness. Thus one challenge in industry practice is that recently suggested, 
undeveloped and rudimental ideas are compared to very tangible, further developed 
ideas. This has to be kept in mind and the analysis process has to be adapted (Bösch, 
2008). 
According to Schmitt-Grohe (1972) the top management has to make the final go 
decision for the development start. He sees the development as costly and killing new 
product development ideas after development should be avoided as it wastes precious 
resources.  
2.2.3.2 Screening criteria 
When screening new product development ideas, evaluation may range from 
qualitative (e.g. use of judgment, intuition or hunch) to quantitative (e.g. rate of 
return, net present value or payback time) (Hart, 1966). Yet, in practice the rating on 
new product development ideas is a rather ambiguous process. Sometimes not enough 
information is available if too much detailed criteria have been used for screening 
ideas in the early pre-development phases (De Brentani and Droege, 1988; Bösch, 
2008). Yet, using only few criteria has the danger to skip and miss essential 
information (Bösch, 2008). Thus Bösch (2008) recommends having several criteria 
categories with increasing depths. All of these categories are always checked, but the 
detailing of investigation per category increases for each gate. 
Gate 1 is what Cooper describes a “gentle screen” (Cooper, 1990). The newly 
proposed idea is checked against a few key criteria that either have to be met or 
should be met to indicate or weigh the attractiveness of the idea.  
“These criteria deal with strategic alignment, project feasibility, magnitude of 
the opportunity, differential advantage, synergy with the firm’s core business 
and resources, and market attractiveness” (Cooper, 1990).  
However, in his opinion, financial and cost criteria are not part of this first screen. In 
the view of Schmitt-Grohe (1972) the first screen is low on information. Depending 
on the newness, quantitative information (e.g. production costs or sales figures) and 
qualitative information (e.g. usability of production know-how) are usually not 
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available before development start or the efforts would be too high to build up this 
information. Thus he recommends having this screen based on expert opinion. The 
recommended tools for this screening are checklists and score-cards (Schmitt-Grohe, 
1972). The checked characteristics should be hygiene factors. These are minimum 
requirements that have to be fulfilled at least. It is possible to handle these 
characteristics in a qualitative, quantitative or semi-quantitative way. According to 
Bösch (2008) the semi-quantitative way is on the rise in industry practice. These are 
then done with scoring models where qualitative declarations are translated to values. 
These values are then added to get an overall score to rate different new product 
development ideas (Bösch, 2008). 
According to Cooper (1990) the screen in gate 2 is very similar to the one of gate 1. 
The idea is reevaluated with the help of the additional information gained since its last 
check. Compared to the first check, Cooper sees new evaluation criteria around 
marketing and financial issues. It is the first time that the financial return is 
considered according to Cooper (1990). This is done only quickly with the help of 
simple financial calculations. However, through this financial evaluation costs are 
also implicitly estimated. A multitude of information about the new product 
development ideas has to be available as a base for the second gate evaluation. Thus 
product concepts have to be completed in the view of Schmitt-Grohe (1972). He gives 
a recommendation how to structure the examination and selection of new product 
development ideas. For incremental innovations he sees the lead at marketing. New 
products are then developed, followed and integrated with the existing products. 
However, if innovations are more radical, a cross-functional team should carry out the 
first coarse selection and the economic analysis and the selection committee should be 
formed out of experienced employees (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972). 
Carbonell et al. (2004) studied the correlation between new product development 
success and screening criteria. They also distinguished between incremental and 
radical innovations. They found that the importance of different criteria can vary from 
gate to gate of every stage in the new product development process. They state that 
strategic fit dimensions are the vital screening criteria in the first screening. 
Furthermore, they found that market opportunity criteria related positively with the 
initial screening in pre-development. They further found that at the rear pre-
development, in front of the go-to-development gate, technical criteria screening 
significantly correlated with new product development success (Carbonell et al., 
2004).  
Yet, evaluation numbers of possible new product development can be part of strategic 
controversy and political debate in companies (Pavitt, 1990). Abandoning an ongoing 
new product development project may also be complicated, as companies fear to lose 
customers and demotivate employees (Varila and Sievanen, 2005). 
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2.2.3.3 Cost analysis  
Some new product development ideas comprise future product costs (as one quality 
parameter) that do not correspond to the market need or customer value. The 
controlling effort in new product development funnels is to screen out these projects 
(Voigt and Sturm, 2001).  
The second gate proposed by Schmitt-Grohe (1972) is an economical analysis. He 
sees it as the finer sieve that works as a filter to separate the most promising of the 
already pre-screened new product development ideas. In that stage predictions 
regarding income and expenditure are to be made. During that analysis he also looks 
at the future costs of the new product development ideas. However, he points out that 
in his view estimating the future product costs has often to be postponed until 
technical development is underway, especially for radical innovations.  
Financial analysis is an “important part” (Cooper, 1990, p. 53) in the screening of gate 
3 before development begins. It is based on market research, competitive analysis and 
concept testing of the stage before. 
One approach to screening ideas can also be to evaluate them in an innovation 
portfolio. In this approach, only the most promising ideas are selected (Bösch, 2008). 
Yet, Bösch (2008) does not describe cost analysis on its own as being a selection 
criterion. However, cost analysis can play a part for estimating the value to customer 
and the net present value of new product development ideas (Bösch, 2008). 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1986) studied 252 new product development projects in 
Canada. Overall, nearly two thirds of the studied companies conducted a business or 
financial analysis before moving into product development. They also found that in 
nearly a third of the cases cost and sales forecast were done before product 
development start. 
2.2.3.4 Investment theory as a base for screening 
Innovations are investments (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; Hauber and Schmid, 1999; 
Varila and Sievanen, 2005; Gemünden and Littkemann, 2007). At their start, they are 
connected with significant expenditures and risk. These investments are done in 
anticipation of future income. However, the time horizon for this future income is 
usually quite large. Thus product cost analysis during pre-development can also be 
seen as a problem of larger up-front investments for financial return under uncertainty 
(Schmitt-Grohe, 1972; Lindermeir, 1988; Bösch, 2008).  
Innovation, like other business matters, is often a trade-off between some kind of risk 
and a connected possible return. Schneider and Miccolis (1998, p. 10) describe it as 
such:  
“In a sense, the uncertainty and possibility of harm is the price we pay for a 
reward.” 
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Shareholder value is created when the return exceeds the costs, including risk, and the 
higher the achieved return per taken risk the more an investment is worth. This 
translates to higher stock prices of stock listed companies, as investors will pay a 
premium for a company that manages uncertainty more effective than others 
(Schneider and Miccolis, 1998). Thus sophisticated, but efficient management of 
innovations is important to the success of companies. 
Investment in R&D and technology development is expected to be repaid in the future 
with sales from the new products; while cost, quality and cycle time efficiencies from 
improved processes (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). Schmitt-Grohe (1972) suggests 
using the internal rate of return for the detailed analysis of new product development 
ideas. Similar Bösch (2008) advocates to use the net present value to rate new 
development ideas in innovation project portfolios. Lindermeir (1988) uses the 
concept of innovation as investment for a quantifying valuation of innovations. 
However, she looks only at cash flows for this valuation, not at product cost and cost 
levels.  
The company Schindler, a producer of lifts and stairways, is using a figure-of-merit 
evaluation at the gate before product development kick-off (Gassmann and Kobe, 
1999). This figure-of-merit is an estimate of the ratio of future discounted income 
relative to the future discounted expenses. Together with this figure-of-merit, net-
present-value, depreciation time, and risk are also taken into consideration. 
The notion of innovation as investment can be enlarged to see it as a continuum of 
small sequential investments. Success is constantly evaluated and projects can be 
stopped if they seen to be unsuccessful. This notion also connects the idea of real 
options and the stage-gate model (Varila and Sievanen, 2005). At each gate the 
different new product development ideas are screened and a decision regarding 
continuing or not is made. This can be modeled with the real option approach. 
However, incremental investment appraisal systems can undermine the ability to 
exploit innovations in a timely fashion (Baldwin, 1991). Companies do invest in 
R&D, but without using investment appraisal procedures. These procedures are firstly 
used for investments during the development process, e.g. for new product ideas or 
investments related to innovation. Thus investment appraisal tools can lead to the 
situation that a company will consistently postpone introductions. This is the case if a 
newly developed product would cannibalize existing products with high cash flows 
(Baldwin, 1991). 
2.2.4 Uncertainty and information acquisition  
Usually high uncertainties are attached to innovations, especially to radical ones 
(Deszca et al., 1999; Shenhar and Dvir, 1996). Innovations often do not have a 
predecessor and have a singularity that is higher than for e.g. investments in new 
production equipment (Lindermeir, 1988). The earlier during innovation the analysis 
of new product development ideas is done, the more data is based on assumptions and 
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estimations. Thus a critical factor of success is to minimize risks (Schindler, 1999). 
Also, especially in radical innovations, market uncertainty will be carried over to the 
technical side and increase complexity and uncertainty for technical new product 
developments (Lindemann, 2008). This uncertainty is reduced through an ongoing 
information acquisition. The rest of this subsection focuses on this information 
acquisition view. 
The innovation process can also be seen a process of ongoing information acquisition 
(Hafkesbrink, 1986; Srinivasan et al., 1997; Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). An 
innovation might start with a conceptual statement of needs, which are then translated 
to specific object specifications like shape, material, and production processes to be 
used. Thus the process starts with a high uncertainty and many unknown parameters, 
which are then clarified and determined during the development process (Srinivasan 
et al. 1997). A large part of the information acquisition occurs during pre-
development (Moenaert et al., 1995). 
Moenaert et al., (1995, p. 249) found that “successful projects have reduced, on 
average, as much uncertainty during the planning stage, as the unsuccessful projects 
have during the complete innovation cycle.” Also Lynn et al. (1999) found a positive 
correlation between information acquisition and new product development success. 
Regular reviewing meetings are an effective way to share information and help 
overall information acquisition during innovation (Lynn et al., 1999). 
2.3 Pre-development phases, its character and success  
There is a large diversity of understanding and definitions about pre-development in 
literature. This section looks closer at the notion of pre-development. Firstly, time 
frames are defined for this thesis. Furthermore, specialties of the pre-development 
compared to other innovation phases are cited from literature. And finally, success 
factors stated in literature that are special to pre-development are noted. 
2.3.1 Time classification and scope 
Pre-development are the phases that lie before the actual development start of a 
specific innovation. This thesis follows the definition of Griffin (1997, p. 28) that 
development “starts with the first spending of research and development money 
on physically developing the product” through design and engineering. 
Literature about pre-development is divers about its time-wise classification. Thus in 
the following, the different stages and phases in pre-development are presented from 
selected authors to clarify this time-wise classification in this work. 
2.3.1.1 Basic and applied research  
Some innovation models start with basic research (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; 
Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). Today many concept understandings and definitions 
of basic research exist between scientists. Basic research is often used to refer to 
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research that is aiming at acquiring new knowledge rather than more practical aims 
(Calvert, 2006).  
Basic research uses science to generate new knowledge that may or may not be 
applicable in later new product development projects (Calvert, 2006; Wheelwright 
and Clark, 1992). Zellner (2003) found that what ‘basic research’ definitions have in 
common is that they rely on some notion that the search activity is kept isolated from 
immediate commercial considerations and is usually independent of new product 
development ideas.  
Applied research on the contrary uses specific methodological knowledge about 
experimental procedures and research techniques to gain specific propositional 
knowledge from current research and is less broad than basic research (Zellner, 2003). 
Basic and applied research should be effective and several evaluation ratios and 
metrics do exist (Werner and Souder, 1997). However, it is important to notice that 
these metrics focus on cost budgets, which are left aside here as this thesis studies 
product cost analysis. 
2.3.1.2 The front end of innovation  
Koen et al. (2001) define the front end of innovation – quite largely – as the activities 
that come before the formal and well-structured new product and process 
development process. Similarly, Kim and Wilemon (2002) see the front end as the 
period between initial opportunity consideration and when an idea enters the formal 
development process.  
Yet, this thesis follows the notion from literature that the front end is the first stage in 
which an idea is born (e.g. Cooper, 1990). Alternatively it also called Stage 0 or 
concept generation (e.g. Griffin, 1997). To state a precise start of this stage for this 
research, this thesis follows the definition of Griffin (1997) that the front end of 
innovation starts when the idea for the product first surfaces. Thus, the front end 
of innovation is the first stage of a development effort that focuses on a specific new 
development idea with the aim to launch this idea successfully in the market.  
Koen et al. (2001) claim that there is hardly any concise understanding about the 
processes happening in their companies in the front end. Thus the front end of 
innovation is sometimes also referred as fuzzy front end (e.g. Kim and Wilemon, 
2002).  
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While idea generation is often done by scientists or technical people, it can also be the 
result of other activities according to Cooper (2006), such as: 
• Strategic planning,  
• Technology forecasting and roadmapping,  
• Brainstorming or other creativity secessions,  
• Scenario generation about future technological and market possibilities,  
• Customer visits and feedback, or  
• Company internal idea suggestion programs. 
 
Figure 25: Model with systems view according to Khurana and Rosenthal (1997) 
Another model of the new product development front end is presented by Khurana 
and Rosenthal (1997) and shown in Figure 25. Khurana and Rosenthal (1997) stress 
that not only the activities in the different phases are important to be understood; It is 
as essential to comprehend the interrelationships between them. In their view product 
strategy and portfolio plans should drive the entire new product development efforts. 
Furthermore the capabilities and competencies of the organization with its inherent 
assumptions about roles, communications, and culture provide the framework for the 
new product development. The front end itself is then subdivided in three phases. Pre-
phase zero contains the semiformal recognition of a new product development 
opportunity. Phase zero is about the shaping of product concept and definition by a 
small group that can also include suppliers. Next, in phase one, the company assesses 
the business and technical feasibility, confirms the product definition and plans the 
further project activities (Khurana and Rosenthal, 1997). 
2.3.1.3 Idea evaluation and planning  
If an idea passes this first screen, it enters the first stage. Stage 1 incorporates a 
preliminary market assessment and its rough technical feasibility. In order to find out 
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the potential of the idea, its total available market and its likely market acceptance, 
several rather inexpensive research activities are undertaken (Cooper, 1990). This 
stage can be named project evaluation stage (Griffin, 1997), concept level phase 
(Srinivasan et al., 1997), preliminary assessment (Cooper, 1990), and concept 
development phase (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000). Griffin (1997, p. 28) states that 
project evaluation “starts when the product strategy and target market have been 
approved and the project has been given a ‘go’ to develop specifications.” 
Once this information is gathered, an idea is submitted to the check within the next 
screen – gate 2 – in Coopers (1990) model. If the new product development idea 
passes that gate, stage 2 is entered (Cooper, 1990). Stage 2 is the detailed 
investigation of the business case before larger investments in the (next) development 
phase are made. The idea definitions have to be narrowed down to give a clear picture 
and to ease the further evaluation of the idea on its market potential and feasibility. 
Market research, competitive analysis and concept testing are part of this stage before 
the check of gate 3 (Cooper, 1990). 
 
Figure 26: Pre-development sub-tasks according to Ulrich and Eppinger’s (2000)  
The model of Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) is shown in Figure 26. It shows different 
tasks that are usually performed between the planning and the system-level design 
stage in the model of Ulrich and Eppinger (2000). These are the stages that Ulrich and 
Eppinger (2000) call together with the preceding planning phase the front end. The 
first two tasks are the identification of customer needs and the establishment of target 
specifications. Yet, the other activities fall already in the development stage according 
to the definition of this work, as they already do physically develop the product. 
2.3.1.4 Development begin  
Development begin is the second boundary for this work. There the actual develop-
ment of the product starts (Cooper, 1990). The aim of this stage is to develop product 
concepts into effective and practical physical products (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). 
Development is a sequence of steps or activities that a company uses to envision, 
design, and commercialize a product (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000). It starts when a 
company starts physically developing a new product development idea (Griffin, 
1997). That is one reason why the development stage sees large rises in expenditures 
(Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1993; Kotler and Armstrong, 2008).  
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In the development stage, study and research results are implemented into design and 
engineering to achieve the intended functions of the new product development idea 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). The development 
process transforms ideas and concepts through detailed design and engineering, then 
tests and refines them and finally launches them commercially (Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992; Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). Many steps and activities in development 
are intellectual and organizational rather than physical (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000).  
Yet, generally describing the way in which companies develop products is 
problematic because different companies will adopt different processes (Slack and 
Lewis, 2008). The above described are some general traits. However, as the 
development stage is not in the focus of this thesis, readers that want a more detailed 
description about design and engineering in the development stage and later are 
referred to literature of that area. 
2.3.1.5 Summing up on pre-development phases 
As already pointed out before, this thesis looks at the activities before actual 
development start of a specific innovation. Yet, this time is actually separated 
differently in literature; often depending on the disciplinary and research background 
of the author. 
 
Figure 27: Overview of different pre-development notions found in literature 
Term Authors Definition Similar to Cooper (1990)
Discovery Cooper (2009)
“Discovery of new product ideas and opportunities 
through Fundamental research and technology 
development, voice-of-customer methods, 
strategically driven ideation, stimulating company 
internal ideation, and Open innovation”
Stage 0
Concept 
generation Griffin (1997)
“Phase of product strategy and target market 
definition between idea discovery and gate to 
develop specifications”
Stage 0
Front end of 
innovation
Koen et al.
(2001)
“Activities that take place prior to the formal, well-
structured New product and Process Development 
or Stage-Gate process”
Stages 0(-2)
Fuzzy front 
end
Kim and 
Wilemon (2002)
“Period between initial opportunity consideration 
and when an idea is judged ready for development” Stage 0-2
Preliminary 
assessment Cooper (1990)
“Gathering of market and technical information at 
low cost and in a short time for a more thoroughly 
reevaluation of idea at Gate 2”
= Stage 1
Planning
Ulrich & 
Eppinger 
(2000)
“Activities starting from strategy with assessment of 
technology and market objectives, specifying target 
market, business goals, key assumptions and 
constraints”
Stage 0-1
Project 
evaluation Griffin (1997)
“Phase from go for product strategy and target 
market until start of physical development of 
product”
Stage 1-2
Detailed 
investigation Cooper (1990)
“Verification of attractivenessand product definition 
based on market research, concept testing and 
competitive analysis”
= Stage 2
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Figure 27 compares the different pre-development notions and terms used of several 
authors. For comparison, these notions are all set into relation to the stage-gate model 
of Cooper (1990) shown in Figure 15 on page 26. One can see that Koen et al. (2001) 
and Kim and Wilemon (2002) use the term front end nearly synonymously for the 
whole pre-development. Yet, Griffin (1997) and Cooper (1990) separate pre-
development in different stages. The model of Cooper (1990) is the finest cut, as it 
has the largest amount of stages in pre-development. Due to that fact and due to its 
popularity in business, the model of Cooper (1990) is used further on in this thesis. 
2.3.2 Characteristics of pre-development  
Srinivasan et al., (1997) note that quantitative manufacturing analyses are less well-
developed in pre-development than at the detailed design level. Thus rather qualitative 
techniques are used to support pre-development. In their view the models used in pre-
development are relatively non-quantitative because there is a multitude of paths to 
product concepts with specific features under study. 
Because of its decision freedom, the front end gives one of the greatest opportunities 
to improve the overall innovation effectiveness. However, the flip side is that 
uncertainties are higher. The time span spent on the front end might be very small for 
some products, but larger for others (Kim and Wilemon, 2002). 
It is in the front end where companies formulate a concept of the product to be 
developed and decide on whether or not to invest resources in the further development 
of an idea. It is the phase between first considerations of an opportunity and when it is 
judged ready to enter the structured development process (Kim and Wilemon, 2002).  
According to Koen et al. (2001) there are clear differences between pre-development 
and the development process itself. The work in pre-development is more 
experimental, unplanned and can be more chaotic than during later innovation phases, 
which are more structured, controlled and goal-oriented. The uncertainties are higher 
and the date of commercialization of results is also vaguer in pre-development than in 
later phases. Seldom is the front end a process of purely sequential steps, completing 
each activity before beginning the next. In practice, activities may be overlapping and 
iterating in the front-end, as new information may become available over time (Ulrich 
and Eppinger, 2000). Thus the main differences between pre-development and later 
innovation phase characteristics are that the pre-development is less structured, more 
iterative, less formalized and might span over a long time until an idea is processed 
further (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000; Koen et al., 2001; Kim and Wilemon, 2002).  
2.3.3 Success factors in pre-development  
Cooper (1990) and Dwyer and Mellor (1991) found several factors that contributed to 
a higher new product development performance regarding both profitability and sales. 
The contributing factors rooted in pre-development are:  
• Initial screening 
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• Preliminary market assessment  
• Preliminary technology assessment 
Additionally, Cooper (1990) linked the quality of the execution of pre-development 
activities with a new product development success. Besides the above mentioned 
points he added the following activities to also be factors contributing to a higher new 
product development performance:  
• Detailed market study / marketing research 
• Business / financial analysis 
The combination of R&D and marketing activities in pre-development is necessary 
for success in innovation projects (Moenaert et. al., 1995). In the pre-development 
phase the attention shifts from technology development towards the customer need 
(Voigt and Sturm, 2001). With this shift the customer needs should be translated into 
technical functionality. This can be done e.g. with conjoint-analysis, functional 
analysis and / or Quality Function Deployment. 
Kim and Wilemon (2002) suggest several tactics how to manage the pre-development 
effectively. Some tactics are obvious, like to involve customers and suppliers, while 
others might be more subtle. As very many ideas are turned down during the front-
end, a positive and motivational frame of mind and rewards have to dominate to mild 
disappointments, acknowledge and support. It might also help to appoint a 
knowledgeable individual (or team) as leader in pre-development. Furthermore it is 
very important to put up the right screening methods – not too soft and not too rigid. 
The first will lead to too few projects being killed and resources wasted, the latter will 
lead to too many ideas being rejected. The screening criteria often have to be varied 
from case to case (Kim and Wilemon, 2002). Additionally, different variations of an 
idea should be considered. These should then compete until the best product concept 
crystallizes. Finally it is also important to provide information systems and build up 
databases that allow R&D personnel to promptly check data on technologies, markets, 
other development projects and competitors. 
According to Cooper et al. (1998) a good requirement capture is needed for successful 
innovations. This requirement capture starts in the front-end and continues during pre-
development. This is a method of translating information and ideas into design briefs 
and specifications in the front end of innovation. It is essential if a company wants to 
capitalize on market-generated impulses for innovations. They give three steps during 
requirement capture: 
1. Information gathering 
2. Information transformation 
3. Requirements generation 
In the information gathering step the impulse from the market side can come from a 
constant monitoring of customer needs and requirements. One way companies are 
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doing this is by using the results of market research agencies as input into the NPD 
process. Or it is employees with market contact that are bringing the information into 
the organization. Unfortunately this information gathering is usually done in an 
unstructured and unsystematic way. This leads to a subjective pre-screening by the 
person bringing the information into the organization, which could lead to a loss of 
opportunities, as chances are not recognized (Cooper et al., 1998). During the 
information transformation step the gathered information is processed and knowledge 
about the market is won. In the third step, the requirement generation, the won market 
insight is translated into one or several requirements, which are then reported. 
However, this is also too often a tacit process, where subjective opinions lead to 
wrong dismissal of data about the market. 
2.4 Innovation and product cost  
Product cost and cost related market issues are one of many contributing factors for 
succeeding with innovation (Mishra et al. 1996; Hax and Majluf, 1982; Hauber and 
Schmid, 1999; Gassmann and Kobe, 1999; Ernst, 2002). Product cost should be 
viewed as an input to innovation, not as an outcome of it (Cooper and Slagmulder, 
1997). This section crosses innovation with one of its success-important characters – 
future product cost.  
2.4.1 Growing cost importance in innovations 
Different innovation generations after the Second World War have been identified in 
economic history by different academic researchers (Rothwell, 1994; Cooper, 1996). 
While Cooper sees three different generations, Rothwell classified the innovation 
types in five generations. The more detailed five generation concept is described here 
in the following. 
 
Figure 28: Summarizing overview of innovation process generations according to Rothwell 
(1994) 
Generation Time frame Competitive environment
Leading 
paradigm
Importance of 
costs
First generation 1950s to mid-1960s
High economic 
growth;
Industrial expansion
Technology push Costs not in the development focus
Second 
generation
Mid-1960s to early-
1970s
Economic growth;
Increase in 
productivity
Market pull Costs not in the development focus
Third generation Early-1970s to mid-1980s
Economic saturation 
and crises;
Higher supply than 
demand
More critical 
innovation process 
with feed-back loops
Strategy on cost 
reduction and cost 
control translates 
also to innovations
Fourth 
generation
Early-1980s to early-
1990s
Economic recovery;
Focus on core 
competences
Integration and 
parallel development
Cost management 
together with time 
and quality focus
Fifth generation Started in the 1990s
Stable but modest 
growth;
Companies operating 
in networks
Incorporating inter-
firm linkages
Cost is an 
important aspect 
and analyzed as 
trade-off to time
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Figure 28 shows the different innovation types in the five generations that are 
classified by Rothwell (1994). In addition the last row presents the interest in cost 
management methods during these generations. 
During the first generation the economic environment was one of large growth 
through industrial expansion, where demand might have even been higher than 
supply. At that time the industrial innovation process is rather linear, starting with a 
scientific discovery that is processed inside of companies and transformed to products 
that are then launched onto the marketplace (Rothwell, 1994). No significant cost 
management was made during the first generation innovation process.  
In the second generation companies were still facing growth, but innovations were 
getting guided by demand side factors, changing to market pull innovations. In the 
second generation the industrial innovation process is still rather linear, but now starts 
with the potential market as a source of ideas (Rothwell, 1994). Also in the second 
generation innovation process, no significant cost management was used.  
During the third generation supply capacity generally surpassed demand. At that 
time the innovation process is still a sequential process, but it now includes feed-back 
loops. It is the earliest generation that significantly incorporated cost management 
issues, as the strategy was focusing more on cost control and cost reduction 
(Rothwell, 1994).  
However, after that – during the fourth generation – the economic environment for 
companies recovered and companies started focusing on core businesses and core 
technologies. At the same time product life cycles got shorter and time based 
innovation strategies became more important. Cost management was connected with 
quality and rapidness of developments (Rothwell, 1994).  
According to Rothwell (1994) the fifth generation innovation process started in the 
1990s with a stable, but modest economic growth. Companies incorporate a balanced 
view on strategic issues, networking, time to market, flexibility and manufacturing 
excellence. Costs are an important aspect, especially as a trade-off between 
development time and costs can be found. This trade-off is usually nonlinear, with 
costs rising over-proportionally when a company wants to accelerate its product 
development (Rothwell, 1994).  
Summarizing, one can say that through the years the environment for innovations has 
changed. After the Second World War the importance of costs has grown as the 
markets have developed from a seller to a buyer market. Hand in hand with that, there 
has been a constant progress towards more market-need conscious innovations – one 
of these market needs being cost competitiveness! 
2.4.2 Cost management 
This section starts on a general outline of cost management before the innovation 
focus is taken up again. 
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2.4.2.1 A brief historical background 
Many cost management models are known for over a hundred years, as they started 
being developed by engineers after the wake of the industrialization (Johnson and 
Kaplan, 1987). However, accounting principles have gained access to, and replaced 
earlier cost management procedures during the middle of the last century according to 
Johnson and Kaplan (1987). The focus was then shifting towards overheads and their 
calculation rather than investigating direct costs and efficiencies of processes and 
procedures. One major problem was the aggregation of cost data. In order to have fast 
and overall fitting financial data, the financial accounting principles aggregate many 
positions that can later not be separated and/or used for the cost/efficiency analysis of 
single processes. 
However, the traditional cost management literature has focused on running processes 
and less on innovations. It has put cost management for innovation in the tray of tools 
to “support special studies” (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987, p. 228). Nevertheless, later 
through the enhanced perception of target costing in the 1990s (in the Western world), 
cost management focusing on innovation processes and new product development has 
gained more attention in literature (see e.g. Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997, or Davila 
and Wouters, 2004). 
2.4.2.2 Cost management in general 
In the industry cost management is often associated with short-sighted cost reduction 
programs, like general budget cuts and personnel reductions. However, the aim of 
cost management is to eliminate costs that bear no longtime potential of success 
(Voigt and Sturm, 2001). Thus especially in the field of innovations, a proactive cost 
management can be fruitful and is to be targeted.  
Cost management focuses on cost reduction, continuous improvement and change and 
can be defined as the “actions by managers to satisfy customers while continuously 
reducing and controlling costs” (Horngren et al., 1994, p. 5). In contrast to that, 
traditional cost control systems “tend to be based on the preservation of the status quo 
and the ways of performing existing activities are not reviewed” (Drury, 2004, p. 
943). As can be seen in the cost management literature (e.g. Dury, 2004; Horngren, 
1994; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998), there are different possibilities to influence costs 
of a product during the product life cycle. The core cost management concepts can be 
grouped into two different sets. The first set is cost management concepts that are 
connected to innovation and new product development activities. On the contrary, the 
second set is cost management concepts that are connected to running operations and 
offerings (e.g. Kaizen costing). As the focus of this thesis lies in the pre-development, 
only the first sets of cost management concepts are taken into consideration here. The 
cost management concepts for optimizing running production are not in the center of 
this work and a discussion of them here lies outside of the focus of this thesis. 
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2.4.2.3 Managerial use of cost information, decision making, and 
innovation  
Through the focus on decision making, management accounting has over time 
increased the attention on how accounting numbers are used and why they are 
demanded (Demski and Kreps, 1982, Horngren et al., 1994).  
Cost management has traditionally a focus on decision making, especially when it 
comes to efficiency related assessments. Traditional textbooks (e.g. Horngren et al., 
1994, Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998, Baum et al., 2004, Drury, 2004) all more or less 
present traditionally several cost management tools as the compendium of that 
discipline and the relevant ones to this research are presented in the following in 
section 2.5.  
According to Kaplan and Atkinson (1998, p. 222) there “are three important 
managerial uses of cost information. To: 
• Understand costs so as to determine whether to make or abandon a product 
and to influence the nature of customer relationships 
• Develop a cost basis for a price (as in cost-based transfer pricing or for a 
contract that calls for a cost-based price) 
• Identify opportunities for, or the need to, improve product or process design 
and process operation”  
Many managers in business argue that they cannot afford more analysis work in pre-
development (Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1986) or that too much is not good 
(Boutellier et al. 1997). Yet, here the same position is taken as from Cooper and 
Kleinschmidt (1986) that a company cannot afford not to commit resources to critical 
activities in pre-development, given the importance of new products, the amount at 
stake and the high likelihood of failure. Fast, light, and valuable tools are needed to 
support innovations (Boutellier et al., 1997; Schindler, 1999). 
2.4.3 Companies, competition and innovation 
This subsection focuses on companies and their competitive environment. It starts 
from a general strategic outset and then shows the importance of product costs for 
innovation.  
2.4.3.1 Strategy, innovation and cost 
Even so, cost management and the origins of its today’s techniques are much older; 
one foundation is rooted in strategic management. Porter (1980) bundled up different 
strategies of how to successfully run a business. He divided the strategic approaches 
into approaches of: 
1. Cost leadership  
2. Differentiation  
3. Specialization 
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Cost leadership is an approach that is based on the notion of the learning curve and a 
steady increase of efficiency to produce goods cheaper than any other market player 
(Porter, 1980; Hax and Majluf, 1982). This cost leadership is then used as a potential 
barrier to keep the competition out of a specific market. However, some empirical 
studies reject the idea of entry barriers into markets through learning curve effects 
(Lieberman, 1987). Yet, competitive costs can be crucial for all industries, not only if 
they compete on cost leadership (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997; Nixon, 1998). 
Schmitt-Grohe (1972) points out that product and industry specific parameters can 
have an impact on the product cost analysis during pre-development. The parameters 
that he points out are: 
1. Amount of new products per year 
2. Degree of technical novelty 
3. Amount of competitors on the market 
4. Effectiveness of advertisement 
Thus company contingencies are also affecting the importance of product cost for 
innovation. 
2.4.3.2 Importance of future product costs  
Nowadays, new product development ideas have to compete on price early in the life-
cycle and the cost of ownership to potential customers can play a vital role (see e.g. 
Nixon, 1998). Future product costs have the highest priority especially for new 
product developments targeting competitive markets. Thus the realization of 
competitive product prices and the attainment of target cost are essential (Boutellier et 
al., 1999). Product cost and price together with functionality and quality are crucial to 
a long time survival of companies (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997).  
Furthermore, cost targets are important. Cost targets can play a vital role for new 
product development ideas even though they are of distinguishing high quality and 
value and thus less part of price competition (Nixon, 1998). There is a need for more 
efficient innovations due to cost pressures on the market (Gupta and Wilemon, 1996; 
Werner and Souder, 1997). The earlier future product costs can be estimated, the 
better, as this information can then be used to manage cost actively (Becker, 1990).  
In times where the new product development process is organized efficiently in 
companies, improvements in the performance in the pre-development phase can be 
vital for the success of companies in today’s market situation (Khurana and 
Rosenthal, 1998). Furthermore, in times of saturated markets, the cost aspect becomes 
more important, as products must be sold cheaper in order to reach new markets, 
which could economically not meet the expenses of the products so far. One possible 
answer to these cost pressures is to design new products cost efficiently and to avoid 
cost-inefficient lock-in decisions during the development stage. Also, the screening of 
new product development ideas should be done before costly procedures are started, 
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as development efforts spend on ideas that are filtered out are otherwise wasted 
(Schmitt-Grohe, 1972).  
2.4.3.3 Cost lock-in during innovation 
One aspect that makes future product costs important in innovation is the lock-in 
effect. As decisions are made during the innovation process, different development 
possibilities are narrowed and also with that the uncertainty about the final structure 
and logic of a new product development. The other side of the coin is that there are 
lock-ins through these decisions if they cannot be reversed (Slack and Lewis, 2008). 
Many costs are designed in and cannot be avoided after the design stage “without 
redesigning the product. […] Consequently, effective cost management programs 
must begin at the start of the design phase of a product’s life cycle” (Cooper and 
Slagmulder, 1997, p. 72).  
 
Figure 29: Relative cost and influence on cost of design according to Boothroyd (1988) 
E.g. Boothroyd (1988) reports that studies at Ford Motors have shown that even 
though only about 5% of total cost of car parts are spent on the design activity itself, it 
determines about 70% of the total product cost of these parts. Others (Blanchard, 
1978; Michaels and Wood, 1989; Schindler, 1999) speak of lock-in effects where 
80% of the final product costs are locked through decisions made in the new product 
development phase and Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) cite even higher percentages 
(90-95%). The setback with lock-in effects is that changes cost a multitude of the cost 
for the initial right development (Voigt and Sturm, 2001). Similarly, the 
successfulness of an innovation depends partly on good concept development, as the 
following quote shows:  
“Once an organization has committed to a future product’s concept, most of 
the potential for change and improvement is gone from the project. If the 
concept is a bad one, if the product is difficult to manufacture or 
inappropriate for the desired user application, the project will run into 
problems – no matter how well integrated the team or how powerful the 
project leader“ (Iansiti, 1998, p. 4).  
Overhead
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Franz (1992) sees the highest degrees of freedom to avoid costs is in a new design if 
no concept is frozen so far. In order to be able to carry out effective cost management 
programs, the right cost information has to be available for decision making. Thus one 
issue where management accounting can help in product development is to reduce 
uncertainty (Davila, 2000) and assist top management in decision making (Gemünden 
and Littkemann, 2007). However, top management might look at innovations after 
lock-ins happened and thereby too late (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
It is important to also show the designers the impact of their decisions on indirect 
costs (Franz, 1992). E.g. the amount of parts used for a new product will also 
influence the costs for sourcing and internal logistics. Yet, there are also critical 
voices against investing too much in the early development phases. Gemünden and 
Littkemann (2007) argue that even though the expenses are low and the cost and value 
efficiency is high, many new product development ideas are stopped before reaching 
the market. Successful innovations also have to bear the costs of the stopped ones. 
Thus it is an optimization problem regarding the optimal resource use in early 
innovation phases. Furthermore, it is a search and selection problem for solutions that 
are especially valuable to be realized (Gemünden and Littkemann, 2007). 
2.4.3.4 Technology selection  
A new product development idea might be realized through the use of different 
alternative technologies. The right technology selection can have a large impact on 
new product development cost optimization (Voigt and Sturm, 2001). The need for 
cost analysis methods and accurate cost data of new and emerging technologies is not 
new. Already 20 years ago, Laughlin (1989, p. K.2.1) stated that:  
“Both government and industry perceive a lack of cost data and estimating 
methodologies to handle new and emerging technologies and acquisition 
strategies [… and that the…] scope and complexity of modern technology 
complicates the preparation of assigned analytical studies”.  
Through factors such as future production costs, technology selections influence 
potential profitability and marketing, as the example of Lorenz (2008, p. 10) shows: 
“[…] the choice of packaging compounds and sterilization technologies 
influences the products’ profitability and the optimal sales approach. […] 
Persons involved in product development and design regularly report that 
such cross-functional interdependencies and uncertainties cause enormous 
difficulties. Managers claim that there is only little structural support to 
handle these crucial but complex issues in the design process for market and 
technology innovations.” 
Some companies work with corporate-level technology plans. These technology plans 
help linking strategy and new product development (Albright and Kappel, 2003).  
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Voigt and Sturm (2001) distinguish between technology development, pre-
development and development. For the technology development they see a need for a 
filtering innovation and technology approach. This approach should include 
environment scanning and analysis and lead to a focusing of strategic opportunities.  
The company Hilti uses a portfolio approach to compare its technologies under 
development against the technological possibilities of the competition. Besides other 
issues, future production cost levels also play a role here. (Bösch, 2008). 
Seldom will a company have an all-embracing competence in every field of 
technology. Thus some companies join for strategic inter-firm technology 
cooperation, which has also the benefit of reducing uncertainty (Hagedoorn, 1993). 
2.4.4 Product cost reduction in innovation 
Even though the analysis and management of future product costs is important, there 
are several effects making the focus on this aspect laborious. Product cost is not the 
only dimension on which new product development ideas are competing on the 
market. 
2.4.4.1 Conflicting dimensions in NPD 
Innovations are developed in a field of many trade-offs. New product developments 
often show a clear “tension between focusing on technological innovation, product 
performance, time-to-market, and designing cost-effective products” (Davila and 
Wouters, 2004, p. 24). Usually there are several conflicting dimensions of new 
product developments that are difficult to be maximized all at once (Davila and 
Wouters, 2004, Everaert and Bruggeman, 2002). E.g. a ground breaking new product 
development will usually take more time-to-market than an incremental improvement 
of a product.  
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During concept development Franz (1992) recommends several aids to influence 
costs. The left branch shown in Figure 31 illustrates four techniques suggested by 
Franz (1992). The first one is development rules. These rules are connections of 
constructive methods with cost data based on expert knowledge. These rules are used 
where numerical data is missing or where the effort of doing calculations is too high. 
The second aid is good / bad examples. These are examples that are similar to the 
rules previously described and used rather for illustration. The third technique is using 
relative cost data. This technique helps estimating costs by comparing the new 
product development with a similar object and its cost data. Catalogs with relative 
cost data can be used to inform developers and designers about cost efficient solutions 
for different design alternatives (e.g. alternative material or production methods). The 
forth technique is the use of absolute cost data. This cost data is based on units of 
standardized and / or purchasable components, subsystems and materials. Franz 
(1992) points out that this data should be up to date and preferably is available online 
to developer and designer. In summary, the first and second techniques use expert 
knowledge and rule of thumb, while the third and forth technique use cost databases. 
On the left branch in Figure 31, techniques for influencing product cost during design 
are shown. A detailed explanation of these techniques is skipped here, as the design 
stage lies out of the focus of this thesis. However, it is interesting to notice that the 
suggested aids for development are in general lighter compared to the suggested aids 
for the design. 
2.4.4.4 Platform planning, modules and cost 
The third newness type mentioned by Wheelwright and Clark (1992) – platform 
development projects (see Figure 10 on page 19) – can also lead to improved 
developments. Davila and Wouters (2004) refer to so called ‘product-platform 
planning’ as a tool that looks at cost effective developments. This tool is an approach 
that incorporates future cost saving possibilities into design decisions, by allowing 
components, processes, and knowledge to be shared across a set of products (Davila 
and Wouters, 2004). Parts that can be designed in advance and then used as modules 
in other developments can help to simplify and streamline future developments. The 
attention of the development team is focused on several narrow scopes, rather than on 
an extremely large full-scope development. However, product-platform planning 
might also lead to over-design and thus the trade-off between effort and benefit has to 
be judged (Davila and Wouters, 2004).  
2.4.4.5 Cost information support quality and uncomplicated models 
Cost information has then also to be available and understandable for non-
management accountants. Too late cost information support is equal to non-delivered 
support in fast pace new developments (Wieczorek, 1999). The quality of the 
information also has to be good. Otherwise, the results will be corrupt and not be 
usable or even misleading. In literature that is sometimes called the ‘garbage in, 
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garbage out’ (GIGO) paradigm (Chadwick, 2002). This paradigm stands for the 
notion that the quality of the output can only be as good as the quality of the input.  
Additionally, gathered information can be used not only in the pre-development stage 
but also in the design stage of products. However, it is known that the development of 
cost models (data collection, data identification, data analysis and decision making 
tasks) is often lengthy and might require a high level of resources to reach an 
adequate result (Delgado-Arvelo et al., 2002) and that it might be too time and 
resource consuming during developments e.g. in high-technology industries (Davila 
and Wouters, 2004). Thus fast and easy to use methods should be set up. This is also 
found in past research. In general, companies use lighter tools for the analysis of 
possible future scenarios in the industry, than for analyzing their current business 
(Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). 
2.4.4.6 Obfuscation and political debate 
Reporting should avoid misplaced precision for somehow uncertain and vague matters 
(Cohen, 1996). Also, too sophisticated methods can lead to detailed number fallacy, 
as Bösch (2008) notes in respect to net present value calculation in pre-development. 
The potential fallacy results from the fact that detailed figures are calculated based on 
subjective estimations (Bösch, 2008). The underlying uncertainty is obfuscated 
through the apparent details of the number presentation.  
It is noted in literature that company internal politics can contribute to the failure of 
an innovation (Crawford, 1977). Similarly, multiple concepts may be carried forward 
due to delayed – politically or emotionally difficult, but technically and economically 
clear – screening decisions (Srinivasan et al., 1997). Thus companies and ‘internal 
entrepreneurs’ have to be sensitive towards internal politics (Roberts, 2007). Even so 
the evaluation of possible new product development can be part of strategic 
controversy and political debate (Pavitt, 1990; Nixon, 1998); ultimately the market 
decides about success and profitability and thus the ability to satisfy the market needs 
better than the competition is essential (Pavitt, 1990). Thus, objective cost analysis 
and discussion during pre-development can also aid to avoid political power plays that 
lead towards the failure of an innovation on the market. Or even just make the 
innovation process more effective by objectively screening out ideas that would 
otherwise be carried out because of emotional or political pressures. 
2.4.5 Creativity and cost control 
There are only a few academic studies about cost consciousness during innovation 
and prior to the development stage. Shields and Young (1994) point out that this lack 
of research may be explained by the belief that the creativity of scientists and 
engineers should not be restricted by cost concerns prior to the development stage.  
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2.4.5.1 Creativity and importance of cost in innovation 
Traditionally, designers of new products made their designs without their creativity 
being ‘hindered’ by cost considerations. Their prime focus lied elsewhere, mostly on 
functionality (Anderson and Sedatole, 1998). There seems to be a historic 
confrontational relationship between accountants and R&D personal and designers 
that might even have constrained the role of management accountants (Nixon, 1998). 
Accountants and manufacturing engineers have not been involved in product design 
decisions in this setting. The designer was seen as the ‘creative artist’, the 
manufacturing engineer as a ‘technician’ and the accountant as a “bureaucrat who 
compromises design integrity to save pennies” (Anderson and Sedatole, 1998, p. 223). 
Later, in order to change this, less traditional methods were introduced to the early 
product development procedures. The designers were called for using value 
engineering (sometimes together with target costing) for cost reduction or they were 
provided activity based costing data for their developments (Anderson and Sedatole, 
1998). The importance of cost information in the innovation process has increased in 
the past and cost consciousness found its way into design.  
Shields and Young (1994) identify a turning point of this cost consciousness during 
innovation. They indicate that, in contrast to the research work of R&D, the 
development work of R&D is put under strong product cost pressures. This issue is 
also repeated in the interviews that Shields and Young (1994) did. Some of the 
interviewed managers said that it is unusual that persons involved with basic research 
would be rigorously concerned with costs, whereas it is more frequent to observe a 
development engineer focusing on costs. However, Shields and Young (1994) also 
state that there is a changing view in companies with large R&D programs. There the 
view spreads more and more that all innovation activities should incorporate cost 
consciousness.  
2.4.5.2 The controller as a neutral person vs. problems with cost 
controllers  
The neutrality and background in economic evaluation can be reasons to include a 
controller into information gathering and decision preparation for the selection of new 
product development ideas, especially if the controller is a trusted person by the top 
management (Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). Managers in research and 
development and other technical areas might have excellent technical and 
technological knowhow, nevertheless a sober and economic look might help. A 
controller can ‘digest’ much cost data and avoid an information overload. Otherwise 
this information overload could lead in the worst case scenario to an ‘analysis 
paralysis’ where the company is unable to process the information amount to find the 
relevant issues (Pitkethly, 2006). 
However, Vinkemeier and von Franz (2007) also warn that controllers might have a 
too short-sighted view and might be uncomfortable to handle the uncertainty and risk 
coming with innovations. Redfield (1951) also points out that two sights can collide 
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when estimating future business: the sales manager’s optimism and the controller’s or 
production manager’s conservatism. 
2.4.6 Concluding summary 
Summarizing, one can say that over the decades after the Second World War the 
importance of costs has constantly grown as the markets have developed from a seller 
to a buyer market. Yet, just cutting budget costs and personnel is the wrong way, as 
this is harmful for the long time business run of companies. Lowering costs through 
proactive cost management is a superior approach, focusing on correct decision 
making from the start on. Some managers in business might argue that they cannot 
afford more analysis work in pre-development; others might argue that cost 
considerations strain their creativity. However, the position of this work is that a 
company cannot afford to not commit resources to critical activities in pre-
development, given the importance of innovation, the sums at stake and the high 
failure risk of innovations. This is valid regardless of the strategy of the company, but 
most crucial for companies trying to achieve a cost leadership in their industry. Thus 
efficient and valuable tools to support innovations are suggested in literature.  
The realization of competitive product prices and the attainment of target cost are 
essential as efficient product cost and price together with fine functionality and 
quality are crucial to a long time survival of companies. Never the less, developments 
face lock-in effects. Cost is also only one dimension on which innovations are 
competing. Thus correct, understandable and usable information should be available 
on time to reduce uncertainty for correct decision making during the innovation 
process. The following section deals with literature about the tools used for product 
cost analysis during pre-development. It leaves the general overall patterns for 
innovation and cost of this section and one by one introduces the tools and their 
application in business. 
2.5 Analysis tool classification  
There is no established body of knowledge for the topic of cost information collection 
and analysis during pre-development phases as this area is a crossing of cost 
management and innovation research. However, there is a large amount of different 
methods that vary in comprehensiveness and special cost management focus. For 
analysis purposes management accountants can select “almost an infinite number of 
tools, methods, techniques, approaches, and other concepts floating around” (Clinton 
and Van der Merwe, 2006, p. 15). However, the focus can be narrowed down on 
concepts that are applicable for innovations, as the research focus of this work is on 
the purpose of assisting decision making during innovations for favorable designs. 
Thus tools and methods that are dedicated to assisting decision making to optimize 
already established and running processes are not considered further and the 
optimization of running processes (e.g. through kaizen costing) is not analyzed in the 
case companies. Furthermore, tools for this analysis can be divided into two 
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categories according to Wieczorek (1999). The first category is tools that advert to 
product specific development contents. The second category is tools that advert to 
project management specific contents. This thesis concentrates on the first category of 
tools. 
There are plenty of different names for the means of analysis researched in this work. 
E.g. tool, technique, method, system, procedure, concept and methodology are used 
variously and partly analogously (Brady et al. 1997; Clinton and Van der Merwe, 
2006). This work chooses deliberately the term ‘tool’ and follows the definition that a 
tool is a document, a framework, procedure, system or method which enables 
companies to achieve or clarify particular objectives (Brady et al. 1997).  
In general a tool may be applied by particular individuals or groups within a company 
or may be used across the entire company (Brady et al. 1997). There also might be an 
overlapping of the particular analysis objective from several tools. I.e. the borderlines 
between the different tools are often blurred; however, the core ideas can be 
separated. 
Furthermore, this work follows the differentiation of Brady et al. (1997) between 
specific and generic tools. However, for easier readability the differentiation is 
named specific and unspecific here. The information found and gathered with an 
unspecific analysis tool will tend to overlap for the information need of several new 
product development ideas. On the contrary, the information found and gathered with 
a specific analysis tool will be dedicated to one particular new product development 
idea. Thus for this research on product cost analysis during pre-development the 
differentiation of specific and unspecific analysis tools is defined as follows. Specific 
analysis tools analyze primarily information regarding one particular new 
product development idea. Unspecific analysis tools gather information for an 
array of new product development ideas at a time. 
A second classification dimension is whether a tool provides general information or 
cost specific information about a new product development idea. In this work, the first 
is called a general tool, while the latter is called a cost focused tool.  
2.5.1 General and unspecific analysis tools  
Next, each subsection will introduce tools that were developed not specifically for 
cost management and/or innovation management, but which are nevertheless suitable 
for and supporting the cost information collection and analysis during pre-
development. The next two tools are unspecific, as they analyze a range of 
information that is not specific to one new product development idea. Unspecific tools 
are less focused and provide rather general information.  
2.5.1.1 Intelligence work 
The first group of tools is called intelligence work. Intelligence work in the front end 
of innovation can be seen as a base for economic planning (Wheelwright and Clark, 
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1992; Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). It can be done as a potential market study, 
technology scouting or any other assessment of the business environment of a 
company. Intelligence work is carried out because comprehensive and timely 
information and knowledge is essential in generating new product development ideas 
(Hannula and Pirttimaki, 2003). 
 
Figure 32: Environment of intelligence work according to Brenner (2005) 
Intelligence work is sometimes referred to as business intelligence or competitive 
intelligence. However, the more universal and embracing term intelligence work is 
used in this thesis.  
So what is intelligence work all about? There is no generally accepted conception of 
intelligence work in literature, but rather plentiful connotations of different aspects 
that authors wanted to highlight (Hannula and Pirttimaki, 2003). E.g.: 
“We view business intelligence as knowledge and foreknowledge of the 
competitive environment to support decision-making with a primary emphasis 
to obtain early warning of new developments, capabilities, and strategies of 
competitors and potential competitors to support decision-making.” (Brenner, 
2005, pp. 6f) 
Intelligence work aims at early recognizing of trends and changes in the environment 
of a company. It can be used to start proper measures and actions in an anticipating 
way (Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). Intelligence work can be used in the 
opportunity-identification stage of new product development (Lilien and 
Rangaswamy, 2003). From a market perspective, intelligence work can assist in 
quantifying of feelings and motivations of potential buyers and help forecasting likely 
market acceptance (Cohen, 1996).  
Thus intelligence work carries several aspects around gathering and processing 
information about the environment of a company. This thesis follows the definition of 
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foretell the future exactly, and thus all forecasting includes guesswork. Furthermore, 
as guesswork is inescapable, one should reduce error to a minimum. The time horizon 
of forecasting can stretch from short-term (e.g. demand forecasting) to long term (e.g. 
strategic trends) (Vollmann et al., 1997; Pitkethly, 2006). Short-term estimates can be 
made through moving average forecasts, exponential smoothing forecasts, trend-
enhanced forecasts, seasonally enhanced forecasts, and mixes of them (Vollmann et 
al., 1997). Redfield (1951) points out four main elements of forecasting: 
1. Developing the groundwork 
2. Estimating future business 
3. Comparing actual with estimated results 
4. Refining the forecast process 
Thus it is very important to prepare data for forecasting, as one cannot figure out 
where one is going unless one knows where one has been (Redfield,1951). 
Furthermore, comparing the actual business with the estimated results is important to 
be able to refine the forecasting process. The actual techniques can be classified into 
five categories of basic viewpoints according to Vanston (2003): 
1. Extrapolators 
2. Pattern analysts 
3. Goal analysts 
4. Counter-punchers 
5. Intuitors  
Extrapolators analyze past trends and extrapolate them, as they believe that the 
future will represent a logical extension of the past. Somehow similar, pattern 
analysts believe that powerful feedback mechanisms in society, together with basic 
human nature, will cause future trends and events to occur analogous to past 
experiences. Goal analysts believe that the future is shaped by the beliefs and actions 
of a collection of individuals, organizations and institutions, like trendsetters and 
decision-makers. Thus they assess the long-term results of their actions. Counter-
punchers believe that the future is shaped by unpredictable and random events and 
actions. Thus, a wide range of possible trends and events are monitored and a high 
degree of flexibility is maintained to react to developments. Intuitors are convinced 
that complex forces, random events, and actions of key individuals and institutions 
shape the future. Thus no rational technique is sensible, but one should gather as 
much information as possible, and then use intuition for the forecasting (Vanston, 
2003). 
One tool used by intuitors for long-term forecasting and connected to expert opinion 
is the so-called Delphi method (Vanston, 2003; Pitkethly, 2006). It was developed “in 
order to obtain the most reliable opinion consensus of a group of experts by subjecting 
them to a series of questionnaires in depth interspersed with controlled opinion 
feedback” (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963, p.458). Interestingly, an early experiment using 
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a Delphi-style technique was carried out in 1948 in horse race betting in order to 
optimize the winning chances. Shortly thereafter, the Delphi method was brought into 
the scientific research world, where it started to be used in scientific forecasting 
(Gerstenfeld, 1971; Martino, 1980). Yet, forecasting is only a tool that can aid 
decision making, not substitute it. Thus companies have to employ forecasting wisely 
as support not replacement to managerial judgment (Vollmann et al., 1997). 
A similar tool is war-gaming. War-gaming is predicting conflicting future situations 
and playing through these to derive measures and steps to be taken at present 
(Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). This simulation of conflicting future situations is a 
dynamic game that was developed for training top military personnel in the 19th 
century. War-gaming is based on the idea of competition. Managers playing it are 
separated in groups and each group plays a market role, e.g. a competitor, a customer 
or a regulating governmental body. Through analysis of these games and its 
dynamics, managers should realize the forces and approaches that shape the future 
market.  
One more option for intelligence work is the so-called SWOT analysis (Brenner, 
2005). It is a tool that originates from strategic management. SWOT is a tool that 
originates from the positioning school of competitive strategic management 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998). This stream of strategy was largely crafted by Porter (e.g. 
1980). The acronym SWOT stands for four separate fields of analysis:  
• Strengths,  
• Weaknesses,  
• Opportunities, and  
• Threats.  
These should show internally and externally, favorable and unfavorable factors of a 
company and its arrangement in the markets. The SWOT analysis was originally used 
to position a company in its competitive environment, but over time the concept has 
been applied to several other objects of analysis, e.g. a specific technology or product. 
An analysis tool similar to the SWOT analysis is the PEST factors analysis (Pitkethly, 
2006). The acronym PEST stands for the first letters of: 
• Political, 
• Economic, 
• Social, and 
• Technological. 
Several actions can start from alerts that come from intelligence work. Brenner (2005) 
reports the reactions of the people alerted in the company Air Products. They are: 
• 3% started licensing / technology acquisition 
• 2% started joint development 
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• 9% called the inventor 
• 41% incorporated the new knowledge to improve their project 
• 31% addressed the competitive threat 
• 50% searched for additional information 
• 16% pursued the opportunity 
Thus intelligence work can be a gateway leading to a new product development idea. 
Yet, if a new product development idea comes from some other source, intelligence 
work will be essential to assist its progress. 
2.5.1.2 Roadmapping  
A boat – even sailing at full speed – will not reach its destination if it is steered in the 
wrong direction. Similar innovations need a direction if the success of developments 
should be systematic and not only strikes of luck. Roadmaps are visual tools often 
based on strategic plan requirements and incorporate product attributes. Furthermore, 
they outline phases over time to achieve defined goals, development requirements, 
priorities, and defined evolution plans for new developments (Strauss and Radnor, 
2004). On the example of technology roadmaps, Rinne (2004) explains the principal 
functions to be representation, communication, planning, and coordination of the 
roadmapped topic. Roadmaps can be used internally to locate the position and 
development direction of companies in their environment (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992). There are needs for roadmapping on different levels of organizations. One of 
these needs originates in the linking of strategy and operational issues, as 
roadmapping is linking strategy to product and technology plans (Albright and 
Kappel, 2003; Strauss and Radnor, 2004). This comes from the fact that operative 
planning and activities that translate strategic decisions into operative decisions are 
restricted by a multitude of variables rooted in the production of a company. As any 
production parameters must be taken into account, decisions made on intuition and 
past experience may not yield as good results as if roadmapping is used as a 
management tool for this purpose (Tan and Platts, 2004). One aim of roadmapping is 
the systematic identification and measuring of weak signals coming from the 
industry-specific supply chains. These weak signals are then processed further to new 
product developments and solutions (Vinkemeier and von Franz, 2007). These are 
typically created independently by people responsible for them and have to be 
connected. Roadmaps explicitly create the linkages between market needs, the 
competitive environment and the technology evolution and implementation plans 
(Albright and Kappel, 2003). Roadmaps can provide a time-directed representation of 
relationships between technologies and products, augmented with connections to 
market and other information (Rinne, 2004). Along the lines of the above statement, 
roadmapping is defined in this thesis as the visual process of planning and 
displaying the timely evolution of new development idea attributes regarding 
goals, requirements and priorities.  
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Roadmapping also fulfills several smaller functions. Besides linking product plans to 
strategy, it can be used to enable corporate-level technology plans, guide investment 
decisions, improve the communication of plans, help to focus on long-term and high 
priority topics, and be used for monitoring ongoing progress (Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992; Albright and Kappel, 2003). At Philips Electronics product-technology 
roadmaps are used to gain a better integration of business and technology strategy 
already in the front end of innovation (Groenveld, 1997). GM used a mapping 
technique to evaluate the strategic positioning of the Buick Reatta car in a gap of the 
market (Lilien and Rangaswamy, 2003). 
Roadmaps can also be used to show cost developments over time. They can be used to 
illustrate the cost structure over time. This can be done by volume levels, by relative 
performance, or by factors of production (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Albright 
and Kappel (2003) demonstrate how roadmapping is done at Lucent Technologies. 
One part of their roadmapping is a ‘forward cost model’ that is used to analyze the 
cost evolution of new technologies. This forward cost model is a roadmap that is 
based on an experience curve that helps finding probable developments and setting 
targets for prices and costs of new technologies. It is embedded in a multitude of 
different other roadmaps that show how a quantity of parameters develops over time. 
2.5.2 General and specific analysis tools  
The next two tools were also not developed explicitly for cost management and/or 
innovation management, but can be used for cost information collection and analysis 
during pre-development. Also, these two tools are specific, as they analyze 
specifically one new product development idea at a time. Specific tools are more 
specialized and provide mostly particular information for a distinct new product 
development idea or a narrow range of ideas.  
2.5.2.1 Scorecard use  
Scorecards assemble different qualitative and quantitative figures in a summary (De 
Brentani and Droege, 1988; Baum et al., 2004). Generally one can say that a 
scorecard is an overview of different important parameters that are analyzed together 
to give a coherent big picture for decision making. It is named like this as different 
dimensions are scored to give an overview and make comparison between different 
possible alternatives. Scorecards can help to make discussions more objective as they 
connect values or estimates of them to a specific situation under discussion. 
Furthermore, it is possible to weigh up the summary and evaluate the final score. 
However, the prominent balanced scorecard of Kaplan and Norton (1992) does not 
summarize to a final overall score, but leaves different area scores up to a qualitative 
evaluation. On the contrary the ‘weighted-point method’ (also called ‘linear 
averaging’) does. This method translates qualitative factors into quantitative ones and 
then uses weights for the different criteria (Timmerman, 1986). For innovations and 
their evaluation, the principle of using scorecards is based on the notion that 
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qualitative criteria or factors are often better predictors of success than financial 
projections (Cooper, 2009). 
Scorecard use is defined in this thesis along Baum et al. (2004) as analysis through a 
weighted rating assessment system of different qualitative and quantitative 
factors that are aggregated with standardized and uniform levels of scale 
measurement to final scores for judgment. Very often parts of the used scorecards 
in business are extremely industry-type specific (Chow et al., 1997).  
Perhaps the most prominent scorecard is the Balanced Scorecard introduced by 
Kaplan and Norton (1992). The balanced scorecard was developed to communicate 
several dimensions that companies must achieve to compete with their core 
competences and innovation. It has four main perspectives that give a holistic view of 
the business of a company and its development. A different prominent scorecard is the 
‘Tableau de Bord’ that was developed in the 60s in France (Baum et al., 2004). After 
its development it was used mostly by French and Canadian companies as a 
multidimensional performance measurement and management system. The company 
Schindler uses an innovation cockpit for steering and controlling its new product 
developments. Part of this cockpit is also a monitoring of the forecasted product target 
cost (Gassmann and Kobe, 1999). Like traffic lights, a forecasted overrun of target 
costs is shown in red, critical forecasted target costs are shown in yellow and 
forecasted target costs below the maximum allowable cost are displayed in green. 
Srinivasan et al., (1997) note that manufacturing checklists and expert judgment are 
used for concept selection during the concept level phase of innovations. These ask 
designers to rate the technological change or probable cost of alternative concepts. 
These scorecards have in common that several factors and criteria are checked. These 
are grouped together to several categories. In general, the scorecard can be a simple 
listing of the different criteria with a score for each evaluation. However, this 
approach can be enhanced by putting different weights on the checked criteria. The 
evaluation scores are than added to a final score. This final score is used for the 
screening decision (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972; De Brentani and Droege, 1988). Either 
different new product development ideas are compared or there is a minimum score 
that has to be achieved (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972). For new product development ideas 
that are rather incremental, Schmitt-Grohe (1972) suggests that the weights and 
minimum final score are set according to company specific analysis results of 
successful and unsuccessful innovations. The scores can also be shown in a graphical 
way for each product. These product profiles can uncover weaknesses of a new 
product development idea and thus be the base for a targeted concept improvement 
(Schmitt-Grohe, 1972). 
Another scoring model used in product development is Quality Function Deployment. 
Quality Function Deployment is a scorecard-based method to ensure several quality 
dimensions and to translate customer demands and wishes into design targets (Akao, 
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2004). Even so, it is mostly used in the design stage, Quality Function Deployment is 
also used as a tool to grasp the customer need in pre-development (Voigt and Sturm, 
2001). Quality Function Deployment can also be used to reduce product cost while 
maintaining a balance with quality. This is referred to as cost deployment (Maekawa 
and Ohta, 2004).  
Scorecards are also used as scoring models in pre-development for the display and 
screening of new development ideas in portfolios (Bösch, 2008). Some examples 
from literature are introduced next.  
Schmitt-Grohe (1972) recommends a coarse screen of new product development ideas 
to eliminate ineffective new product development ideas as soon as possible. He 
recommends checklists and scorecards based on expert opinion for this screening. 
These scorecards check factors based on five main categories: 
1. Probability of success 
2. Development time 
3. Development costs 
4. Product demand in the long run 
5. Turnover growth 
In the scheme proposed by Schmitt-Grohe (1972) this screening does not involve any 
estimation of the future product costs of the new product development idea. However, 
he states that the scorecard measures can be enlarged to fit company or industry 
practice. Two further extensions that he recommends are to further check the 
availability of human resources and the patent situation.  
 
Figure 34: Product research and development ideas evaluation criteria according to Hart (1966) 
One scorecard used as scoring model in pre-development is proposed by Hart (1966). 
It was developed for a company to assist the management in decision making. It 
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71 
checks twelve criteria in total (see Figure 34). E.g. the first criterion is the peak sales 
value, which is essentially an estimate about market size, market share and selling 
price. In total three criteria deal with cost estimates. Firstly, the model checks the 
marginal cost as a fraction of sales. Secondly, the additional fixed capital investment 
has to be estimated. These are the estimated cost for facilities and manufacturing 
equipment needed to produce the peak volume of sales. Thirdly, the future costs of the 
research and development work including overhead expenses have to be estimated. 
Furthermore, the model checks the customer's value perception in regard to quality 
and price of the product. If one runs into trouble estimating the marginal cost criteria, 
Hart (1966) recommends comparing the new product development idea with existing 
products, and their characteristics including sales volume, labor and material 
requirements. However, this is only possible for incremental innovations. 
 
Figure 35: Scorecard at Henkel according to Gerhardt and Knobel (1999, p. 90) 
At the Henkel Company group a scorecard is used to rate new product development 
ideas and projects according to attractiveness. A part of this scorecard is shown in 
Figure 35. The attractiveness is measured in eight criteria: 
1. Market size 
2. Market growth 
3. Potential further turnover 
4. Potential further profitability 
5. Differentiation potential 
6. Sustainability of competitive advantage 
7. Marketing resources 
8. Contribution to eco-leadership 
Similar potential risks connected to new product developments are evaluated with 
scorecards. The risks scorecard uses six criteria: 
1. Technological know-how 
2. Potential length of use 
3. Competitive situation 
4. Reliability of reaching technological targets 
Portfolio analysis Weighting Scoring Justification
A1 Market size
What is the size of reachable 
future market?
Market size in Mio €
A2 Market growth
What growth rates has the target 
market (inflation-adjusted)?
Real growth in %
A3 Potential future turnover
How much additional turnover can 
be reached with the development
(net of cannibalization)?
Additional turnover in %
‐‐ ‐ 0 + ++
‐‐ ‐ 0 + ++
‐‐ ‐ 0 + ++
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5. Reliability of reaching economic targets 
6. Time-to-market 
The projects are then classified according to its scoring on an attractiveness/risk 
matrix for a graphical overview, discussion and go/no-go decision making (Gerhardt 
and Knobel, 1999).  
 
Figure 36: A typical scorecard for gate 3 (go to development) according to Cooper (2009) 
Figure 36 shows a typical scorecard and the evaluated criteria for the last gate before 
development start. In that gate meeting, the gatekeepers are using these six categories 
to rate new product development ideas. These gatekeepers are usually senior 
management. The scores are used to rank the ideas according attractiveness. The 
scores can be a weighted or un-weighted additional subcategory scores. Usually 60% 
of the maximal score is required for a Go decision (Cooper, 2009).  
In the model shown in Figure 36, at least two categories deal indirectly with future 
cost of new product development ideas. The first category is about the product and its 
competitive advantage. Here a compelling value proposition is seen as important 
(Cooper, 2009). The second category is about financial reward in opposition to risk. 
Here the financial return figures consider calculations or estimations of future product 
cost (Cooper, 2009). 
• Alignment of project with our business’s strategy
• Importance of project to the strategy
• Impact on the business
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importance
• Product delivers unique customer or user benefits
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• production/operations
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• distribution/sales force
Core competencies 
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• Size of technical gap (straightforward to do)
• Technical complexity (few barriers, solution envisioned)
• Familiarity of technology to our business
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Technical 
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• Size of financial opportunity
• Financial return (NPV, ECV, IRR)
• Productivity Index (PI)
• Certainty of financial estimates
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versus risk
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2.5.2.2 Uncertainty management 
As stated in 2.2.4, high uncertainties can be attached to innovations. However, they 
are reduced step by step the further innovation proceeds. Uncertainty management 
tools can help to identify and manage the issues connected to reducing the uncertainty 
during pre-development.  
In practice the terms uncertainty management and risk management are often used 
interchangeably to include the management of risk, opportunity and uncertainty 
(Olsson, 2006). Yet, in this thesis the term uncertainty management is deliberately 
used to illustrate that there can also be an upside attached to it.  
Uncertainty management can be defined as the activity of taking care of, 
understanding, leading, handling, or being in charge of uncertainty (Olsson, 
2006).  
There are two main types of uncertainty – technical and market related. Technical 
uncertainty is related to the new product development idea meeting the required 
technical specifications and quality. Market uncertainty is the uncertainty around the 
commercial success if technical specifications and quality requirements are met 
(Smith, 1999).  
Furthermore, two types of uncertainty management tools can be distinguished. The 
first concentrates on projects, the second on new product development ideas and 
portfolios of them (Olsson, 2006). The focus is on the latter for this work. 
 
Figure 37: Unmanaged vs. managed risk according Smith (1999) 
Time Time Time
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Likelihood
of occurrence
Resulting
level of risk
Time Time Time
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of occurrence
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level of risk
Unmanaged risk
Managed risk
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The lower part of Figure 37 shows the mitigating and damping effect that a reduction 
of the occurrence likelihood of a risk can have. In that case, the best way to manage 
the risk level is to manage its occurrence likelihood (Smith, 1999).  
Basically all methods of a guided and structured management can be seen as 
uncertainty management (Young, 2007). E.g. risk identification can be made by 
creativity tools such as brainstorming (Smith, 1999). Similar Cooper (1996 & 1990) 
sees a structured and well-executed stage gate process as an uncertainty management 
tool. This can be seen as the wide view on uncertainty management tools. Somehow 
conversely, this thesis takes a more narrow view on uncertainty management tools for 
this classification. Uncertainty management tools in the narrow view are tools 
dedicated to reduce or handle uncertainty in data specific to product cost analysis 
during pre-development, like:  
• Decision trees 
• Scenario thinking/analysis 
• Sensitivity analysis 
• Using distributions for data input 
• Triple-point estimates 
The pursuit of new product development ideas is a multi-stage and multi-period 
endeavor that can also be modeled by decision trees (Schmitt-Grohe, 1972). E.g. 
Varila and Sievanen (2005) suggest decision trees for considering and valuating the 
variety of options for high-tech R&D projects. 
Especially when the information state is blurred, tailor-made scenarios should be 
used (Lechner and Völker, 1999). Scenario thinking and planning aided Shell to be 
prepared for the oil crisis in the 1970s, setting itself apart from the competition 
(Senge, 1990). Intelligence work like forecasting and uncertainty management tools 
like scenario analysis can be connected. E.g. HP has developed a forecasting tool that 
uses three levels of uncertainty as a base for their cost estimations (Carbone, 2004). 
These levels are called low, base and high. E.g. the company can be sure that it will 
sell at least a specific amount of computers during the next analysis period even if 
things are not going well. This can be seen as a worst case scenario. The volumes of 
this worst case scenario can be used to have base contracts in purchasing that are 
fulfilled with a 100% guarantee.  
The scorecards proposed by Schmitt-Grohe (1972) use several factors and criteria that 
are checked. However, if a factor cannot be estimated well, he suggests using 
sensitivity analysis for that parameter. This sensitivity analysis is to be carried out by 
varying the parameter under consideration. A new product development idea should 
also be further elaborated, even if a pessimistic approach on that variation leads to a 
positive overall outlook.  
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Basically, all quantitative data can be modeled as distributions. Schmitt-Grohe 
(1972) discusses a model that uses standard deviations of parameters for the analysis. 
Another possibility to describe the uncertainty of estimates is to use triple point 
estimates. This is done by estimating the worst case, the best case and the most likely 
outcome. These three different scenarios can then be used to qualitatively evaluate the 
matter under investigation (Turner, 1998). In the easiest way this is done by the above 
mentioned triple point estimates (minimum, most likely and maximum figures) and to 
evaluate them. More sophisticated methods can be based on commercially available 
special software. This is especially easy to apply if the uncertain data is available in 
spreadsheet form. It is done in form of a Monte Carlo analysis that compromises all 
entered elements of risk. In that analysis a comprehensive model of the situation is 
made that incorporates ranges referring each element of risk (Turner, 1998).  
 
Figure 38: An example screen shot from the result of a Monte Carlo simulation 
The model is then evaluated many times with the program and offers a distribution 
like the one shown in Figure 38, which is an example screen shot from the result of a 
Monte Carlo simulation. However, even though distributions can be used to model 
and demonstrate uncertainties, communicating distributions is perceived as more 
difficult by managers. Thus training and increasing the awareness of uncertainties in 
companies is important. Similar as for costs, uncertainty drivers and factors can be 
identified (Turner, 1998). Usually a perception of potential problems and their origin 
is already identified in an organization. Sometimes, solutions for these challenges are 
already known within the organization or by suppliers. Through that, the uncertainty 
for important decisions during new product developments is reduced. This leads 
ultimately to a mitigation of lock-in effects during the development process. 
For the evaluation of new product development, ideas in pre-development can also 
use sensitivity analysis (Cooper, 1990; Varila and Sievanen, 2005; Bösch, 2008). 
With this approach the change of the results is analyzed when alternating different 
subjective estimations (Varila and Sievanen, 2005; Bösch, 2008). One or several 
estimations are varied and the changes in results are studied. 
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It is important to see uncertainty management as a cross-functional work, as most 
issues in new product development are cross functional. A specialized group will only 
focus on their specialty and skip important issues (Smith, 1999). 
2.5.3 Unspecific cost analysis tools  
In the last two subsections above general analysis tools for pre-development were 
introduced. On the contrary, this and the next subsection focus on tools particular to 
product cost analysis. The next two tools are unspecific, as they analyze a range of 
information that is not specific to one new product development idea. 
2.5.3.1 Analysis of cost dynamics 
Usually prototypes and products in early product life stages show much higher 
production cost than products that are already in later product life stages. Besides the 
fact that prototypes are often manufactured with different methods and materials, this 
is due to cost reduction efforts and optimization over time.  
 
Figure 39: Scheme of effects for cost reduction (amended from Baum et al., 2004, p. 91) 
Figure 39 shows different cost reduction schemes how they are presented in literature. 
There are static and dynamic cost reduction principles.  
The two static cost reduction reasons (i.e. splitting of fixed costs and economies of 
scale) can easily be calculated, as these effects are static and come with higher 
volumes. This volume effect is achieved through a better utilization of secondary 
functions of a company (fixed costs, overheads) that are not directly related to 
production volumes. Thus the higher the production volumes, the lower the fixed cost 
share a single produced part has to bear (Baum et al., 2004).  
Economies of scale also come from higher production volumes, but are related to the 
magnitude of the production (Chandler, 1990). Contrary to the splitting of fixed costs, 
economies of scale lead to an over-proportional increase of the output for an input 
increase. An example could be the higher purchasing power connected with high 
volumes, which leads to lower raw material prices (Baum et al., 2004). Similar 
Quantity related cost reduction 
(static)
Knowledge related cost reduction
(dynamic)
Volume effects through
splitting of fixed costs 
Economies of scale
(Volume effects through
larger company size )
Learning curve effects 
Rationalization
Technological progress
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different production technologies can show over-proportional increases of the output 
for an investment increase (Chandler, 1990). Economies of scale can have an 
important influence on how long an innovating company can hold a quasi-
monopolistic market role (Walker, 1979). This is because following innovation is 
usually time consuming. If a company comes up with a radically new product 
development idea that succeeds on the market, the competition will need time to 
imitate that new technology. During the time that the competition needs to catch up, 
the innovating company can use economies of scale to fortify its position.  
Furthermore, literature proposes several dynamic cost reduction types (i.e. learning 
curve effects, rationalization and technological progress). Technological development, 
kaizen efforts, redesigns and changes of underlying production technology fall into 
these categories. All have the principle in common, that there is a cost reduction, even 
though the annual volumes do not have to increase (Baum et al., 2004). One dynamic 
cause of cost reduction is the learning curve effect, which provides an empirical 
relationship between changes in direct manufacturing cost and the accumulated 
volume of production (Hax and Majluf, 1982). The learning curve is sometimes also 
referred to as experience curve (Lieberman, 1987). There is considerable empirical 
evidence for learning curves in a wide range of industries (Lieberman, 1987). The 
learning curve can be observed when the cumulative output increases, even though 
the annual volumes do not change (Baum et al., 2004). It was empirically found that 
these cost decreases are a function of cumulative output, rather than calendar time 
(Lieberman, 1987). The learning curve effect was firstly observed on the Wright-
Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton/Ohio in 1925 (Baum et al., 2004). There the used 
time for air craft production processes decreased with the cumulative output through 
learning effects. The learning curve is a key tool to assist managers in judging 
competitive cost structures (Hax and Majluf, 1982). However, study results have been 
mixed about whether learning curve effects lead to the creation of entry barriers into 
markets. While some studies see it so, others find only quite low affirmation 
(Lieberman, 1987). In high technology areas, often companies bid for contracts 
which, if obtained, would lower their cost of units produced due to learning curve 
effects. For that, forecasting and projecting cost structure effects are essential (Hax 
and Majluf, 1982). Considering learning is an important factor in cost estimation, as 
initial fabrication and assembly can take up to five times longer than when it has 
become a routine task (Curran et al., 2003). Incorporating these effects, the lowered 
cost per unit are calculated and used during negotiation processes for bidding and 
winning contracts by passing on learning curve cost reductions to the customer (Hax 
and Majluf, 1982). 
Technological progress happens through invention and conception of new and more 
powerful production technologies (Baum et al., 2004). These lead to lower cost for 
one produced product – independent of the annual volume.  
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Similar, rationalization leads to lower cost through increasing the efficiency of 
company internal processes. In this case the business of a company is planned 
according to scientific rules of management in order to achieve more efficient 
processes (Baum et al., 2004). Also this effect is independent of the annual volume.  
 
Figure 40: The dynamic view of technology choices (Illustrative example) 
The learning curve has become a central concept in corporate strategic planning 
(Lieberman, 1987). Yet, it can also be applied to technology analysis. In Figure 40 a 
fictive example of two technologies with different cost reduction potentials is shown. 
Over time one technology might get cheaper, as there is a steeper learning and 
experience curve effect than for a competitive technology. That means that even if the 
costs of one technology are higher when a company gets to know that technology, the 
costs could decrease faster over some years so that the technology gets cheaper in the 
long run (see Figure 40).  
The above described effects and their cost reduction effects can be calculated by 
analyzing the initial unit cost, the learning steepness and the amount of output 
doublings (Baum et al., 2004; Lieberman, 1987). Estimating these described cost 
reductions is referred to as cost capability estimations in this thesis. This can also 
lead to a target cost strategy of declining prices over time as described for the camera 
business of Olympus by Cooper and Slagmulder (1997). 
Hax and Mijluf (1982) describe the analysis of cost dynamics through diagnosis of 
industry cost structures. This analysis contains determining the experience curve for 
each competitor in the industry. If the single experience curves are similar for all 
market participants, the market share of each competitor is crucial to assessing their 
strengths (Hax and Mijluf, 1982). However, if the experience curves are not similar 
for all market participants, identifying the different technologies in use can provide 
insights for the strategic positioning of a company in the business (Hax and Mijluf, 
Unit
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1982). In the latter case, investments in lower cost production technologies can lead to 
surpassing of learning curve effects. 
In this thesis the analysis of cost dynamics is defined a bit broader than the use of Hax 
and Mijluf (1982) by using the differentiation of Baum et al. (2004) shown in Figure 
39. The analysis of cost dynamics is the diagnosis of variable cost structures that 
are influenced through knowledge related cost reductions of learning curve 
effects, rationalization, technological progress, and alike. Analysis of cost 
dynamics is classified as unspecific, as it analyzes variable cost structures that are not 
specific to one new product development idea, but rather a range of technological 
possibilities. 
The cost capability should be known to do the right decisions, including the decision 
to accelerate the decline. The most cost efficient technology at a given point of time 
does not have to be the most cost efficient in the long run and/or might neglect 
strategic aspects. Companies are using these cost capability estimations through 
internal rules of thumb (Baldwin, 1991). These rules of thumb are often stated as a 
performance goal, e.g. as price drop to 50 percent within 18, 24 or 36 months 
(Baldwin, 1991).  
2.5.3.2 Cost database use 
Franz (1992) suggests using cost databases as an aid to optimize cost of new product 
developments. In general, cost databases can be defined as records of detailed cost 
information based on a range of cost drivers or manufacturing variables (Yoshikawa 
et al., 1990). These can be catalogs with relative cost data or other databases that are 
also known as cost tables. These cost databases use up to date cost information about 
standard components, subsystems and materials. Once these databases are in place, 
this cost information can be used to evaluate a range of new product development 
ideas and thus is an unspecific tool. Thus cost database use is defined as analysis of 
new product development ideas with databases of detailed cost information 
based on a range of tabulated cost information, cost drivers or manufacturing 
variables. 
According to Yoshikawa et al. (1990) cost databases are used by Japanese companies 
to project product costs assuming the use of different materials, different 
manufacturing methods, and different functions. In their opinion, cost tables can be 
used to improve cost effectiveness during all phases of the product life cycle, but 
especially before production begins. Traditionally the cost tables have originated from 
needs of the purchasing department. They have helped to negotiate better prices with 
subcontractors. However, the use has been extended to other controllable elements of 
production cost. With that the focus of the cost tables has also shifted. When cost 
tables were developed, they focused on production activities. Only later the focus 
shifted towards the functions or parts of products (Yoshikawa et al., 1990). The 
survey by Tani et al. (1994) found that the companies that use cost tables record 
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usually costs for material (94,8%), purchased parts (94,8%), and direct processing 
(94,8%). However, still quite often cost data on overheads (82,3%), the depreciation 
of new investments (74,0%), and logistics (52,1%) was gathered. Less often data on 
development costs (39,6%) and trial production costs (36,5%) was also gathered. 
The distinctiveness of cost tables against normal databases with cost information is 
their planned approach as well as preparation and maintenance. The cost information 
can be represented differently, but the specific value of cost tables is the sound 
approach in compiling them. Japanese management accountants maintain their cost 
tables accurately, to be able to provide help for cost based decision making by 
answering questions to “cost implications of alterative courses of action under 
consideration” (Yoshikawa et al., 1990, p. 30). They are reported to be used for what-
if analyses. Also they answer cost implications of different designs (design cost 
tables). Furthermore, they aid to find cost reduction potentials of products in the 
production phase (manufacturing cost tables) and can help to make decisions about 
(dis-)continuation of product lines. Tani et al. (1994) found that cost tables are mostly 
prepared by departments that focus on development, design or production technology, 
but also by accounting departments. In Japan, cost tables are already used in very 
early stages of the new product development. A multinational company uses them 
together with target cost to screen out unprofitable new product proposals (Yoshikawa 
et al., 1990). Thus they have a good potential to be used in pre-development for the 
analysis of new product development ideas. 
According to Yoshikawa et al. (1990) cost tables are put up gradually, based on the 
knowledge and insight of a company. They are based on a wide-ranging, 
multidimensional identification of the major variables that drive costs in the 
operations of that company, not only of the present design, but also alternative and 
future methods. However, the preparation of cost tables also needs a fair amount of 
resources. Yoshikawa et al. argue that the “analytical power of cost tables requires a 
full-time team of management accountants who must specify production activities and 
cost drivers, gather relevant cost data and then construct and maintain the cost tables” 
(Yoshikawa et al., 1990, p. 32). As an example they state that a factory with a 
workforce of 1,000 people, employs three management accountants to maintain cost 
tables full-time. In Japan cost tables are usually revised annually or semi-annually 
(Tani et al., 1994).  
In general, one can say that the availability of cost information can be important for 
cost-based decision making in early stages of innovations. Cost tables codify and 
store cost information as databases. This information could later be used to evaluate 
new product development ideas, and make right decisions in early stages of 
innovations.  
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2.5.4 Specific cost analysis tools  
This subsection presents three tools particularly focusing on product cost analysis. 
These three tools are specific, as they analyze explicitly one new product 
development idea at a time. Thus they are completely dedicated to the product cost 
analysis of one individual new product development idea. 
2.5.4.1 Cost modeling and estimation 
Accurate product cost estimation is critical in today’s environment (Newnes et al. 
2008). Cost estimations are part of pre-development and important for the evaluation 
in early screening (Cooper, 1990). It is seen as important to have accurate product 
cost estimations already at the concept design stage to support decision making (Ong, 
1993; Srinivasan et al., 1997; Curran et al., 2005). There is a demand for reliable cost 
estimating across the industry. Some companies develop in-house spreadsheets while 
others rely on tight control or cost management during new product development 
(Newnes et al., 2008). 
There has been some standardization work been done for the estimation of life cycle 
cost (EN 12973:2000 and IEC 60300-3-3:2004) that can be used for cost modeling 
and estimation. In order to make the right decisions in product development, cost 
information has to be available. The first possibility to estimate costs is to ask experts 
(EN 12973:2000). However, there are also several other cost estimation methods. E.g. 
the IEC 60300-3-3:2004 standard gives three methods to estimate life cycle cost: 
1. Engineering cost estimation 
2. Analogous cost estimation 
3. Parametric cost estimation 
The first is the ‘engineering cost method’, where the driver for a special cost element 
is directly estimated by investigating the components of an asset one by one. 
Established cost factors, e.g. the current engineering and manufacturing estimates, can 
be used to find the cost of each element. However, the needed data might not be 
available in pre-development phases. The second method is the ‘analogous cost 
method’, were cost estimations based on information from a comparable product or 
technology or historical data are used. This method provides a rather straightforward 
and brief instrument. It is easily applied to known components of the asset if actual 
data is available. The third given method is the ‘parametric cost method’, which 
uses parameters and variables to build up cost estimating relations. These relations are 
usually equations where costs are estimated through some kind of cost function (that 
can be e.g. non-linear). However, in all cases of cost estimation the effort shall be 
justified by the information gain and increase (EN 12973:2000). Already in the 
1970’s, costs were estimated using parametric cost estimations for the 767 airplane at 
Boing (Anderson and Sedatole, 1998). The cost database for the 767 development was 
data derived from the 727 series. The number of labor hours per pound of specific 
sections of the 727 was taken and multiplied by the expected weight of the new plane 
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section. That figure was then multiplied by a learning factor per plane generation and 
additionally a learning curve was estimated for the different numbers of planes 
(Anderson and Sedatole, 1998). 
Cost modeling and estimation is a pair, as cost estimation demands the use of a prior 
developed cost model (Rios et al. 2007). In general, the primary function of cost 
estimation is the provision of reliable capital and operating cost assessments and 
information that can be used for decision making (Curran et al., 2005).  
Cost modeling and estimation is defined along the above as follows. Cost modeling 
and estimation work is representing and predicting cost factors, relations and 
drivers by investigating product details to provide approximated cost 
assessments and information that can be used for decision making. These used 
product details can be product components, cost elements, information from historical 
data, comparable products or technologies, or parameters and variables. Cost 
modeling and estimation is classified as specific in this thesis, as it usually focuses on 
one single new product development idea at a time.  
Cost estimators use a combination of logic, common sense, skill, experience, and 
judgment, to derive estimates that are timely, relevant, and meaningful (Rush and 
Roy, 2001). The accuracy of these estimates can be relatively high for incremental 
developments with traditional manufacturing processes of known products or product 
families. However, issues arise when products are new without any similar products 
or processes in place (Newnes et al., 2008). For the first, incremental developments in 
known areas, cost estimations can be done in real-time and on-screen during the 
design of a component (Newnes et al., 2007). However, for estimating the costs of 
new product developments, Roy et al. (2005) distinguish between currently used 
technology and new technology. Components using known technology are estimated 
with approved cost estimation relationships. The costs for components using new 
technology are approximated with analogous cost estimation of similar components 
from inside or outside of the company and industry. 
Schmitt-Grohe (1972) recommends also using break-even analysis for the product 
cost analysis during pre-development. These require cost functions, which he sees as 
linear functions with a fixed cost part. In his view usually expert opinion is used for 
these cost function estimates. He points out a multitude of different options at this 
point regarding the final innovation characteristics. The uncertainty stretches over 
final product quality, distribution channels, marketing, packaging, and prices. 
Depending on the quality of the cost estimates, he suggests using alternative final 
prices for profitability calculations. 
Srinivasan et al. (1997) suggest three different approaches for estimating costs during 
the concept selection phase of innovation to estimate the overall profitability. The first 
approach is subjective estimates of experts. The second approach is estimating the 
cost of attribute bundles for a sample of products and then estimating a function 
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Figure 42: An example of a life cycle cost tradeoff (amended from Woodward, 1997) 
Life cycle costing is a tool for finding the lowest life cycle costs by analyzing trade-
offs. One example of that is shown in Figure 42. It shows a trade-off between price 
and costs of lost energy for a product that can have different efficiency levels. 
According to Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) life cycle costing is particularly important 
for developments with large planning and development cost (e.g. developing a new 
plane) or large product abandonment costs (e.g. nuclear power plants). In their view, 
there are three broad purposes of life cycle costing.  
1. Develop a sense of the total cost associated with a product in order to identify 
whether it will be profitable to the company. 
2. Identify environmental cost consequences connected to a development and 
direct the development efforts towards reducing or eliminating these costs. 
3. Help to identify the planning and decommissioning costs already during the 
product and process design phase in order to control and manage these costs.  
Life cycle costing has been a strong point of engineering economics for over 50 years 
and became popular in the 1960s when the concept was taken up by U.S. government 
agencies as an instrument to improve the cost effectiveness of equipment 
procurement. From that point, the concept has spread to the business sector, and is 
used in product development studies and project evaluations (Riggs, 1982). The life 
cycle costing concept was then taken up by management accounting. Park and Seo 
(2004) have found that companies are nowadays integrating life cycle cost analysis 
earlier in their product development as it gets a higher value in company policies. 
Life cycle costing has to be distinguished from the product life cycle concept 
articulated in the economic literature (e.g. Levitt, 1965; Polli and Cook, 1969; Dhalla 
and Yuspeh, 1976; Kotler and Armstrong, 2008). The main idea of the product life 
cycle concept is that the type of products offered by a company shows a life cycle 
with a limited life time similar to the one of living creatures, from being born, to 
growing, maturing and finally dying. The product life cycle model is used to illustrate 
the sales volume of an object type through different market stages.  
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Furthermore life cycle costing has to be distinguished from life cycle assessment, 
which analyses environmental impacts of products. Earlier, this concept was also 
referred at as life cycle analysis (Webb, 1999) and life cycle thinking (Wiegard, 
2001). 
A further enhancement to traditional costing is reported by Cooper and Slagmulder 
(1997). They mention the computation of perfect waste-free cost estimations. These 
estimations are used to enhance the target costing process by showing the theoretical 
limit as a goal to aim for. According to Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) the perfect 
waste-free level is the cost level that is reached when all value-adding activities are 
performing as efficiently as possible and all non-value-added activities are removed. 
They also define a second waste-free cost level – the unavoidable waste-free cost. 
This second term is defined as the most aggressive short-term cost reduction goal 
possible for a product (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). According to these authors, the 
first waste-free cost level is the ultimate long-term goal of a lean enterprise that 
follows the cost leader approach. It is linked to the zero-defects objective in quality 
management. The second waste-free level is a nearer future cost target. 
2.5.4.2 Target costing efforts 
The initiative of searching cost reduction upstream into product development, 
together with its supporting systems and procedures, is called target costing or Genka 
Kiaku in Japanese (Kato, 1993). Target costing (also called target cost management) 
is a set of activities aimed at attaining a cost target through means that assist the 
planning, development and detailed design of new products (Tani et al., 1994). 
Target costing is a tool to determine maximum allowable product cost of a proposed 
product with specified functionality and quality, with the aim to meet future profit 
plans (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997; Franz, 1992). Target costing is used during the 
planning cycle and drives the process of choosing product and process designs that 
will result in a product that can be produced at a cost that will allow an acceptable 
level of profit, given the product’s estimated market price, selling volume, and target 
functionality (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). It can take the control of future product 
cost early into the innovation process (Jens, 1999). Target costing is a strategic cost 
management system with several objectives around costs (cost reduction), quality 
(quality assurance) and time (timely market introduction) (Tani et al., 1994). Together 
with the newness of the product, it therefore takes into consideration the several trade-
off dimensions that Davila and Wouters (2004) named the most important for 
innovations - costs, newness, performance, and time to market (see Figure 1). 
There is an ongoing debate in literature, of which functions target costing teams most 
commonly represent - with a focus on team members from engineering (e.g. Tani et 
al., 1994; Dekker and Smidt, 2003) or with an important role of controllers and 
accountants (e.g. in Germany: Tani, et al., 1996). Traditionally it is specialists taking 
care of the target costing practices in companies. In a study of Japanese stock listed 
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companies, Tani et al. (1994) found that over one third (37,6%) of the companies that 
were using target costing, had an office dedicated solely for target costing. Another 45 
% had either a person in charge for target costing or another functional department 
taking care of the target costing procedures. However, the remaining 17,4% of the 
companies using target costing had no specific office or person in charge.  
When target costing was taken up by western companies, they focused mostly on the 
calculation methods, i.e. first determining target costs and then calculating the 
allowable costs of product parts. This was due to the fact that when the interest in 
western countries grew, these calculation methods were the only focus of the first 
publications available in English language (Tani, et al., 1996). However, with later 
publications, the surrounding set of approaches also got clearer. Yet, the environment 
seems to play a role in the adoption of the tool. Target costing efforts were relatively 
more often used under circumstances of intense competition and high environmental 
uncertainty in the Netherlands (Dekker and Smidt, 2003). Hibbets et al. (2003) 
studied the role of the competitive environment and strategy on the adoption of target 
costing in a twelve company case study. They found that product differentiators are 
more likely to adopt target costing efforts than companies following other strategies 
like cost leadership. Additionally, they point out that a high company rivalry in the 
industry of a company will lead to a use of target costing in development. 
Target costing combines company external and internal views (Voigt and Sturm, 
2001; Kaplan and Cooper, 1998). The internal view is on a good organization of 
internal development procedures. The external view is on the market and the 
achievable market price of a development. Kaplan and Cooper (1998, p. 217) describe 
the idea of target costing as follows:  
“At the heart of target costing is a very simple syllogism: Let the marketplace 
determine the selling price of the future product, subtract from this selling 
price the profit margin that you want to generate, and this figure yields the 
target cost at which the product must be manufactured. In target costing, the 
cost of a new product is no longer an outcome of the product design process; 
it becomes an input into the process.”  
Thus, one principal idea of target costing is that costs are a criterion to the product 
development process and used during it. The target costs are derived by estimating a 
target selling price of a new product. It takes into consideration what customers are 
willing to pay and subtracts the desired profit margin from it. The use of target costing 
has several benefits. Through the development aim of staying below the target cost, 
competitive cost pressures of the market are transmitted to product designers and 
suppliers (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997, Ewert and Ernst, 1999, Helms et al., 2005). 
Another central benefit of target costing is to avoid over-engineering. It helps to meet 
the customer demand and at the same time be profitable for the producing company 
(Butscher and Laker, 2000). Dekker and Smidt (2003) found that Dutch companies 
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had independently developed practices that resemble target costing. They started to 
develop these through the pressures of the competitive and volatile environment they 
were operating in. Most of the analyzed companies claimed to use target-costing-like 
methods, but used different names for them. Similar findings are stated by Boer and 
Ettlie (1999) for U.S. companies.  
The literature about target costing is rich in describing the practices in companies 
(especially in Japanese ones), in specifying the goals of target costing, in surveying 
the adaptation of this method, and on who exactly is involved in target costing efforts 
in organizations. However, a blank spot in literature so far is the earliness at which 
target costing is started to be used.  
Another tool similar to target costing is Design to cost (DTC), which is used for cost 
effective planning and engineering. This is a tool that considers production cost goals 
already from the start of a development program. It does so by considering the 
estimated production costs as a performance parameter that shall be attained together 
with technical performances. The tool helps to keep the balance between costs, 
functional performance and schedule (EN 12973:2000). Similar to target costing, it 
establishes maximum allowable product costs connected with specified functionality 
and quality. Design to cost was developed by the US Department of Defense to 
encounter the constant cost overruns of larger armament programs. Since 1971 the US 
Department of Defense made it compulsory to use design to cost for each contract that 
is larger than 10 million USD (EN 12973:2000). Nowadays, design to life cycle cost 
(DTLCC) as a further development can also be used. It uses the same principles, but 
takes additional life cycle costs into account. 
 
Figure 43: Cost management for different criteria and complexity according to Davila and 
Wouters (2004, p. 14) 
Yet, there are also some limitations mentioned in literature on target costing. One is 
that target costing only could be too narrow for successful innovation management 
(see the graphical overview in Figure 43). There are several matters that have to be 
taken into account during innovation. Davila and Wouters (2004) group these into two 
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main categories. One category is the complexity of modeling costs of shared 
resources. The other category is the importance of parameters different than costs (see 
Figure 43). 
A further mentioned limitation is that target costing is best used with incremental 
developments, but is less suited when addressing the cost estimation of radical 
product innovations (Roy, 2003). This comes from the fact that target costing requires 
functionality and future cost breakdowns for new product development ideas. This is 
hardly possible for radical innovations, unless a special system for product definition 
and breakdown during these early stages is developed (Roy, 2003). 
2.5.4.3 Value analysis work  
Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1986) state that a high performance to cost ratio and 
economic advantages in the form of cost benefits to the customer are fundamental to 
new product development success. Also Vandermerwe (2000) states that a superior 
value at low delivered cost is essential to success on the market. This value can be 
described by the value to customer concept. According to Tu et al. (2006, p. 697), 
“Value to customer (VC) is the degree to which customers believe that they received 
products and services that are worth more than the price they paid.” The value to 
customers is seen as essential to stay profitable in today’s business environment 
(Vandermerwe, 2000). Karlsson and Ryan (1997) developed an analytical tool for 
rating new product development features according to their relative value and cost. 
Even though they use this tool for software development, it is essentailly transferable 
to all kinds of new product development ideas. Similarly, Ayag (2005) developed an 
analytical tool for evaluating conceptiual design alternatives of new product 
development ideas regarding value and cost. Both tools use the Analytic Hierarchy 
Process (AHP) for the customer value ranking. The Analytic Hierarchy Process is a 
multicriteria decision making approach (Saaty, 1990). It uses paired comparisions to 
arange factors in a hierarchic structure. It uses verbal judgements to rate these pairs 
against each other. These judements are then converted into numerical values and 
analyzed. However, in practice the Analytic Hierarchy Process can also result in 
inconsistent ratings by the customers (Karlsson and Ryan, 1997). Despite this, an 
average trend will usually emerge. 
A concept related to the value to customer concept is value analysis which is also 
known as value engineering or functional value analysis (Drury, 2004). It is focused 
on reducing cost at constant or better quality and customer satisfaction (Stippel, 
1999). This tool can be defined as a methodical approach to evaluating new product 
development designs with the intention of identifying other development possibilities 
that will improve the value of the development by achieving the same utility at lower 
cost. This value is defined as the ratio of functionality to cost (Kaplan and Atkinson, 
1998). According to the ISO 15663-2:2001 standard, value analysis “is a technique 
that is particularly useful for the identification of cost drivers and subsequent option 
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generation” (p. 28). Value analysis analyzes all parts of an offering, starting from the 
bill of materials up to the production type and equipment used. However, it focuses on 
the functions that are connected to high costs. It is a methodical approach that 
systematically analyzes the functions of a procedure or design. Subsequently, costs 
are attributed to these functions. By proper definition of the functions, it is possible to 
create a distance from the design and come up with alternative solutions (ISO 15663-
2:2001). Value analysis work is rooted in investigations around the two main 
equations stated by Cooper and Slagmulder (1997, p. 81): 
• Value = function / cost and 
• Perceived value = perceived benefits / price. 
In this work value analysis work is defined as using one or a set of means that 
measure and analyze the benefit to cost ratio for a new development or 
components of it. It compromises both the technical oriented value analysis and 
the market-oriented value to customer notion. 
According to Kaplan and Atkinson (1998) the connections of value analysis to target 
cost are:  
• Identification of improved product designs or even new product 
developments with reduced component and manufacturing cost at same 
functionality levels and  
• Elimination of unnecessary functions that increase the product’s cost and 
complexity 
Value analysis starts with a detailed specification of the essential functions, an 
activity often called functional analysis (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). The result is a 
detailed specification, e.g. in diagram form. After that, it is analyzed how existing 
products achieve those functions, before new ways of achieving those functions are 
searched and analyzed. Consequently, the alternatives are rated, and, if possible, the 
best elements are taken from each of the alternatives to develop the proposed product 
design (Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998).  
Another value analysis approach is presented by Timmerman (1986). He presents a 
tool called the ‘cost-ratio method’, in which prices are adjusted by the costs or 
benefits the client experiences according to the total cost of ownership principle. One 
example out of a business-to-business setting: If the cost of bad quality results higher 
inspection costs of 100€ and in rework of 1 000€ and the total purchasing value is 100 
000€, the total quality cost ratio is (1 100€/100 000€=) 1,1%. The quoted price then 
has to be adjusted to reflect the total cost of ownership. In this case, there would be 
1,1% of the quoted price added to reflect the cost of bad quality. The disadvantage of 
this method is that it requires a lot of cost data to evaluate the different criteria cost-
wise. 
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2.5.5 Analysis tool summary 
Several tool classes have been presented in the previous subsections. Some do have a 
more explicit cost focus than others. Yet, all these tools can be used to analyze new 
product development ideas during pre-development. 
 
Figure 44: Summarizing tool overview based on literature 
Figure 44 shows an overview of these different tool classes and their definitions. On 
the right side of Figure 44, two characteristics of this tool class are stated. Firstly, it is 
shown whether the tool is analyzing information primarily regarding one particular 
new product development idea (specific); or rather analyzes information for an array 
of new product development ideas at a time (unspecific). Secondly, it is shown 
whether a tool provides general information (general) or mainly cost specific 
information (cost focused) about a new product development idea. 
One has to bear in mind that there can be a possible overlapping in tool use. The 
application of one specific tool can also bring – besides its main use – information 
Tool Definition Specificity Cost focus
Intelligence 
work 
Organized and systemic processes, which are 
used to acquire, analyze and disseminate 
information significant to the business activities 
of companies
Unspecific General
Roadmapping
Visual process of planning and displaying the 
timely evolution of new development idea 
attributes regarding goals, requirements and 
priorities
Unspecific General 
Scorecard use
Analysis through a weighted rating assessment 
system of different qualitative and quantitative 
factors that are aggregated with standardized 
and uniform levels of scale measurement to a 
final score for judgment
Specific General
Uncertainty 
management
Tools used for taking care of, understanding, 
leading, handling, or being in charge of 
uncertainty 
Specific General
Cost dynamics 
analysis
Diagnosis of variable cost structures influenced 
through knowledge related cost reductions of 
learning curve effects, rationalization, 
technological progress, and alike
Unspecific Cost focused
Cost database 
use
Analysis of new product development ideas with 
databases of detailed cost information based on 
a range of cost drivers or manufacturing 
variables 
Unspecific Cost focused
Cost modeling 
and estimation
Representing and predicting cost factors, 
relations and drivers by investigating product 
information to provide approximated cost 
assessments
Specific Cost focused
Target costing 
efforts
Activities aimed at attaining a cost target 
through means that assist the planning, 
development and detailed design of new 
products 
Specific Cost focused
Value analysis 
work
Using one or a set of means that measure and 
analyze the benefit to cost ratio for a new 
development or components
Specific Cost focused
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At DaimlerChrysler Aerospace Airbus (DASA) new product development projects are 
classified according to three different categories (see Figure 46): 
1. Basic research 
2. Technology projects 
3. Product development 
In line with that classification, new development projects are ranked differently 
depending how far a project is from actual use in a product. New product 
development ideas that are still far from incorporation in a market product are 
analyzed qualitatively with a cost benefit analysis. New product development ideas 
that are near to market launch are evaluated through net present value or other cash 
flow based analysis. The cost analysis depends on in which category a new 
development idea is.  
Firstly, new product development projects that fall into the product development 
category use target costing and a continual comparison of product part cost and 
product part benefits to the customer. The customer value is obtained through quality 
function deployment and set in relation to the estimated costs.  
Secondly, new product development projects that fall into the categories of basic 
research or technology projects use parametric product cost modeling and estimation. 
These parametrical cost estimates are based on rule of thumb and experience from 
past developments. The screening of new development ideas is based on R&D 
internal prioritization for basic research projects. For technology projects, the new 
development idea screening is done through the attractiveness of the cost benefit 
analysis. Furthermore, the strategic and operative value of the idea for the company is 
used for rating and analysis.  
2.6.3 A new generation machine innovation at CCM Ltd.  
This subsection is based entirely on a case study reported by Nixon (1998). The case 
study focuses on CCM Ltd. that manufactures and markets continuous casting 
machines for non-ferrous metals. At the time of reporting the company had around 50 
employees and additional sales agents. In the 18 years on the market, it set innovative 
standards in the technology of continuous casting through research and in-house 
development and design. Its competitive position is based on machines that are easy 
and economic to operate, low in investment, and capable of producing consistently 
high quality output. According to the top management, the business would probably 
quickly cease without a steady stream of new and improved machines. In 1995, 65% 
of the turnover came from products introduced in the last 3 years; in 1996 this 
percentage rose to nearly 90% (Nixon, 1998).  
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reduction and consensus building. It was an enabler to acquire technical capability at 
moderate expenditure. Also, the small prototype proved technological feasibility, but 
several technical problems were identified. These had to be resolved in order to 
assemble a full-scale machine. In 1993 the management felt sufficiently confident 
about technical feasibility and that a viable market existed. The top management also 
saw the prospect that the new product development idea could serve as a 
technological platform for a new generation of machines. However, this benefit was 
not quantified, e.g. with a real options approach. Yet, the top management claimed 
that this possibility was never forgotten. The company then acquired external funding 
for the development and convinced a customer to cooperate. This alpha customer also 
agreed to purchase the first machine, if certain pre-defined performance conditions 
were met. The agreement on the future machine price was deferred, as uncertainties 
were still too high. The targeted performance criteria were multiple, e.g. production 
speed, flexibility, and quality of output. However, one of the most important criteria 
was the cost per ton of copper rod produced. The small prototype and the 
collaboration with the alpha customer resulted in a very precise definition of the 
technical and cost targets. The following detailed design and development work on 
the full-scale machine were based on these targets. The financial controller was a part 
in the design and development work from the very outset. This was partly because the 
direct cost per ton of the copper rod output was a crucial design variable. One role of 
the financial controller was to weigh on the one hand operating costs and purchase 
price, and on the other hand profit contribution and cash flow requirements. The 
supervised costs were threefold: 
1. Total budget development costs including consulting, testing and related 
overheads 
2. Future product direct costs of manufacturing 
3. Operating costs as cost per ton of output including maintenance  
This cost type trinity required very close cooperation among design engineers, R& D 
team, manufacturing engineers, component suppliers, financial controller and the 
alpha customer. These costs also turned out to be the linking pin that integrated the 
different interests of the parties (Nixon, 1998). 
The company used value engineering with cost driver analysis to balance the different 
cost dimensions. The financial controller assisted the designer in: 
1. Production and operation cost trade-off evaluation of design possibilities  
2. Standardization to reduce the time and costs of assembly and service 
3. Minimization of the total number of parts 
4. Design simplification for efficient manufacturing, assembling and service. 
The overall development had an emphasis on customer value on top of cost. In order 
to achieve the cost and quality targets, further features that the customer valued and 
was prepared to pay for were added. The financial controller divided the target 
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The calculation scheme used at Leica Geosystems is shown in Figure 48. It deducts 
profit margin and overhead margin from the target price to get the allowable costs. 
These are then further analyzed by forecasted actual costs that are derived in an 
activity-based style. Often there is a target gap between the allowable costs and the 
actual on the other side the forecasted costs. The guiding idea of this calculation is to 
find out what a product is allowed to cost and how the target cost can be reached. It 
replaces the older scheme of calculating what a product will cost and how to convince 
the customer to pay it (Schindler, 1999). 
One lesson learned at Leica Geosystems is that ‘rather be 80% sure to influence the 
right things, as to state with 100% certainty existing facts afterwards and too late’ 
(Schindler, 1999). Thus one should proactively manage costs rather than to administer 
costs with hindsight. 
In general the case does not state explicitly how the product cost analysis during pre-
development is done at Leica Geosystems, as most of the described is done during the 
development phase (Schindler, 1999). 
2.6.5 Target definition and controlling of development projects at 
Siemens ElectroCom 
This subsection is fully based on case study written by Wieczorek (1999) about the 
company Siemens ElectroCom, part of the Siemens group. The company 
acknowledges that nowadays fast changes in science and technology also lead to 
faster product life cycles. An additional megatrend is that the amount and speed of 
exchanged information is growing exponentially worldwide. Furthermore, trade 
barriers are diminishing, leading to a never before seen globalization. This also affects 
customer-supplier relationships. Nowadays the company is analyzing the needs of its 
customers and the customers’ customers more intensely to optimize the entire value 
chain. The company also looks for ways to achieve higher customer retention in a 
more and more unstable business environment (Wieczorek, 1999).  
The above mentioned megatrends also impact the R&D of Siemens ElectroCom. It is 
becoming more difficult to maintain its lead in time and technology compared to its 
main competitors. There is a growth in the strategic relevance of technology 
monitoring and technology pre-development. These two are seen as important to have 
basis components for new products ready on time (Wieczorek, 1999). 
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their potential value. Ultimately, the results are checked and corrected if they are not 
satisfactory (Wieczorek, 1999). 
 
Figure 50: Checks before product development start according to Wieczorek (1999) 
Figure 50 shows different parameters that are checked before a new product 
development idea can proceed into the actual development phase. When checking the 
product cost it is seen important to have comparable cost models for several 
production locations. A clear cost stewardship on component and product level is also 
seen as important. Furthermore, the controlling department has to constantly supply 
product cost estimates in a timely fashion to support the innovation (Wieczorek, 
1999). 
The case of Siemens ElectroCom shows that product cost analysis is already done 
during pre-development in some companies. The company starts using target costing 
already in pre-development and evaluates product cost estimates for their go decision 
in the development stage. However, the described case study does not explain the tool 
use in pre-development in detail.  
2.6.6 Cost dynamics and Miller Lite beer 
The Miller Brewing Company was founded in 1855 by Frederick Miller. In 1966 the 
ownership majority was bought by W. R. Grace & Co. Later in 1969 Philip Morris 
purchased the company for USD 130 million2. Under the ownership of Philip Morris 
it introduced successfully the Miller Lite beer in 1973. According to Hax and Majluf 
(1982) the assessment of the industry cost structure, learning curve effects, and low-
cost technology investments partly explain the success of this market introduction. At 
the time of the entry the beer industry was seen as an aging industry. In line with 
Porter (1980) “entry into an aging industry is regarded as a highly unnatural and 
unproductive strategy” (Hax and Majluf, 1982, p. 59). Nevertheless, the success of 
Phillip Morris was based on a coherent set of strategies, which also included heavy 
investment in new and efficient production facilities (Hax and Majluf, 1982). Also, 
the new beer was an innovative product with a high potential market. Together with 
                                                 
2 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_Brewing_Company. 
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impressive marketing3 and distribution, it succeeded in the market as it followed a 
completely different experience curve than its competitors (Hax and Majluf, 1982). In 
2002 Philip Morris sold Miller to South African Breweries for USD 3.6 billion worth 
of stock and US$2 billion in debt, with Philip Morris retaining a share of 36%4.  
2.6.7 Value oriented project selection at BASF Pharma 
This subsection is fully based on the case study written by Lechner and Völker (1999) 
focusing on the company BASF Pharma. The company uses the discounted free cash 
flow concept for the evaluation of its new product development ideas. This concept is 
based on the notion that the value of a company equals the sum of the discounted free 
cash flow surplus that can be attained with its business activities. Thus a new product 
development idea is to be rated positively if it creates a positive discounted free cash 
flow. Every new product development project that has a positive net present value 
contributes to a value increase for the company. However, simply the analysis of the 
net present value is not enough to rate new product development ideas. Thus it is seen 
as beneficial to model adapted scenarios, especially because of fuzzy data situations. 
Furthermore, it is not only the profitability, but also the general volume and a short 
payback time that matter. Furthermore, a project might create options for follow-up 
projects that also have to be taken into consideration (Lechner and Völker, 1999). 
 
Figure 51: Determination of anticipated product net sales according Lechner and Völker (1999) 
BASF Pharma aims for an as objective as possible evaluation of new product 
development ideas. Thus is uses the net present value as a guiding principle and 
focuses on a cash flow oriented approach. The company starts evaluations during the 
development stage ‘Clinical phase II’, which follows the first phase. Only then is one 
                                                 
3 Miller Lite's advertising campaign was ranked as the 8th best advertising campaign in history by the 
Advertising Age magazine (Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_Lite). 
4 Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Miller_Brewing_Company. 
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able to generate the large amount of data needed for the evaluation. At this point data 
is available that can be used to make a product determinable and describable in its 
markets. E.g. it is needed to know the profile of pharmacological effects, its derived 
therapeutic indication, and also the forecasts of daily dose rates. This information can 
then be used to make first price and production cost estimates. The base calculation 
scheme used for the sales estimation is shown in Figure 51. The calculation scheme 
uses the volume of the market, market share, and price estimates, based on estimated 
daily therapeutic costs. Additionally marketing tools are used. These tools are the 
SWOT analysis and key value driver analysis. The new product development idea is 
also compared to the medical criterion standard5 as a benchmark. This comparison 
evaluates and benchmarks the new drug under development regarding medical 
effectiveness, tolerance, application form, length of therapy, and other factors 
(Lechner and Völker, 1999). 
 
Figure 52: Calculation of expected project value according Lechner and Völker (1999) 
Figure 52 shows an overview how the evaluation number is calculated. The 
production costs are estimated on the basis of standard values by using indicatory 
calculation schemes and the average daily dose rate. Also, the marketing costs are 
planned that result from the targeted marketing mix. Furthermore, other cash-out like 
investments are also taken into consideration if they are necessary. The calculated net 
present value is further multiplied by an estimated probability of implementation. At 
BASF Pharma this probability is p<0,15 for projects in the second development phase 
and 0,3<p<0,5 for projects in the third development phase (Lechner and Völker, 
1999). 
                                                 
5 The criterion standard is also referred to as gold standard in the medical field. It refers to a medical 
diagnostic test or benchmark that is regarded as definitive. [See also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold_standard_(test)] 
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research is to understand the effect for Hilti for discovered and understood scientific 
effects. On the basis of that, technology development at the corporate research unit 
should advance technologies in such a manner that they could be applied to product 
modules. Also the product costs are optimized in the technology development stage. 
This is done in a tradeoff with quality and durability. In the ideal case the technical 
feasibility of a technology has to be 100% certain before it is moving into the product 
development stage. This product development stage is then located at the different 
business units. It is the responsibility of the business units to develop products and 
market them (Bösch, 2006). 
Overall, work of the corporate research unit is guided by the demand of the 
technology development units of each business area. In that case the technology 
development units are the internal customers of the corporate research unit. However, 
a part of the applied research is one without internal customers. This is done with the 
focus of working on technologies whose applicability is still very far in future. There 
the aim is to gain insight and elaborate the relevance for Hilti (Bösch, 2006). 
Each business unit has its own innovation strategy that is derived from the top-down 
formulated corporate strategy. The corporate strategy is based on the on the concept 
of “Champion 3C”. The 3C-concept stands for customer, competence, and 
concentration. The customer notion stands for the idea that Hilti wants to be the best 
partner of the clients and that customer needs are driving Hilti’s action. The 
competence notion stands for leading innovation, comprehensive quality, direct 
customer relationships, and effective marketing. The concentration notion stands for 
focusing on markets where Hilti will achieve and hold a leading position. The overall 
strategy of R&D is reported by the corporate innovation management unit. This 
corporate innovation management unit is one further part of the new business and 
technology division (Bösch, 2006). 
Product managers of the different business units accompany new product 
development ideas through the product development process as well as the entire life 
cycle. The continuous involvement of these product managers lowers interface 
problems at the different innovation process phases. These product managers also act 
as the voice of the customer during product development (Bösch, 2006). 
Hilti also employs Business Developer and Controller for the corporate research unit, 
the technology development units, and product development. Regarding innovation 
these Business Developer and Controller provide several services for the different 
business units: 
• Project controlling 
• Reporting on project over-spanning level 
• Decision support about potential new product development projects 
• Support regarding go/no-go decisions of running projects 
• Information support for strategy updates 
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Regarding the project controlling, a cockpit-chart is created monthly. This cockpit-
chart is a short status report that also shows possible challenges, the cost situation, and 
progress of a new product development. This reported cost situation contains both 
budget costs and future product costs. For the creation of this cockpit-chart the 
Business Developer and Controller supports the new product development project 
manager (Bösch, 2006). 
The reporting on project over-spanning level is based on a budget-focused analysis. 
Here the Business Developer and Controller helps the management of the different 
business units to control actual vs. planned costs (Bösch, 2006). 
The Business Developer and Controller also assists regarding the decisions about 
potential new product development projects. Each business unit has a committee 
that decides which new product development ideas should be developed into projects. 
This committee analyses new ideas in specially scheduled meetings. One part of this 
analysis is the potential future profitability of new product development ideas. For 
this analysis the Business Developer and Controller prepares an analysis that answers 
the following questions: 
• How large is the total available market (TAM) for the new product 
development idea? 
• What will be development and future production cost for the new product 
development idea? 
• How is the demand expected to develop on the market? 
• What activities of the competition are to be anticipated? 
• How many pieces of the new product development idea can be sold within 1 
and 3 years? 
If possible new product development ideas are compared to existing products. The 
comparison analyses especially if the new or added customer benefit justifies the 
expenses for development and market launch (Bösch, 2006). 
Regarding go/no-go decisions of running projects the Business Developer and 
Controller helps analyzing new product development ideas on gate reviews. At Hilti 
only one new product development idea at a time is analyzed in a gate review 
meeting. The go/no-go decisions are made by the guiding committee of the business 
unit that also contains the Business Developer and Controller. The analyzed criteria 
depend on the innovation stage in which a new product development idea resides. 
However, they usually contain at least the technical feasibility and the potential 
profitability of the development (Bösch, 2006). 
The Business Developer and Controller provides information support for strategy 
updates to the business areas. Information about the different projects of the business 
units are summarized at business unit level. This summary is the base of the 
innovation project portfolio that is regularly checked. Furthermore, the Business 
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good as possible for all technologies that are seen as important for a product to stand 
out on the market based on quality and performance. Several analyses are made after 
roadmapping all technologies of a business area on this S-curve. One analysis aims at 
finding underperforming technologies in the technology portfolio in order to improve 
them. Furthermore, it is analyzed if the technologies of the company are represented 
in all phases of the technology life cycle (Bösch, 2006). 
As stated above, Business Developer and Controllers also assist the controlling of the 
whole new business and technology division by maintaining a cockpit-chart for the 
division. Through maintaining a cockpit-chart the business and technology division 
has three main blocks that are measured or estimated:  
• Build enabling elements 
• Create enthusiastic customers 
• Create a better future 
Competences and processes are in focus in the block of building enabling elements. 
It checks e.g. how many competences are available in comparison to an ideal 
situation. Furthermore, the quality of processes in the business and technology 
division and other issues are rated.  
The block of creating enthusiastic customers focuses on single research projects. It 
checks the effectiveness of the projects, i.e. whether the projects of the corporate 
research unit satisfy the expectations of the business units. Also the budgeted cost and 
time are checked.  
The ‘create a better future’ block stands for the notion that enough interesting and 
valuable ideas should be available. It also checks whether the research is evenly 
distributed between the different business areas and the maturity of the different 
technologies (Bösch, 2006). 
Last but not least, the corporate innovation management unit is the hub where data 
from the business units, the technology development and the corporate research are 
converging. The corporate innovation management unit is consolidating the data of 
the different units to give a picture about the past performance and innovation 
planning. Regarding the past performance, this consolidated data is analyzed with six 
key ratios: 
• On time delivery 
• Sales share new products 
• Time to market 
• Total cycle time 
• Profit share new product 
• Introduction sales of new products 
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Regarding the innovation planning, the aim is first and foremost how the future sales 
of new products are going to develop in the next 3-5 years. The portfolio balance is 
also checked regarding technology risk, innovation newness and market 
differentiation. The strategic orientation of the innovation portfolio is also regularly 
checked.  
On top of the aforementioned, the corporate innovation management unit offers 
company internal innovation consulting at Hilti (Bösch, 2006). 
2.6.9 Summarizing the case studies from literature 
In the last subsections seven case studies from literature are described. They all have 
in common that they at least partly deal with product cost analysis during pre-
development.  
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found in the article of Nixon (1998) and the doctoral thesis of Bösch (2006). 
However, in Nixon (1998) the product cost analysis is focused on the development 
stage and Bösch (2006) takes more of a helicopter view focusing on the role of his 
developed controlling management performance measurement system. 
Nevertheless, the cases show that product cost analysis during pre-development is 
done in the industry. However, the cases also show that there is a need to study the 
practices in more detail. This is done in the empirical part of this thesis further down. 
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3 Methodology  
3.1 Qualitative vs. quantitative and deductive vs. inductive 
research 
Generally, the key issues in research are from where to gather which kind of evidence 
and how to interpret it correctly to answer the declared research question. There are 
two radically different approaches to research – qualitative or quantitative. Depending 
on which one you choose the research design will be different. As the names suggest, 
quantitative studies rely on quantitative information (i.e. numbers and figures), while 
qualitative studies base their accounts on qualitative information (i.e. words, 
sentences and narratives) (Blumberg et al., 2005). In his book about qualitative and 
quantitative approaches in research design, Creswell (2003) describes how the 
research questions and hypotheses should be derived for these different approaches to 
research. On one hand, in quantitative studies, the researcher will state hypotheses. 
These are predictions the researcher derives from theory or experience about 
relationships among variables. These predictions are then tested and either confirmed 
or falsified. A third possibility is that it is not possible to make a statistically sound 
decision about the validity. Creswell (2003) gives three main uses of hypotheses: 
1. Comparison of variables/parameters 
2. Relations of variables/parameters to each other 
3. Description of response to independent, mediating or depending variables. 
Depending on the matter under study the research question will be either a null 
(stating the inexistence of a relationship) or an alternative hypothesis (stating that the 
outcome will be in favor of one alternative). 
On the other hand, in qualitative studies, the researcher will in most cases state 
research questions to show what his study should answer. Qualitative data is useful 
for understanding the rationale or theory underlying a setting, while quantitative data 
can reveal relationships that are not evident from a mere qualitative study (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Creswell (2003) recommends to have a central question and to associate sub-
questions, which then should be answered in the research investigation, an approach 
taken in this thesis. 
As the taken research approach is an in-detail investigation of tools, methods and 
mechanisms in pre-development, a quantitative approach that presumes predictions 
about relationships from theory or experience is less useful in this research. Instead, 
this thesis looks at challenges of innovations, different (cost) analysis tools and their 
use during pre-development. In general, the analyzed research material is not 
homogeneous. Important contingencies might be found through a detailed study, 
rather than a quantitative approach. 
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A further point enforcing a qualitative research approach, rather than a quantitative 
one is that the terminology used might not be familiar to mangers. The research is 
near to the daily business that companies are facing during the management of 
innovation. This makes mailing surveys failure prone as different methods articulated 
in academic literature might not be known to managers by the academic name, even 
though they are using them.  
However, taking an overall qualitative research approach does not mean that no 
analysis based on quantification could be used. Miles and Huberman (1994) believe 
that too much quantitative-qualitative argument is in essence useless. They argue that 
both are needed to understand the world. Besides the limitations of a questionnaire-
based survey stated above, qualitative approaches can also use quantification strategy 
for sense making.  
3.2 Research strategies and design 
One of the main challenges in the process of writing a thesis is to assess, choose and 
work with a methodology. This section explores possible research methodologies and 
strategies that could be applied to answer the research questions introduced in a 
suitable and methodologically rigorous manner. The objective of this section is to 
present an overview of existing methodological concepts and to define the research 
paradigm and strategy used in this thesis.  
 
Figure 58: Relevant situations for different research strategies according to Yin (1989, p. 17) 
Yin (1989) gives an overview of five selected research strategies and their relevant 
situations (see Figure 58). It would be difficult to set up an experiment for the above 
stated research question, as it would require control over behavioral events of the 
studied phenomena. This is a setting that is usually not feasible in management 
research, as the subjects under study –managers – tend to be powerful and busy 
people. Thus an experimental setting to answer the stated research question would not 
be practically feasible.  
Strategy
Form of research 
question
Requires control over 
behavioral events?
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events?
Experiment How, why Yes Yes
Survey
Who, what*, where, how 
many, how much
No Yes
Archival analysis
Who, what*, where, how 
many, how much
No Yes/no
History How, why No No
Case study How, why No Yes
* what questions, when asked as part of an exploratory study, pertain to all five strategies
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As no archive with relevant data could be accessed, archival analysis is also not 
feasible in this setting to answer the sought after research question. Similarly, a 
historical study would not be beneficial for this research as a contemporary setting is 
desired to reflect the latest findings and contingencies. Thus out of the five presented 
research strategies in Figure 58, only the survey and the case study strategy remain.  
According to Yin (1989) if results of a specific event or phenomenon are the 
researched topic, surveys will be favorable over case studies, especially if a tested 
theory is predictive about certain outcomes. On the contrary, Yin (1989) argues that 
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions are more explanatory and likely to lead to the use of case 
studies as preferred research strategy. Additionally, Langley (1999) notes that a case 
study research will lead to more subtle nuances to be discovered and included than in 
a questionnaire-based study. According to her, the research will be thicker and can 
lead to more meaningful and potentially more powerful explanatory variables.  
The research underlying this thesis elaborates why and how cost information is used 
in pre-development phases. Moreover, this research deals with cost management 
concepts and methods that are likely to not be fully familiar to many managers 
working in innovations (as representatives of the study population). Furthermore the 
sophistication of use will be different in different companies. Therefore the validity of 
the results of a survey would be doubtful. E.g. my own past experience has shown that 
managers could easily mistake the concept of target costing with some other practice. 
Thus, in order to get reliable data, a deeper understanding, and to be able to answer 
the research question, a case study approach was selected.  
In the footnote of the overview presented in Figure 58, Yin (1989) states that in the 
case of an explanatory study, ‘what’-questions can be supplemented to all research 
strategies. This is also done in this thesis. This thesis is not only focusing on the how 
and why, but explores new areas of cost management in pre-development phases. 
 
Figure 59: Contrasting theoretical contributions of selected methods 
Hand in hand with the qualitative approach of this thesis goes the aim of this thesis to 
build up a higher understanding of the tools, methods and mechanisms in pre-
development. There are several approaches to case study research. Furthermore the 
Type Focus Starts with Mean
Case study 
acc. to Yin (1989)
Confirm/falsify 
theory
Theory 
development
Individual & cross case 
conclusions
Case study 
acc. to Eisenhardt
(1989)
Build theory
Research 
question 
identification
Develop constructs & 
compare to literature
Constructive approach 
acc. to Kasanen et al. 
(1993)
Solve 
problems
Problem 
identification
Construction of models, 
plans etc. & application 
(market test)
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constructive approach, a method developed in the field of management accounting, 
could be applicable. Some major points of these three methods are presented in Figure 
59. As one can see, the focus of the three methods is slightly differently. While the 
case study approaches according to Yin (1989) and Eisenhardt (1989) both are 
connected to either theory testing or building, the constructive approach from 
Kasanen et al. (1993) aims mostly at problem solving. When it comes to theory, 
Sutton and Straw (1995) clearly state that references, data, lists of variables, 
constructs, diagrams and hypotheses are not theory by themselves. All these points 
have to be processed further to build theory. As this thesis aims not at solving a 
specific problem, but at developing a proposition for a new tentative theory, the 
constructive approach according to Kasanen et al. (1993) is not used. 
When comparing these two approaches one can see an essential difference. Yin 
(1989) assumes that a tentative theory can be derived from literature before the start 
of a case study. The case study is then used to test this tentative theory with the 
empirical material provided by the case study. Thus, in the approach of Yin (1989) the 
theory is stated in the beginning as a ‘blueprint of the research’, Eisenhardt (1989) 
attributes that neither theory nor hypotheses should be used in the beginning ‘to 
maintain theoretical flexibility’. The theoretical flexibility can be a strong motivation 
to choose this approach, if novel findings are the aim of the research like it is in this 
thesis. A general strength to case study research and especially of the approach of 
Eisenhardt (1989) with its flexibility, is that the likelihood of generating novel theory 
is higher than in other research approaches. Instead of starting with a theoretical 
construct like Yin (1989), the approach of Eisenhardt (1989) increases the likelihood 
of a new theoretical revelation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Another strength of case study 
research is that constructs that result from the research are more likely to be 
measurable and easier to confirm or falsify than otherwise derived theoretical 
constructs. Furthermore, theory crafted through case study research is more likely to 
be empirically valid (Eisenhardt, 1989). All these strengths are more likely to be 
found in case studies exercised with the approach of Eisenhardt (1989) rather than 
Yin (1989), as the first develops theory only at later stages, while the latter develops 
the theory as a first step. For the reason of this crucial difference, the case study 
approach of Eisenhardt (1989) is chosen for this thesis.  
Nevertheless, there has also been a critical voice regarding the case study approach of 
Eisenhardt (1989). Dyer and Wilkins (1991) would like to see a richer description of 
fewer cases. However, this work incorporates both positive aspects. Several cases are 
researched and richer descriptions – in form of quotations – are included. This is 
possible because this thesis is not as much restricted in pages as a scientific journal 
article would be. 
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3.3 Contingency analysis, determinism and managerial 
choice 
One main question often used for theorizing is ‘why is something like it is’ (Sutton 
and Straw, 1995; Daft, 1985). In this case contingency theory can provide valuable 
answers.  
The second research question asks why the product cost analysis during pre-
development is done the way it is. This question is one example of a possible strive 
between ‘contingency approach’ (e.g. Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Donaldson, 1996) 
and ‘strategic choice’ (e.g. Child, 1972). Simplifying and shortening the matter a great 
deal, one can say that that this question is part of a larger question set that deals with 
what forces shape the organization of a company.  
Supporters of the contingency theory see a connection between the environment of a 
company and how a company is shaped. The environment “shapes its strategy, 
technology, size and required innovation rate. These contingency factors in turn 
determine the required structure” (Donaldson, 1996, p. 2). On the contrary, supporters 
of the strategic choice view state that managers running organizations can choose 
freely about strategies and structures (Donaldson, 1996). The notion of ‘strategic 
choice’ is here renamed to ‘managerial choice’, as to fit the frame of this thesis that 
lies in management accounting and not strategy.  
In its basic description, contingency theory is based on the principle of theoretical 
formulations. These theoretical formulations associate contingent variables with the 
environment, organizational characteristics, and decision-making style in which they 
are identified (Donaldson, 1996; Drury, 2004). In the context of this thesis the 
question is how the analysis practices during innovation are arranged and why it is 
like that. One possibility is that the analysis style depends on several characteristics of 
the specific company and environment in which it is operating in. Another possibility 
is that managers can chose freely.  
Several contingency factors have been analyzed and identified in studies (see 
Donaldson, 1996, for a selective review). Contingencies can be the variable 
characteristics when looking at a multitude of several companies. However, for one 
company itself, these variable characteristics are actually fixed to a certain extent 
(Pavitt, 1990). Companies cannot completely freely change their underlying business 
and the dominating business logic (e.g. if the business is rather product or process 
oriented). Otherwise, they would have some penalties in the form of cost, 
inefficiencies or new knowledge to acquire. The approach to the market, rather 
specialized or rather broad with diversified products, is also usually set to some 
degree. Thus these sluggish and slow-variable distinct features are typical company 
characteristics for the companies. 
Already over 25 years ago, contingency theory has been accepted in the field of 
management accounting (Otley, 1980; Drury, 2004). Shifting to innovation research, a 
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multitude of factors can affect innovation practices and it is unlikely that there is a 
general formula for successful innovation that can be used by all companies 
regardless of the situation they are in (Tidd, 2001). However, according to Tidd 
(2001), contingency theory helps to create improved understanding how context 
affects innovation. Tidd (2001) also argues that contingencies cannot determine 
everything, as this would dictate certain management and there would be no choice of 
the company leaders anymore. Thus he argues that contingencies constrain, rather 
than fully determine the operations and (best) practices for companies and the 
respective environment they are working in. 
This thesis analyses a set of case companies to talk about cost management during 
pre-development phases. However, it is difficult to claim that the findings are 
universally applicable as there are always different conditions attached to a specific 
situation in which some cost management tool performs better than in others. This is 
based on the idea of the contingency theory postulated by Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1967). Thus, when it comes to theorizing the findings, the contingency theory 
approach should be used. Langley (1999) is arguing similarly when stating that there 
is a trade-off between accuracy and generality.  
In management accounting research prior to the employment of contingency theory 
approaches, researchers assumed that a – for all organizations alike – fitting 
management accounting information system design could be discovered. However, 
the contingency theory approach supports the idea that there is not one ‘best’ design, 
but that ‘it all depends’ upon the situational factors. These situational factors represent 
the contingent factors (Drury, 2004). In the words of Eisenhardt, building evidence 
“occurs through constant comparison between data and constructs so that 
accumulating evidence from diverse sources converges on a single, well-defined 
construct” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 541) and this construct will be dependent upon the 
situational factors according to the contingency theory.  
 
Figure 60: The contingency theory framework applied to management accounting according to 
Drury (2004) 
The framework shown in Figure 60 represents the simplified chain of argumentation 
used in the contingency theory framework. In this framework the contingency 
variables of the first box are assumed to influence the design of the management 
accounting information systems (box 2) that are e.g. used for preparing decision 
Contingent variables
Characteristics of management
accounting information systems
Organizational effectiveness
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making. Furthermore, contingency theory implies that in the end the organizational 
performance or effectiveness depends on the level of fit or alignment between the 
contingent variable and the management accounting information system (linkage 
between the second and third boxes in Figure 60) (Drury, 2004).  
3.4 Setting up the field study  
These methodological considerations stated above are the base for the further work in 
this thesis. With these as a base the field can be entered for the study that is described 
in the following. 
3.4.1 Getting started 
The chosen case study approach starts with an initial definition of the research 
question (Eisenhardt, 1989). This has already been done in subsection 1.2. This thesis 
follows the recommendation of Eisenhardt (1989) and does neither spell out a 
predominant theory, nor hypothesis for the research to be taken. This is done in order 
to retain the theoretical flexibility. However, the methods and tools introduced in the 
literature overview about cost management tools are kept in mind in order to provide 
a better grounding of the construct measures during the research (as it is suggested by 
Eisenhardt, 1989). 
This thesis is founded in empirical research conducted as a research project during 
2005-2007. During this research project, the focus has gradually moved from the 
beginning of the development phase towards the front end of innovation and basic 
R&D.  
3.4.2 Case selection 
The study of future product cost analysis during pre-development lives from the 
analysis of companies. This intersection of innovation management and management 
accounting is enriched to a high extend by company developments. This is due to two 
facts. The first is that management accounting has been driven for quite a long time 
by company developments (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). The second is that the latest 
academic developments have not been applied widely outside of simplified academic 
settings. Thus a dependency on company developments is evident in the history of 
management accounting.  
Furthermore, studying a single company would allow a very detailed description of 
the procedures of this company. However, studying several companies would increase 
the likelihood of discovering new practices, allow cross-company patterns to emerge 
and provide more generalizable findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus a multiple case 
study is chosen as approach to this study. 
3.4.2.1 Selection criteria 
According to Eisenhardt (1989) the selection of cases is an important aspect in theory 
building from case study research. Generally, there are two different possible 
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approaches to case selection; random sampling and theoretical sampling. Random 
sampling tries to create a representative sample of the study population, for example, 
a vote analysis. The aim of random sampling is to be demographically representative. 
On the contrary, theoretical sampling tries to look for specific characteristics in order 
to learn about what kind of influence these have on the researched topic (e.g. the 
R&D spending on the intensity of cost management in pre-development). The aim of 
theoretical sampling is to choose cases according to theoretical reasons rather than 
statistical ones. According to Eisenhardt (1989) a random selection of cases is 
possible, but neither necessary nor preferable.  
During the study, several cases are added for further study, until a closure is reached. 
Eisenhardt (1989) states that the ideal point for stopping adding cases is when 
theoretical saturation is reached. This is the case when the marginal learning is 
minimal because the researcher is observing phenomena seen before. This is the case 
in this thesis. Adding cases was stopped as the marginal utility of the research was 
going down and a lack of novelty in the cases was apparent. As there was a limitation 
of time and resources, i.e. one researcher, the addition of supplementary cases was 
stopped once the total of seven case companies was reached. The core cases with 
which the analysis was started were Dali, Kandinsky and Warhol. The other four 
cases joined in while the interviews for these core cases were already on-going. 
The research is done as a seven-company multiple case study. The sample selection 
aimed to cover several central aspects. The first and perhaps most important was that 
the company should be engaged in innovation activities. The second aspect was to 
achieve differences in the size of the companies under study. Three medium sized 
companies (turnover between 10 and 100 Mio Euro) were studied, while three other 
companies can be classified as very large companies (turnover over a billion Euros). 
No small companies were included in the study, as the innovation activity and the 
amount and effort of cost management made in the pre-development was estimated as 
being rather low, and the companies would not have met the first criterion. The third 
criterion was to get a differentiation of business to business (B2B) vs. business to 
consumer (B2C) companies. Two of the studied companies are operating in a B2C 
environment. However, one of these companies operates in both B2C as well as B2B 
markets. Furthermore, it was attempted to gather a diversified industry sample, i.e. 
companies operating in different industries. However, as five of the seven case 
companies are partly or fully operating in the telecommunication industry there might 
be a bias towards its business type and its operating logic.  
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Figure 61: Classification of case companies 
An overview of the case companies is shown in Figure 61. As a pointer for the R&D 
activity the R&D spending per turnover is included in the overview. Additionally the 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) per turnover are used as an indicator for 
profitability. To relate the company to its performance on the stock market, they are 
also classified by price per earnings ratio. However, in three cases this is not possible 
as the company is part of a larger group.  
3.4.2.2 Case overview  
This section presents details of the seven case companies. To retain the 
confidentiality, the different case companies were assigned names of artists (Dali, 
Duchamp, Kandinsky, Lichtenstein, Miro, Van Gogh and Warhol). The companies 
are presented in alphabetical order in this section. 
• Dali is operating in a business-to-business (B2B) environment and produces 
mechanical and electronic parts and modules for the telecommunication, 
medical and automotive industries. It is a large sized company that operates 
globally in four continents. The company traditionally has a manufacturing 
focus, as it grew through manufacturing excellence. The case company is 
using up-to date manufacturing technologies and methods.  
• Duchamp operates in both business-to-business (B2B) and business-to-
consumer (B2C) environments in the telecommunications industry. Duchamp 
is an international company, operating mostly in Europe.  
• Kandinsky operates in a business-to-business (B2B) environment and 
designs, manufactures and markets electronic products in the 
telecommunication, healthcare and other industrial industries. It operates 
globally in four continents and is classified as a medium sized company.  
• Lichtenstein operates as a venturing organization in the business-to-business 
(B2B) field. It is a part of a larger company operating in the electronics 
industry. Lichtenstein itself is classified as medium sized company. 
Name Dali Duchamp Kandinsky Lichtenstein Miro Van Gogh Warhol
Company 
size Large Very large Medium Medium Very large Medium Very large
Turnover [€] 100m to 1bn > 1 bn€ 10 to 100 m€ 10 to 100 m€ > 1 bn€ 10 to 100 m€ > 1 bn€
R&D 
spending per 
turnover
0 to 1% 1 to 5% 5 to 10% > 10% 1 to 5% 5 to 10% > 10%
EBIT per 
turnover 0 to 5% > 10% negative negative 5 to 10% 5 to 10% > 10%
P/E ratio1 0 to 15 15 to 30 0 to 15 n/a2 15 to 30 n/a2 n/a2
B2B/B2C B2B B2B & B2C B2B B2B B2B B2C B2B
1Earnings reported for 2004 in relation to average stock price 2005 
2Fully consolidated into a holding company that is stock listed
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• Miro operates in a business-to-business (B2B) environment and manufactures 
and markets chemicals and industrial services connected to these industries. 
The company is classified as a very large company. 
• Van Gogh operates in a business-to-consumer (B2C) environment and 
designs, manufactures and markets electronic products connected to a sport 
and health theme. Van Gogh is classified as medium sized company. 
• Warhol operates in a business-to-business (B2B) environment and designs, 
manufactures and markets electronic products connected with 
telecommunication equipment. Warhol is classified as a very large company. 
3.4.2.3 Method of data collection 
The data was mostly collected through semi-structured face-to-face interviews, 
company websites and reports, corporate organizational charts and product 
development records. Interviews were the prime data gathering method due to 
practical reasons of confidentiality. For the case companies the content of their new 
product developments were to be kept strictly confidential, while the methods of new 
product development practices were not classified as strictly. Thus the researcher was 
not allowed to investigate the original documents of the company’s new product 
developments, e.g. business plans or feasibility studies, as that would have meant too 
much disclosure of the actual content of these new product development ideas. 
Rather, the used methods were discussed and documentation about the company’s 
processes during new product developments was studied. As Eisenhardt (1989) 
suggests, the researcher was opportunistic to use all available information available to 
him. Thus whenever possible, further documents were also used. These were often 
organizational presentations about different methods and innovation procedure time 
lines (e.g. company records in the form of MS-Power Point presentations, 
organizational flow charts, checklists, scorecards etc.). Furthermore, the researcher 
asked the interviewees to present or draw their company’s stage-gate model in the 
beginning of the first interview. This was done in order to clear out the time line of 
when which kind of cost management related action was taken. In some cases, 
additional quantitative cost information was gathered during or after the interview. 
This information was usually connected to a specific innovation case and used to give 
a better insight. 
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Figure 62: Interviewee position overview 
An overview of the different interviews in each company is shown in Figure 62. The 
interviews were made in a semi-structured interview style, and usually recorded and 
transcribed (except where indicated differently). In cases where the interviewed 
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managers would have been uneasy and disturbed by the recording, i.e. in some first 
meetings, notes were written down per hand during the interview and enriched shortly 
after the interview. The semi-structured interview style was chosen, as the goal was to 
get a rather thick description of different situations and tools in pre-development 
phases from the interviewed managers. Usually the discussions went quickly into the 
researched subject as publicly available information on the companies was collected 
from their websites and annual reports. The length of the interviews usually lasted 
from one to two hours. In one case, an interview lasted only 45 min (2nd interview at 
Lichtenstein), while on one other occasion a meeting lasted a whole afternoon (1st 
interview with Dali). The cases are arranged in the order of the first interview date. In 
total the interviews were conducted in the time frame from September 2005 to 
December 2006. The written findings were fed back to the interviewed managers for 
confirmation and comments. 
3.4.3 Research and study towards theorizing 
There are many ways of creating knowledge about the world but not all might be 
scientific. In order to create knowledge through research in a scientific way the results 
have to be supported by empirical reality. Furthermore, the results have to be found in 
a scientific and rigid manner (Abnor and Bjerke 1997).  
Eisenhardt (1989) states that inductive researchers usually use a multitude of different 
methods to analyze cases. As rationale for this, she argues that different data sources 
allow triangulation and provide a stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses. Triangulation can be defined as a convergent validation of several 
methods and research facets (Jick, 1979). It is seen as a method to ensure the validity 
of research in social sciences. 
Even though Glaser and Strauss (1967) propose a joint collection and analysis of 
empirical data to uncover patterns and other discoveries, Eisenhardt (1989) claims 
that this is often not possible to a full extend. However, she recommends having at 
least some degree of overlap, as it was done in this thesis. Coding and first analysis 
was already started before the first interviews of the last cases were made. 
Langley (1999) identifies several strategies for theorizing. One of these strategies is 
what she calls a narrative strategy. It is the structuring of detailed narratives from 
the collected raw data. This strategy should yield a thick description that will often 
produce a ‘déjà vu’ feeling. However, this approach is limited in the amount of cases 
to be used. Nevertheless, according to Langley (1999) it is used by many researchers 
also as a first stepping stone into further detailed research. 
Another strategy is what Langley (1999) calls the synthetic strategy. This synthetic 
strategy is a sense-making strategy that uses whole processes as units of analysis. 
Global measures are used to describe and explain these processes. In a next step these 
measures are used to compare different processes and to identify regularities. These 
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regularities will form the basis of a predictive theory that relates process 
characteristics to other variables.  
A third strategy is the visual mapping strategy. According to Langley (1999), this 
strategy can be useful for the development and verification of theoretical ideas. This 
strategy contains visual graphical representations that are especially useful for the 
analysis of process data. It displays several dimensions simultaneously usually over a 
time axis. These graphical representations are usually a summary of different 
incidences. One approach to generate a more universal understanding is comparing 
several of these illustrations. These can then crystallize to ‘causal maps’ that can lead 
to a more general theory (Langley, 1999).  
When using the narrative and the synthetic strategy, the data analysis was carried out 
with a conceptually clustered matrix (Robson, 2002). This was basically done by 
structuring the empirical data in tabulated fields and categorizing them. These 
categorizations were done for each case in itself, but on a template that evolved 
during the research. I.e. when a pattern or finding was detected, the other cases were 
also checked according to it and the new categorization was also introduced to the 
other cases. The understanding was build up by constantly checking the empirical 
data case for case and cross-case. Also the following instruments were crafted to 
enrich the understanding and grasp possible findings from the total data set. 
Once the analysis yields results the next step towards theorizing after the within and 
cross-case analysis is to shape propositions using the insights of the analysis 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). The central idea is the constant evaluation of possible 
theoretical conclusions and their fit to the data. This step is depicted by Eisenhardt 
(1989) as the ‘sharpening of constructs’. This sharpening of constructs is done by 
crafting a construct definition and building evidence that assesses the explanation 
power of the construct definition in each case. This is done through comparison 
between case data and possible findings to get a valid construct (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.5 Crafting instruments regarding tool use  
This section looks at the actual research analysis of the empirics. First, general 
research analysis instruments are configured. A process that Eisenhardt (1989) calls 
‘crafting instruments’. The different analysis methods – or ‘instruments’ in the words 
of Eisenhardt (1989) – are defined in the following subsections, in order to craft the 
instruments regarding the analysis of the found tool. 
3.5.1 Tools and their first use 
The motivation for this study is to understand how product cost analysis during pre-
development is practiced in industry today, as this has received little attention in the 
literature so far. A first step towards this study is to use the visual mapping strategy 
according to Langley (1999) to model the found cost analysis during pre-development 
(see Figure 63).  
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Figure 63: An exemplary overview of first time tool use 
Each section about one individual case company starts with a graphical overview of 
the different tools the company reported to use in the pre-development phases. As 
shown in Figure 63, the overview illustrates when the analyzed company is using 
what kind of tools the first time in the course of their (standard) NPD process. As 
many companies use a stage-gate model for their innovation processes, the different 
tools are shown as ‘flags’ and the ‘flag poles’ connect the tools with the respective 
innovation phases in which the company is using it for the first time.  
Additionally the different found tools are described in more detail in the within-case 
analysis for the different case companies. This is done to illustrate how found tools 
are used in business settings. This specific tool use description follows the order that 
is presented in the literature overview. 
3.5.2 Normalizing the pre-development tool use  
In order to analyze the first time tool use of the companies, the term ‘normalized pre-
development tool use’ is used. This normalized first time deployment of the different 
found tools is used in the analysis below.  
In this thesis the normalized pre-development tool use is defined as the standardized 
first time use of a tool. It is standardized to three possible values for the pre-
development: 
1. Front end (or shortly front) 
2. Middle 
3. Rear end (or shortly rear) 
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Figure 64: Normalization of first time tool use in pre-development  
The normalized pre-development tool use is derived as follows: As shown in Figure 
64, the distance between the front end of innovation and the detailed design start for a 
specific product was split and distributed over the above mentioned three values. This 
means that e. g. a method found to be used in the front end of innovation would be 
assigned the value ‘front’. However, a method found in the development stage would 
not get any value assigned, i.e. not be taken into consideration for this research. As 
stated in the literature review in subsection 2.2.1.1, companies can have several stages 
in pre-development. For this analysis the value ‘front’ always means the front end 
of innovation. On the contrary the value ‘rear’ always means the last stage 
before development start. The stage or stages in between are given the value 
‘middle’ (see Figure 64). In the case that a company uses only two stages before 
development start, the first is called front and the second is called rear as it is the last 
stage before the actual development start. This approach is deliberately chosen to 
ensure a consistent notion in the further analysis.  
Further down, the normalized first time use of tools for the different case companies 
are described in detail and set in relation to other company specific parameters. The 
in-detail analysis is carried out in the first sections of the cross-case study (chapter 
4.7.7). 
3.5.3 The relative cost tool importance  
The tool use during pre-development phases varies from company to company. Thus 
different companies organize their future product cost analysis differently. In order to 
analyze this, specific cost tools have the ‘relative cost tool importance’ calculated. 
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Figure 66: Overview of crafted methodological instruments regarding tool use  
In total five instruments regarding the tool use study are shown in Figure 66. The first 
is a graphical overview (first time tool use). The second normalizes the first time tool 
use in three different phases of pre-development. The third uses ratios for particular 
aspects of tool use (relative cost tool importance) that give an aggregated view of the 
found tool use in pre-development. Finally, the fourth and the fifth deal with the tool 
analysis itself. 
3.6 Crafting instruments regarding organizational 
contingencies 
This section also looks at the actual research analysis of the empirics by ‘crafting 
instruments’ (Eisenhardt, 1989) regarding the organizational contingencies of the case 
companies. These instruments are necessary to uncover whether company 
contingencies shape the product cost analysis during pre-development. 
3.6.1 Company characteristics  
Above the instruments were crafted regarding the analysis of the found tools. Yet, that 
looks only at a part of the picture. The possible company characteristics of the case 
companies must also be crafted for this work. 
Company characteristics, e.g. the size of a company, can be organizational 
contingencies (Drazin and Van de Ven, 1985; Pavitt, 1990; Tidd, 2001). Thus the 
analysis below will look at the following company characteristics6:  
• Turnover as a proxy for company size 
• R&D spending per turnover as a proxy for the R&D activity and intensity of 
the cases 
• Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) per turnover as a proxy for the 
profitability of the case companies 
                                                 
6 Reported in the annual reports of 2005. 
Instrument Description Values
First time tool 
use
Visual mapping  through graphical overview of 
reported company tools Flags indicate first time use
Average pre-
development 
tool use 
Normalized first time tool use
• Front
• Middle
• Rear
Specificity 
Whether a tool gathers information for an 
array of ideas (unspecific) or regarding one 
particular idea (specific) at a time
• Unspecific
• Specific
Cost focus Whether a tool provides general information or cost specific information
• General
• Cost focused
Relative cost 
tool 
importance 
Amount of cost tools used relative to the 
number of all tools used in the pre-
development phases
All tools have cost focus = 100%
to
No tools have cost focus = 0%
of pre-development
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• P/E ratio7 as a proxy for the stock performance and outlook from investors on 
the case companies 
• Whether the business of a company is based on goods or services 
 
Figure 67: Classification scheme for the different case company characteristics 
The different categorizations and its boundaries for the company classification are 
shown in Figure 67. An overview of the different cases and their classification 
according to that scheme is presented in Figure 61 above when the different case 
companies are introduced.  
For understanding the tool application in pre-development, different angles are taken 
to study the use of the case companies by crossing the company characteristics with 
the different tools usage ratios. This cross-case analysis further down (in chapters 
4.7.7 and 6) is done in order to analyze and discuss the possible influence and 
explanatory value of the different company characteristics as boundary conditions. 
This part of the study method seeks understanding about contingencies of the tools 
that companies are using regarding the second question of why future product cost 
analysis during pre-development is done the way it is. The question is whether the 
company characteristics in which the different cases are embedded are governing the 
future product cost analysis during pre-development and to which extend, and in 
which relation.  
3.6.2 Companies’ innovation style 
Innovations can be market or technology driven (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2000; 
Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). This distinction can be used to classify companies in 
the analysis according to their prevailing innovation style. In accordance with the 
explanation stated in the literature review (see subsection 2.1.1), the innovation style 
                                                 
7 Earnings reported for 2004 in relation to average stock price 2005. 
Company characteristics
Company size Small Medium Large Very large
Turnover < 10 m€ 10 – 100 m€ 100 m€ - 1 bn€ > 1 bn€
R&D activity and intensity
R&D spending 
per turnover 0% to 1 % 1% to 5% 5% to 10% > 10%
Profitability
% ratio of EBIT to 
turnover negative 0 % to 5% 5% to 10% > 10%
Stock performance
P/E ratio2 negative 0 to 15 15 to 30 > 30
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is determined by the focus, the initiative and the highest newness intensity of the 
targeted innovations. Two different innovation styles are distinguished in this thesis: 
• Technology driven innovation approach 
• Market driven innovation approach 
For the technology driven innovation approach, the focus, initiative and the highest 
newness intensity lies in the technological area. Technological and production aspects 
are in the center of attention. This technology driven focus and newness intensity of 
innovations will be characterized by large changes in the following points according 
to Hauschildt and Salomo (2007): 
• Newly developed technology underlying the innovation  
• New technology substitutes hitherto-used technology to a large extent 
• New design uses very little of the hitherto-used engineering 
• Using novel technological components  
Technological and production aspects are in the center of attention for technology 
driven innovations.  
For the market driven innovation approach, the focus and the highest newness 
intensity lies in marketing the new product development idea. This market driven 
focus and newness intensity of innovations will be characterized by large changes in 
the following points according to Hauschildt and Salomo (2007): 
• New customers are addressed  
• Novel customer needs are targeted 
• New sales channels are developed 
• Cooperation with new partners regarding the sales market is needed 
Market aspects are the focal point for market driven innovations throughout the whole 
innovation process. Technological aspects of market driven innovation are rather 
different and can be changing greatly during the innovation process. Sourcing and 
production play a minor role in the innovation conception. 
3.6.3 Idea initiative  
The idea initiative can also be differentiated (Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). It is 
distinguished whether the initiative for a new product development idea comes either 
from 
• Discovery by chance 
• Institutional idea search and development  
• Customer led innovation  
• Idea suggestion innovation programs  
• Improvement and byproduct recycling search 
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This distinction is taken from the classification in subsection 2.1.1. In the analysis the 
idea initiative of the different companies is checked and the prevailing initiative is 
selected. 
Some innovation is based on discovery by chance, e.g. by finding a chemical formula 
by chance that behaves in a certain exploitable way. Another initiative for innovation 
is institutional idea search and development. This stands for a planned and 
constructive search of several possibilities based on research, strategic analysis and 
alike. Innovation from the third initiative category can come from the customer 
impulses and is named customer led innovation. The fourth initiative category is idea 
suggestion innovation programs that are based on ideas submitted by employees. The 
fifth initiative category is improvement and byproduct recycling search. This happens 
if a product is defective and has to be modified or if the production of a product leads 
to a side product that can be exploited further, e.g. in the chemical industry 
(Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). 
3.6.4 Innovation funnel type 
According to Wheelwright and Clark (1992) the treatment and screening of new 
product development ideas during pre-development is dependent on the innovation 
funnel type of a company. Thus the product cost analysis during pre-development of 
the different case companies could be affected by the innovation funnel type that they 
use. 
In subsection 2.2.2.2, the two characteristic innovation funnel types of Wheelwright 
and Clark (1992) are introduced (see Figure 23 on page 33). One is called the survival 
of the fittest funnel and the other is called the few big bets funnel. In the analysis 
further down these two funnel types are used as an organizational contingency to find 
out whether this funnel type influences the product cost analysis during pre-
development. 
3.6.5 Technological uncertainty  
Theory suggests that uncertainty can be a driving force in the design and use of 
management accounting systems (Davila, 2000). Thus it is possible that uncertainty 
could explain why future product cost analysis during pre-development is done the 
way it is. In order to get an operational method for analysis, the well crafted and 
described concept of technological uncertainty from Shenhar and Dvir (1996) is used 
(see Figure 12 on page 20). It categorizes the technological uncertainty into four 
categories from ‘A, low-tech’ to ‘D, super high-tech’. 
The analysis below also uses the technological uncertainty of Shenhar and Dvir 
(1996) as an organizational contingency to find out whether it influences the product 
cost analysis during pre-development. 
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3.6.6 Summary of crafted instruments regarding organizational 
contingencies 
This subsection summarizes the crafted methodological instruments (Eisenhardt, 
1989) that look at the different organizational contingencies. The following Figure 68 
gives a summarizing overview of these instruments.  
 
Figure 68: Overview of crafted instruments regarding organizational contingencies 
In total five instruments are shown in Figure 68. All instruments deal with 
organizational contingencies that could explain the specific tool use of the companies 
due to organizational contingencies (e.g. company characteristics). These instruments 
are used in chapter 6 further down. 
In the next step the analysis is then carried out for the different phases of the pre-
development to see a pattern. The field is entered according Eisenhardt (1989) with 
these instruments crafted in the sections 3.5 and 3.6. To some extent these instruments 
combine qualitative data and quantitative figures for the analysis further down to 
achieve a synergistic view of evidence, as recommended by Eisenhardt (1989). The 
tools used and their characteristics are mapped for each stage and each company to 
uncover tool use patterns in the pre-development phases. 
Instrument Description Values
Company 
characteristics
Company characteristics as potential 
organizational contingencies for tool use
• Turnover
• R&D spending per turnover
• Earnings Before Interest and 
Taxes (EBIT) per turnover
• P/E ratio 
• Products vs. service industry
Innovation 
style
Innovation style as potential 
organizational contingency for tool use
• Technology driven  
• Market driven
Idea initiative Idea initiative as potential organizational contingency for tool use
• Discovery by chance
• Institutional search & development 
• Customer led innovation 
• Idea suggestion programs 
• Improvement & byproduct usage
Innovation 
funnel type
Shape and type of the innovation funnel 
as potential organizational contingency
• Survival of the fittest 
• Few big bets 
Technological 
uncertainty 
Technological uncertainty as potential 
organizational contingency for tool use
• A, low-tech
• B, medium-tech
• C, high-tech
• D, super high-tech
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4 Within case analysis  
As Eisenhardt (1989, p. 539) clearly states, “analyzing data is the heart of building 
theory from case studies”. She recommends that the analysis is started with a within-
case analysis, before one should start to search for cross-case patterns. This chapter 
takes the detailed records of each case and compresses them to a description of the 
case according to the guiding themes of different subsections.  
The general structure of the following case company subsections in this chapter is 
divided into three parts with guiding themes for each of the case companies. The first 
part (4.x.1) gives an introduction to the case. The second part (4.x.2) provides an 
overview about the cost information analysis process of the different case companies. 
The third part (4.x.3) introduces the tools found in the case company and looks 
especially at the role of cost information in the tool use. Furthermore, other successive 
subsections highlight interesting findings. 
4.1 Dali  
4.1.1 Introduction to the case 
From the insight gained through the discussion and interviews, one can see that a 
good manufacturability of new technologies and products is still seen as one of the 
most important goals in R&D. The case company uses cross-functional teams in their 
innovation activities already in early stages. The two analyzed new product 
development projects were to a large extent technology-driven. As the company is 
increasing its R&D activities there was a significant rise in R&D expenses.  
 
Figure 69: Stage Gate model of Dali 
Even though it is not shown on corporate charts; the person reviewing proposals 
already pre-screens the ideas according to rough feasibility and strategic fit. In stage 
1, information about the technological feasibility of the analyzed new product 
development idea is gathered. The focus is on the technological feasibility, less on the 
financial feasibility. In this stage, the R&D team is looking for feasible production 
concepts in order to find the most appropriate technologies or manufacturing 
approaches so that the technologies to be used may be clarified. Once this is done, the 
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company has a review meeting where the board decides on the new product 
development proposal. If this board decides that the idea exploitation should proceed, 
it is defined what information should be gathered and what practical steps should be 
done in the stage 2.  
In stage 2, usually the technological feasibility is further checked, but financial 
aspects are also now taken into account. This is the first time that costs, potential 
market volumes and pricing issues are addressed actively and evaluated. The 
technological analysis moves away from the own technology assessment of stage 1 
and is more directed to evaluate competing technologies of other players in the market 
– something that could be named competitive technology intelligence work. The 
company uses a template for the feasibility study where gathered information is filled 
in. Parallel to the work on the feasibility study, the writing of a business plan is 
started.  
Gate 3 consists of a review meeting, where the board of directors decides about 
whether to proceed to the development stage (stage 3), to kill the effort, or to evaluate 
the idea further in order to get more information. Gate 4 is a concept development 
examination, before the launch plan is worked out (stage 4).After Gate 4 the 
marketing department takes over the responsibility. 
 
Due to its focus on technology-lead innovation, innovations at Dali are classified as 
mostly technology driven (see 3.6.2). According to the interviews, the idea initiative 
at Dali comes predominantly from institutional idea search and development rooted 
in structured and strategic business development (see 3.6.3). The funnel type of Dali 
is classified as using a survival of the fittest approach (see 3.6.4). Dali is classified as 
medium-tech in terms of the technological uncertainty according to Shenhar and Dvir 
(1996) (see 3.6.5). 
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4.1.2 The cost information analysis process of Dali 
 
Figure 70: First time tool use of Dali 
As shown in Figure 70, Dali is using intelligence work in the form of business 
intelligence together with results from regular teardown studies in the front end. In 
stage 1 Dali starts using a qualitative risk scorecard to evaluate new technologies and 
new product ideas.  
In stage 2 Dali is using value analysis and has incorporated a system of allowable 
costs and target profit calculations similar to the paradigm of target costing. For their 
cost modeling and estimations Dali is using different types of costing templates in 
pre-development. These are either made ad-hoc or a large cost table is used. This cost 
table is linked to the internal ERP-system, which can be seen as a cost database. In 
more radical new technology and product developments Dali is enriching the value 
analysis by total cost of ownership analysis for the end customer of products, where 
the new solution could be used. And last but not least, Dali uses uncertainty 
management tools. These are triple point estimates and Monte Carlo simulations to 
analyze and judge new product developments together with a scenario analysis 
integrated in the cost database program. 
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Figure 71: Dali’s unified tools use in pre-development  
After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Dali in Figure 71. 
It is interesting to see that in the front end, the tool use is concentrated on one 
unspecific tool, while later the center of attention migrates towards the use of specific 
tools. 
Generally, one can say that in the case of Dali, mostly human expertise based methods 
and a preliminary risk assessment are made in the front end of innovation and stage 1. 
Only if a new technology and product proposal has passed gate 2, more quantitative 
methods are used to further evaluate the idea. 
4.1.3 The role of cost information within the found tools  
In the front end Dali uses business intelligence together with expert opinion. Already 
at this stage, costs can play a role in the market data the company is using for its 
intelligence work. In the next stage the company is using scorecards for finding 
critical issues that have to be checked for new product developments. Managers at 
Dali are aware that the scoring is based on guesswork, which might not reflect reality 
very precisely and through that has a limited meaning. Yet, in total, the tool is seen as 
a valuable tool by the company. 
In the rear pre-development, the importance of cost information rises significantly. At 
this point in time Dali starts using costing templates which are linked to a cost 
template. This cost template is connected to the ERP system of the company and thus 
very detailed. The cost estimations of how much the new product development idea 
would cost if produced in high volumes are in the focus of the analysis. Due to more 
specialized production methods, sales and production volumes have an impact on 
future production costs. This also affects the analysis during pre-development as the 
following two examples show. The interviewed director for New Concept 
Development and IPR at Dali states: 
“The current market price is for very high volumes. It means that the cost 
target needs […] to be equal. […] We can see how near we can come [to the 
Intelligence work Unspecific General Front
Roadmapping Unspecific General -
Scorecard use Specific General Middle
Uncertainty management Specific General Rear
Cost dynamics analysis Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost database use Unspecific Cost focused Rear
Cost modeling and estimation Specific Cost focused Rear
Target costing efforts Specific Cost focused Rear
Value analysis work Specific Cost focused Rear
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market price]. But of course we know that before we are coming there, we 
have a certain kind of loss in the very beginning. […] We calculate first a […] 
higher price when we start and [take] the price erosion in our calculation.” 
Dali is looking at the potential market and using value analysis to estimate allowable 
costs. The company has incorporated a system of value analysis, allowable costs, 
‘back-costing’ and target profit calculations similar to the paradigm of target costing 
in the feasibility study phase in the rear of pre-development before development kick-
off. At the same stage regular target costing is started. Additionally, the company is 
doing idea specific teardown analysis in order to follow the development of 
competitor’s products, find improvement possibilities and try to evaluate the cost 
structure of the competition. Also in this teardown analysis, the role of cost 
information is very important. If a new product development idea has a comparable 
functionality similar to the product of the competition, the own cost estimates are 
benchmarked with the cost information of the solution of the competition. 
Additionally Dali is using uncertainty management tools in the form of triple point 
estimates and Monte Carlo simulations.  
Summarizing, one can say that the role of cost information for the found tools is 
strongly increasing in importance through the pre-development stages. Dali has a high 
focus on costs in their new product development idea analysis once it processes 
through to the rear of pre-development.  
4.1.4 Misleading tools and numbers  
Managers at Dali are skeptic about the validity of estimates that come in the disguise 
of too sophisticatedly calculated numbers regarding the use of Monte Carlo 
simulations for cost analysis in pre-development. One interviewed manager at Dali 
acknowledges that the information handled contains mostly estimates. These show a 
certain kind of variation. In order to make the assumptions behind best guesses more 
reliable, managers use triple estimates. These triple estimates are based on the most 
likely, the worst and best case. The company sees the benefits, but also the limitations 
of simulations based on the Monte Carlo method in pre-development. They used it to 
evaluate new product portfolios, but are hesitant to use it for the profitability 
calculations of a specific new technology. For the latter, the past has shown that 
feeling too confident about simulated numbers conceals the uncertainty that comes 
with estimations and this can be misleading. 
4.2 Duchamp  
4.2.1 Introduction to the case 
The interviewed managers of Duchamp see technology as an enabler for business. As 
the company itself is selling services enabled by new technologies, they might 
develop or adapt technologies and then use field trials to develop products and 
services on this platform. In this way new technologies get a strategic aspect where 
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decisions about strategic directions are taken without being able to fully specify how 
the final product or service based on a new technology will look like. Due to the 
nature of the business in which the company is operating in, they are using field 
customer tests to fine-tune their offering during the development phase. The stage 
gate model of Duchamp is shown in Figure 72. 
  
Figure 72: Stage Gate model of Duchamp 
The R&D work of Duchamp is directed towards strategic growth areas. Generally the 
research efforts of the company are centered on applied research topics rather than 
basic research and organized in programs/campaigns. In each program there are 
several projects running on the program theme. Even though the R&D efforts are 
targeted at developing own products and services, some developments might lead to 
spin-offs or intellectual property rights (IPRs) that are sold. The company is trying to 
locate large new business areas for innovations as the director in charge of the 
employee suggestion process clarifies: 
“I think the most important thing […in idea development] is the customer. 
What is the value for customer and what is the customer need, and how to 
evaluate that. That is one thing. And then the other thing is that we would like 
to get ideas which might be big from business point of view […]. They might 
be very difficult to implement from technical point of views, but then they 
would really bring value to customers; so not incremental steps to our existing 
[… products and services], but really looking [at] something totally 
differently, which means that we would maybe have to change our processes 
to make it happen, but then it would bring value to customers.”  
The company is using a strategic portfolio approach to manage their products and find 
areas of new product development for their front end. The company is using product 
life cycle analysis and market share vs. growth matrices (also called Boston 
Consulting Group matrix) to identify the need for change and progress. 
Furthermore the director of the idea suggestion system of Duchamp also explains that 
it is important to focus on what one wants to do and the size of the ideas (scalability). 
Yet, the organization is open to more radical ideas, as long as it is beneficial for the 
company: 
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“I think [it is] very important when you do something […that] you have to 
look what you really are looking for. What kind of ideas, for what you are 
looking. First thing first, that’s why we have themes. […] Okay. Then the 
second question is, do we want to have small ideas, meaning from business 
point of view, so […] quite incremental ideas, or are they really something 
which could bring, let’s say significant growth or growth possibilities or 
business opportunities for us. And then of course for us the interest is in big 
business opportunities. Because if we do some small change in [our existing 
business…], of course it could be good for customers, but maybe it would not 
bring us lots of revenue. So you have to keep in mind what you are looking 
for.” 
The director in charge of the employee suggestion process of Duchamp states on the 
screening of ideas: 
“Most of the ideas are such that they have already been identified by our other 
organizations. […] So, then we might know already some of those ideas, and 
then we clearly can say okay, this is identified, we don’t go any further, 
because that’s already in the process somewhere, so you can drop quite many 
ideas based on that. “ 
At Duchamp the first gate in the suggestion system approach is very light on analysis. 
The checks are mostly targeting on whether a similar idea has already been evaluated 
and/or whether it is in development. The interviewed director further explains: 
“If you think that you have now good ideas, let’s say for example three ideas, 
which you want to give [to be considered by the] management; then how to 
inform management that you should do something with this. And that is, I 
think, the tricky part. […] We have ideas coming from many sources, so these 
ideas what are coming out from here, these 1-2-3, there might be many 
competing.” 
On the contrary, the second gate is heavy. Many ideas compete for the attention of the 
top management. Thus the analysis as a preparation for this top management screen is 
also heavier. One reason for this is to get the higher management interested in new 
ideas as they get many business issues presented and new ideas are competing for the 
attention of the management. Thus at Duchamp the biggest step in tool use is before 
the heaviest gate in the middle of pre-development. 
When looking at the survival rate of ideas in the employee suggestion panel, a heavy 
first cut can be seen (from 40 submitted, only about three ideas are taken to the next 
gate, e.g. 7,5%). There are many ideas to be screened in the front end and the 
resources for the analysis during pre-development phases are limited. In the twelve 
months preceding the analysis around 460 ideas (around 40 ideas per month) were 
submitted to the employee suggestion system and reviewed by the managers in charge 
at Duchamp. Ideas that were already evaluated before are eliminated out of these. 
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After that the ideas are grouped together with similar ones and evaluated. After this 
process, usually one to three ideas reach the next gate and are presented to the 
management board in a monthly meeting.  
 
Duchamp’s innovation style is classified as market driven due to its clear customer 
focus (see 3.6.2). Even so, Duchamp also has an institutional idea search and 
development; the focus for this research lies in its idea suggestion program as idea 
initiative. Thus Duchamp’s idea initiative is defined as idea suggestion based (see 
3.6.3). The funnel type of Duchamp is classified as using a few big bets approach (see 
3.6.4). Due to the complexity of its business and therefore their innovations, Duchamp 
is classified as high-tech in terms of the technological uncertainty according to 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see  3.6.5). 
4.2.2 The cost information analysis process of Duchamp 
 
Figure 73: First time tool use of Duchamp  
The first time tool use of Duchamp is shown in Figure 73. Duchamp uses intelligence 
work along with expert opinion to evaluate its new ideas in the middle of pre-
development. At the same stage the company is using potential pay-off checklists as 
scorecards, which are primarily used to evaluate whether a new product development 
idea has the potential to pay off and secondly about whether it is technologically 
feasible. The employees reviewing ideas are rating ideas according to guidelines. The 
scorecard also involves value analysis work. Furthermore, Duchamp uses scenarios 
as a tool for uncertainty management in this phase. 
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Figure 74: Duchamp’s normalized tool use in pre-development 
One can see the different tools and their first time use at Duchamp in Figure 74 after 
the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in Figure 
64.  
4.2.3 The role of cost information within the found tools  
At Duchamp, new product development idea reviewing in the first screen is done with 
the help of guidelines and expert opinion of experienced employees based on business 
and technology intelligence. New information from business intelligence leads to 
updates in the business estimations of the early stages or is stored until needed. The 
managers in charge of the evaluation are estimating the technical feasibility, the 
potential turnover for the company and the value for the customer. However, the used 
guidelines still allow a larger amount of personal judgment and costs are not in the 
focus of the analysis.  
Duchamp uses a standardized pay-off checklist in the middle of pre-development for 
their new product development evaluation. The most important factors judged are (1) 
the alignment with existing resources of the company, (2) the potential turnover, (3) 
the future feasibility, and (4) the potential value to the customer. However, costs are 
not specifically checked with this pay-off checklist. It is interesting to notice that 
Duchamp is primarily interested in whether a new product development idea has the 
potential to pay off and then secondly about whether it is technologically possible. 
Yet, costs are not checked explicitly, but rather a business stake in the total available 
market (TAM) is estimated.  
Duchamp is doing value analysis work in the middle of pre-development. If no 
additional value to the customer can be seen, an idea will not be developed further as 
the director in charge of the employee suggestion process states: 
“Customer values and needs are the most important. […] Because if they do 
not have a need and a value, why would they use it? Even though […] it would 
be very easy for us to implement it from a technical point of view.”  
Intelligence work Unspecific General Middle
Roadmapping Unspecific General -
Scorecard use Specific General Middle
Uncertainty management Specific General Middle
Cost dynamics analysis Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost database use Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost modeling and estimation Specific Cost focused -
Target costing efforts Specific Cost focused -
Value analysis work Specific Cost focused Middle
141 
Duchamp is aware of rough target prices, but the company is not carrying out target 
costing efforts in pre-development. As a reason for this, the interviewed director in 
charge of the concept development states that cost estimation is too hard to 
perform. Furthermore, a target price might be too difficult to set up according to the 
manager from Duchamp. The market prices have been fluctuating in a broad range in 
the past and the company is a price taker on the market that has little power to 
influence the pricing of its industry. 
Starting from the middle of pre-development on, Duchamp is also using scenarios in 
several ways during pre-development. First, they are evaluating business directions 
through several scenarios and second, they use it to facilitate discussions during pre-
development phases. Through these scenarios, the company finds that judgments 
about new product developments and their analyses during pre-development are 
facilitated.  
Summarizing, one can say that the future product cost analysis during pre-
development phases of Duchamp is marked by the effect that Duchamp finds it very 
hard to estimate its costs. Furthermore, a price target for target costing is seen as 
difficult to set up and the company is described as a price taker on the market. Thus 
the analysis of new product development ideas compromises only very little 
investigations of costs. Instead of the cost level itself, the relative value as benefit 
per expenditure is checked attentively. If no additional value to the customer can 
be seen, an idea will not be developed further.  
4.2.4 Uncertainties of future costs of processes as a limitation 
Duchamp is not using any cost modeling in the evaluation of new product 
development ideas in the pre-development phases. Its director in charge of the 
concept development says: 
“For example one huge bottleneck is […a significant part in the delivery 
system]. Before checking you may not know how big work something is. It may 
sound very little, but due to the structure of the system it could be quite big 
work, and there is other activities competing with new products as well, 
because you have links to marketing campaigns […] and these have to be 
taken into account […] as well.”  
Thus there can be a large uncertainty connected to innovations due to existing 
processes that might not be able to handle a higher workload resulting from new 
product developments. These can have a serious impact on the cost structure of the 
new product development idea as the example stated above shows and this will also 
affect the product cost analysis during pre-development. 
4.2.5 Need of pre-development cost analysis vs. limited resources  
The director of the idea suggestion system of Duchamp states: 
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“We try to focus the idea hunting, because we have noticed that if you put [out 
the word for the] idea channel saying only ‘give ideas’, then we get ideas from 
here to here. So it’s impossible, we do get lots of ideas, but we get too many, 
and they are too stretched – so it is like fishing, you want to have certain kind 
of fish, you pick up a certain kind of net, and then you go for that kind of fish. 
So what we are doing, we are running themes, so we try to find something 
which is interesting to the company and to our business unit at the present 
moment, and then we say that we have, are running now this theme, please 
give ideas to this theme, which is whatever it is. Then we get more focused 
ideas. […] We don’t get now hundreds of ideas, we might get 20 or 30 ideas, 
but they focused now to the certain theme or idea, which is, I think, better.” 
Thus in a general innovation approach the focus on themes to get ideas in one 
direction is seen more valuable. Furthermore with that approach it is also easier to 
cover with the analysis workload.  
4.2.6 Tools have to be familiar to be used at all and correctly  
For the first assessment of an idea, Duchamp is using the expert opinion of 
experienced employees. The director of the idea suggestion system at Duchamp 
states: 
“Basically it is up to the person who is doing it [the screening]. We have some 
guidelines, but it is the experience of that person. He or she cannot be very 
young or inexperienced. He or she has to have some kind of a broad kind of 
looking, he or she has to know also what we have done previously,[…] have 
we tried that before, and if it was successful or not, what was the reasons and 
so on.” 
He acknowledges that the process is quite open to personal judgment. Also he states 
that the first check relies heavily on experience.  
The director for innovation concept development of Duchamp points out that the 
tools have to be familiar to the employees if they should use them correctly: 
“You can have different scenarios about its possible success, there may be 
parameters […], the time schedule, […] and you have several options, and 
then of course about the revenue and volumes. […] If you are used to work 
with scenarios, you normally use them more, but if you have never used 
scenarios, it’s difficult. We do have some, what could be called as innovation 
tools that are available for people; some, guidelines how to use them. [… 
Also] we have a couple of people who are more used to use them, so they act 
as kind of support pool if needed, sometimes they can act as an activator, run 
workshops, and then the project people can just participate; […] in order to 
make sure it goes very good.” 
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4.2.7 Misleading tools and numbers  
The director of the idea suggestion system at Duchamp also states the following 
difficulty for the value to customer analysis: 
“What we first were trying to put on the customer value [… was] the value, for 
example in numbers. […] But these are very difficult, because what does one 
mean? What does three mean? If you say […] the customer value for this idea 
is three, and I look [at] something else and I decide it has a customer value 
four. Are they in the same scale? Then we would have to define on a very 
detailed level what one means, what two means. So I think it is the best […] to, 
in a way, look that somehow in a bigger scale, no value, yes value, maybe 
value. But of course there are overlappings. [laughs]” 
Similarly his colleague, the director for innovation concept development, is also 
skeptic about the validity of estimates that come in the disguise of too sophisticatedly 
calculated numbers: 
“I do not believe very much in, for example, that type of methods that you give 
different measures, you have lots of questions and then you have numbers 
from zero to ten and then you calculate and get a result, for example 67. What 
does it mean for you? So […] of course they help you in decision making, but 
you cannot make decisions directly with those things. It is always kind of 
intelligence and intelligent decision supported by industry knowledge and 
information. […] For example if you think about new business opportunity, 
there might be a kind of barrier that it has to be big enough. That is still easy 
to say, meaning that if it is not big enough, then it is not worth the activities. 
[…] There have been different models, computer aided or then huge criteria 
and different values and even different weights of parameters; and the more 
it becomes mathematical in the model, the more you miss the point, because 
in a way those models expect that you have facts and then you begin to 
calculate. And then you, in a way, forget that they weren’t facts.” 
Thus the explained paradox is that the more sophisticated a model is, the more it 
misses the point in pre-development in the opinion of the interviewed managers. The 
sophistication conceals the imminent uncertainty coming with the estimates on which 
the analysis is based. 
4.3 Kandinsky  
4.3.1 Introduction to the case 
According to the interviewed managers, one of the highest quality criteria of 
Kandinsky is the reliability of its products. However, through a global cost 
competition the value of the product for the customer is another major criterion, along 
with elevated flexibility to meet customer demands. Many of their development 
efforts focus on custom-designed versions of the main products. Another big part is 
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R&D which is in line with the R&D activities of the main customers. Only a small 
amount of R&D effort goes into radically new technology and product developments. 
While the mainstream new product development projects are very customer oriented 
and are composed mostly of application engineering, this study looks at some more 
radical innovations that are more technology driven. 
 
Figure 75: Constructed Stage Gate model of Kandinsky 
Kandinsky has three product development centers, each in another continent. Even 
though Kandinsky has an execution sequence for its incremental product development 
process, they are not using an explicit Stage-Gate approach to manage their radical 
development efforts. However, for the studied cases, a stage-gate was constructed by 
the researcher for this thesis, which is shown in Figure 75. In the front-end, individual 
employees are looking for new ideas and are screening the environment. The different 
ideas are assessed by each individual on their own. The first real gate is to present the 
idea to colleagues for feedback. The company internal discussion might lead to 
recognition by senior management that will allow and fund preliminary feasibility 
studies. After an idea passes this assessment, an idea is discussed further and different 
cost estimations and cost development calculations are made to evaluate the potential 
of new ideas. The company uses a mix of parametric and analogous cost estimations 
for deducting prices for incremental innovations or new designs in pre-development. 
The parameters relate usually to the functionality of the product under study.  
 
Kandinsky’s innovation style is classified as technology driven, due to its focus on 
technological improvements in products and manufacturing processes (see 3.6.2). 
Kandinsky’s idea initiative steams to the largest extend from institutional idea 
search and development (see 3.6.3). Regarding the funnel type, Kandinsky is clearly 
using a few big bets approach (see 3.6.4). Furthermore, Kandinsky is classified as a 
medium-tech company in terms of the technological uncertainty according to 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see 3.6.5), as the used technologies are state of the art, but 
limited in scope. 
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4.3.2 The cost information analysis process of Kandinsky 
 
Figure 76: First time tool use of Kandinsky 
In the front end Kandinsky uses intelligence work and roadmapping. The 
intelligence work is centered on technologies and other information gathered by 
employees. The roadmapping routines also include cost information. With this 
information, employees at Kandinsky try to pick technology alternatives that they 
think are likely to have the lowest costs for their new product developments. Through 
this they identify new technology alternatives to drive the costs of their products 
down. Some cost considerations in the front end are based on a quotations database, 
which can be seen as a cost database. Additionally to the quotations database, 
Kandinsky has an information system for component and material costs in another 
cost database. This is a system of different cost tables which the employees can access 
through their intranet. In this cost table, price information about purchased materials 
and components is stored. Furthermore a senior manager for new technology 
development is using perfect waste-free cost calculations, which can be seen as a kind 
of cost estimations. This analysis is done, so that he can judge the theoretical 
minimum of costs to fulfill a function. Once an idea is further evaluated, the studied 
company uses parametric cost estimations and target costing ‘inspired’ analysis 
together with cost tables, before a new product development idea is reviewed by 
management in the rear of pre-development.  
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Figure 77: Kandinsky’s normalized tools use in pre-development  
After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Kandinsky in 
Figure 77. It is important to notice that the stage-gate model of Kandinsky has only 
the front end and one additional stage before development start. According to the 
definition in 3.5.2, the stage before development start is counted as the rear end stage 
of pre-development. 
4.3.3 The role of cost information within the found tools  
In the front end of innovation Kandinsky uses technological intelligence and scouting 
done by engineers informing themselves about new product developments in the 
industry. The first analysis is driven through personal interest and discussions with 
colleagues, but focuses mostly on technological parameters and less on costs. 
However, later during the preliminary assessment the idea is discussed further and 
different cost estimations and cost development calculations are made to evaluate 
the potential of new ideas. When it comes to the evaluation of technologies new to 
the company, the technology development of Kandinsky makes a cost trade-off 
evaluation with experts in the front-end. Sometimes suppliers are involved and their 
opinion towards cost trade-offs is taken into account. A senior manager for new 
technology development at Kandinsky has developed a product cost calculation that 
could be labeled ‘perfect waste-free’ cost analysis. These are calculations about the 
theoretical minimum of costs to fulfill a function. 
Roadmapping is used for technology management in the front end at Kandinsky. For 
its roadmapping efforts the company tries to anticipate the ‘cost roadmaps’ of 
the customer, i.e. how much is the customer willing to pay in the future for a 
certain functionality. There is a clear connection to target costing, as the company 
later uses the generated information for target costing calculations together with these 
cost roadmaps.  
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147 
In the rear pre-development Kandinsky starts using a mix of parametric and analogous 
cost estimations for deducting prices for incremental innovations or new designs. The 
parameters relate usually to the functionality of the product under study. For radical 
innovations, the cost modeling of new technologies is made when the need for it is 
seen. In that case mostly parametric cost estimations are made.  
The company uses cost driver analysis during pre-development to investigate the 
cost structure and actual costs of their products and purchased components.  
Furthermore, Kandinsky starts target costing with interdisciplinary teams in the 
first stage after the front-end. With a certain target profit in mind the managers add 
the costs and targeted profit margins in their feasibility studies. In the case that the 
targeted profit margins cannot be realized, developments are started to improve the 
cost situation.  
Additionally Kandinsky starts using cost databases from the front end on that 
are maintained to reduce the uncertainty connected to innovations. This can 
either be a general purchasing cost database or a personally updated quotations 
database. The information gathered in this quotations database is also used for 
roadmapping purposes through trend extrapolation. 
Summarizing, one can say that there are two reflective and distinct roles of cost 
information: 
Firstly, the company wants to find out the feasible market price for its innovations. 
Together with the cost roadmapping the company uses the gathered information for a 
light version of target costing calculations. However, managers at Kandinsky lack a 
specific cost goal provided by their customer, but the company does not want to 
develop solutions that are too expensive. Thus Kandinsky tries to anticipate the ‘cost 
roadmaps’ of (B2B) customers. 
Secondly, Kandinsky’s focus of cost analysis is to evaluate purchasing costs and to 
find innovative ways to achieve requested functionalities with some new method or 
way that turns out to be cheaper or more efficient than before. The role of cost 
information is to provide the background for this search of a better alternative. 
4.3.4 Radical vs. incremental innovations  
The interviewed chief design engineer of Kandinsky states the following on how he 
does the cost estimations for incremental developments in an application engineering 
style at Kandinsky: 
“My way to work is […to] write the block diagram of the whole […special 
system component] and […] I have experience [for] several blocks and I 
roughly know what the block costs. […] Sometimes I must write the semantic 
diagram, when the solution is very new; and I know the price of the 
components; I get them from our key books material system. And sometimes it 
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is very difficult to know what will the price of the components be in the future. 
And I discuss with our material guys and we try to calculate it and […take 
into consideration the] dollar level and so on. It is quite complicated.” 
Thus, at Kandinsky the cost estimation for application engineering works well for 
known components, but is more difficult for new ones. 
When starting developments for a customer, the time is so pressing that no time for 
cost evaluation remains and the approach for the solution should be already decided 
as an interviewed project and key account manager from Kandinsky states: 
“[Our] customer’s developing schedule is that tight that […] everything 
should be more or less clear. You cannot [take] too big risks during the 
product development, because the schedule is one of the most critical issues at 
that time, during that the customer is also doing the product development […] 
in system level and we are trying to support their schedule. There you cannot 
do much [of] any new testing. Only some minor issues to be decided, but the 
basic ideas are fixed. […] And that must be cost effective from the schedule 
point of view and also something can be done there, but mainly the basic ideas 
are fixed in the front end technology thinking.” 
The Vice president new technology development of Kandinsky sees it similar that 
time to market is the most important and thus proven solutions are preferred. 
However, cost reduction programs including more experimental solutions could be 
launched later: 
“Sometimes […] the customer has really a pressure to go to market. So they 
do it in the way it works, and even if there is good ideas how it could be done 
better, you just don’t do it and risk the program. […There have been cases 
where] very soon after the first project has been launched, then after that 
another cost reduction project is already starting with little bit more resources 
to think how it should have been done based on the experiences on these first 
guys.” 
The interviewed project and key account manager of Kandinsky also further states 
that required design changes hinder a better cost management during the application 
engineering: 
“That is one of the biggest challenges […], when [our] customer is doing their 
product development at the same time as we are, they are doing it at a system 
level and we are doing it from our unit level. And the customer realizes [that] 
some changes [are] needed to the specifications and we need to start again 
and we do not have possibly time enough to do all the optimization from the 
costing point of view. […] And the challenges come from fluctuating 
specification and trying to keep up the schedule. Costing, cost structure is 
more or less based on this front end thinking and technology development and 
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then in the pre-design phases, when you fix the basic ideas […] And then the 
next option comes only after the first revision has been released to production 
and you can start developing more cost effective products based on the next 
specification.” 
4.3.5 Need and challenges of pre-development cost analysis  
The following quote is from an interviewed project and key account manager from 
Kandinsky: 
“From the volume point of view then sometimes it is also good see the volumes 
first and then, if that particular product has gone [to be] a huge or big volume 
product then you can start the optimization product development a bit later, 
but if only 20 % of our projects goes to production and if only 20 % of those 
20 % are big volume products, then it is not too cost effective to use all the 
resources for all products, but that can be focused better on those critical 
products, if we have seen that okay, now this seems to be successful product, 
[…] the future is promising and then we should start redesign and cost 
reduction, optimization developing project pretty soon after the first revision 
has been ramped up to the production.” 
This quote is about not spending too much effort on early cost optimization, as only 
roughly 4% of the development projects are actually going to be sold in large 
quantities. Similar is the view of the interviewed Vice president new technology 
development at Kandinsky: 
“I think there is possibility to reduce costs [… after market launch]. That is 
my feeling, because […] in real projects there is always so many compromises 
and you want to be on the safe side because of the schedule and this kind of 
things.” 
Thus the reality for cost optimization seems to be that often it is not practicable as 
there are other constraints that are valued more important. A company could 
deliberately intend to save unnecessary effort. 
However, this loss of cost optimization can be significant as this additional quote 
from the Vice president new technology development shows: 
“I mean, if you think that you just make a conservative design and you are [in 
a] little bit [of] hurry and you do it like that and then if you think that you 
really do it how [it would be cost optimized] and use all the methods to get the 
costs down, I think that you can [achieve up to] 20 to 30 % [cost savings].” 
This significant loss of cost optimization could be one factor leading to a failure of a 
new product development idea on the market. 
Additionally, wrong cost estimations based on feelings can happen in the view of the 
Vice president new technology development at Kandinsky: 
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“There is potential how the things go that now we say that okay, we have to 
increase […the performance of a product]. And you think no no no, it costs, 
but then actually in reality actually, when there is a really-must for engineers 
to do something, like there is some regulations […], then suddenly whoops. 
When it’s a must, it goes and the cost is not changing so much. So I don’t say 
that the people are lazy or somehow, but they are not just prioritized to do 
these things, before it is really a must.” 
Summarizing, one can say that challenges for the cost analysis during pre-
development are that developments are not cost optimized as other points are seen 
more important by the designer and that many new product developments do not 
succeed on the market. 
4.3.6 Need of pre-development cost analysis for technology 
selection 
Kandinsky experiences high uncertainties in respect to the final chosen production 
method in the front-end for radical new innovations. Hand in hand with that goes the 
uncertainty of future product costs, as they are dependent on the used production 
method. This is not the case for incremental innovations. In this case the used 
technology is not changed and the installed production equipment base is used. The 
interviewed Vice president of new technology development at Kandinsky prefers 
flexible technologies that can produce the new product development at a low cost. 
However, this would require a higher initial investment: 
“I think the way to go is that the system has to be upgradable, so easy to start 
with low CapEx and then when you have the revenues, then you invest a little 
bit more, but I think it is an open question.” 
When it comes to the evaluation of new-to-company technologies, the technology 
development of company Kandinsky makes a cost trade-off analysis in the front-end. 
The Vice president of new technology development at Kandinsky then analyses the 
perfect waste-free cost. He further explains: 
“I think that then you need also […to] risk a little bit […], maybe do some 
investment. […] I am sketching […] these new technologies […]. Actually this 
[special technology] is very cheap, but investments for this production line, 
the development, it is […] quite expensive actually […]; so you always end up 
with this dilemma that this is now how to save the cost where we are. Then you 
need to invest a little bit.”  
Thus he sees potentials for new, low cost technologies. However, these technologies 
require an upfront investment. This is one point where the cost analysis during pre-
development should help communication and decision making.  
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4.4 Lichtenstein  
4.4.1 Introduction to the case 
Lichtenstein is a company that focuses on venturing. Lichtenstein takes up ideas that 
can come from internal or external sources. These ideas can be brought externally to 
the company or they can be strategic developments. These developments start from 
special focal points, e.g. a crossing point of two technologies or markets. The 
approach described by the managing director of the venturing unit reminds the 
researcher of the tactic taken by the innovation approach TRIZ. TRIZ is an acronym 
for a theory of inventive problem solving (in Russian: Teoriya Resheniya 
Izobretatelskikh Zadatch) and means that certain principles are systematically used to 
find new product or process innovations (Brostow, 2006). The company is also 
generating business ideas based on mega trends in society. They are analyzing these 
trends and start business development projects based on these findings to uncover 
possibilities and limitations of new business ideas. Similar the company uses different 
key concepts and market trends that are evaluated to find out how that could result in 
a business idea. The result of this analysis in the front end is which segment to enter 
and how to proceed. After that, the case company is searching for an entrepreneur and 
launches the idea as an operative project. Once the team leader is appointed, he can 
decide independently how to use his budget, e.g. whether or not to outsource some 
development work or not. 
 
Figure 78: Stage gate model of Lichtenstein 
Lichtenstein’s stage gate model differs significantly from the one found in 
conventional, non-venture companies as the stage gate model ends with an exit as 
soon as the first (alpha) customer is found. After that the idea is transferred to another 
business unit or it is spun-off, either by selling it completely or establishing a joint-
venture. The company focuses on ideas that have a very high potential, i.e. a high 
total available market (TAM) estimation for the future.  
In the middle of pre-development a feasibility study is conducted and a business plan 
draft made. The rough ideas from the front end are investigated further and crafted 
into the business plan draft. In this case the company already computes the first 
‘rough’ cost estimates. The middle of pre-development has been described as taking 
around three to six months. The rear of pre-development comprises business planning. 
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Here the first cost and revenue estimates are elaborated and refined. This stage has 
been described as typically lasting six to eight months. In the third stage development 
starts and a prototype is usually developed. This prototype is then used to check the 
solution against the customer requirements and make alterations. This stage has been 
described as typically lasting around six months. The fourth stage is the launch or 
ramp-up phase and lasts usually between six and eight months. After this stage there 
is a final review before the venturing company exits the development. 
To exploit these ideas, several small teams are working on different topics. It is seen 
as important to have frequent reviews for their work. These are conducted monthly 
and named operations reviews. Additionally, there are also more strategic decisions 
made in longer time intervals, e.g. every ten months, where the new budgeting and 
planning is made for the next longer time interval. The milestones of a project are also 
discussed during these strategic decision making sessions. In the operations reviews, 
the different business ideas are evaluated and their position in the stage gate is 
checked. These reviews are on an operative level, i.e. how the product is running 
according to the budgeted plan. If it is seen that a project will not fulfill certain 
milestones in the near term, it can also happen that the project is terminated after an 
operational review. However, usually the go / no-go decisions, whether to proceed on 
a project or not are made in the strategic decision making sessions.  
Additionally, Lichtenstein uses templates in the middle of pre-development to be 
more effective, according to a senior manager in charge of the business development. 
They try to ‘recycle’ as much as possible in order to avoid rework and learn from past 
experience. These templates are used for the information collection about the different 
innovation ideas. 
 
Lichtenstein is classified as market driven company (see 3.6.2) due to its focus on 
marketing, new sales channels and customers to achieve large market capturing 
innovations. Due to its venturing approach the company focuses on routine, strategic 
new product development idea generation and thus shows an institutional idea 
search and development initiative (see 3.6.3). Lichtenstein is classified as using a 
few big bets funnel type (see 3.6.4). Lichtenstein is classified as a high-tech company 
in terms of the technological uncertainty according to Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see 
3.6.5). 
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4.4.2 The cost information analysis process of Lichtenstein 
 
Figure 79: First time tool use of Lichtenstein 
In the front end Lichtenstein is using intelligence work focused on business matters 
to evaluate its ideas with a high total available market (TAM). Once an idea passes 
the first screen it is exposed to several tools. In the first stage after the front end (stage 
1), a feasibility study is conducted and a business plan draft made. In this phase the 
company already models and computes the first cost estimates with parametric and 
analogous methods and models life cycle costs. Additionally to this cost estimation, 
roadmapping is done that also includes cost figures. Furthermore, Lichtenstein is 
evaluating the dynamics of costs through a cost capability analysis. The value for 
customers is also investigated through a total cost of ownership analysis. This 
analysis is enriched by scenarios as an uncertainty management tool and later also 
by some use of triple point estimates. The intensity of the analysis with these tools is 
increased the further an idea proceeds. 
 
Figure 80: Lichtenstein’s normalized tools use in pre-development 
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Intelligence work Unspecific General Front
Roadmapping Unspecific General Middle
Scorecard use Specific General -
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Cost dynamics analysis Unspecific Cost focused Middle
Cost database use Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost modeling and estimation Specific Cost focused Middle
Target costing efforts Specific Cost focused -
Value analysis work Specific Cost focused Middle
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After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Lichtenstein in 
Figure 80. A big step up in tool use can be seen between front end and middle of pre-
development. 
4.4.3 The role of cost information within the found tools  
In the front end Lichtenstein is carrying out intelligence work. However, the focus is 
centered not on costs, but rather on the potential market value of an innovation. It is 
only in the middle of pre-development that cost analyses start. Then Lichtenstein 
starts using cost roadmapping in order to meet the need of the target market. The 
managing director of Lichtenstein sees it as important that the cost trends of new ideas 
are taken into account especially in pre-development. He warns that if the cost 
development is not taken into account the new ideas might be rejected by the market 
quite soon.  
Lichtenstein starts estimating and modeling costs in the middle of pre-development. It 
does so with the help of parametric and analogous methods and models life cycle 
costs. However, during project execution, the costing efforts are focused more on a 
variance analysis of cost budgets for the development tasks than on life cycle costs of 
the found solution. As the managing director explained, in the short run the budgeted 
costs are not to be exceeded, even though the project costs are unimportant in the long 
run. What matters in the long run are turnover goals and cost benefits for the 
customer. 
Together with most other tools, Lichtenstein also starts analyzing the dynamics of 
costs. Lichtenstein’s cost roadmapping in the middle of pre-development aims at 
meeting the need of the target market. Similar like the roadmapping effort, analyzing 
the dynamics of costs is done to develop ideas that are (cost) competitive on the 
market. In the view of the managing director of Lichtenstein it is important to be cost 
aware and take cost erosion into account. If the future cost development is not taken 
into account, managers could get a rude awakening when trying to market an 
innovative idea. As can be seen in Figure 79, Lichtenstein also uses many other cost 
estimation or costing tools. Thus the worry of the company of not developing past the 
market is encountered by analyzing the costs of new product developments. 
Lichtenstein uses value analysis in the middle of pre-development and in later stages 
the value for customers is investigated. With this approach, cost benefits for the 
customer are seen as the most important in the long run for innovation evaluation. 
This and turnover goals are seen as vital to the overall success of the new product 
development. Lichtenstein is working on one to two strategic topics per year. These 
are the anchoring points for new product development ideas, which are then checked 
upon for potential of success. Two of these potentials for success are related to cost 
issues. The first potential checked is if the company itself can get a cost leadership 
position in a market. This cost leadership can be significant in corporate success, e.g. 
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in rising markets in emerging countries. Additionally Lichtenstein checks whether the 
new idea can offer a significant cost benefit to the client. The company looks for cost 
related potentials for their clients. I.e. a new product development that increases the 
productivity of the client, so that the client will get cost benefits through deploying 
the new product development. 
Lichtenstein starts using uncertainty management tools in the middle of pre-
development in the form of scenarios. These scenarios contain triple point estimates – 
the best, the worst and the most likely case. The intensity of the analysis with these 
tools is increased the further an idea proceeds and can also include cost analysis. 
Summarizing, one can say that Lichtenstein starts analyzing costs with several tools 
from the first stage after the front end on. The role of cost information is elevated as 
costs are seen as crucial to meet the need of the target market and cost analyses should 
be taken into account from the early stages of innovation on.  
4.4.4 Too low future product cost estimates 
The senior manager in charge of the business development of Lichtenstein states an 
interesting issue. He has encountered the situation where early future product cost 
estimates seem usually too low to be compared to the final product cost of a new 
product development idea. In his view, costs are usually higher than expected as there 
are many indirect cost sources that are not taken into account in the beginning. He 
metaphorically described this as ‘small rivers’. These small rivers are small sources 
of different unexpected costs that then add up to large amount. One example is that an 
idea needs more marketing effort then estimated beforehand. Another example that he 
gave were patents and connected intellectual property rights which can cause 
unforeseen additional costs. Regarding avoiding or better estimating these cost his 
opinion is that there are less ‘unforeseen rivers’ the better the management 
understands the cost implications of the business. Thus in practice, cost analysis 
might be further optimized during innovation.  
4.4.5 Pre-development cost analysis need vs. limited resources 
The managing director of Lichtenstein explains that they had a business plan 
competition that was disestablished. Lichtenstein realized that it is actually ‘complete 
nonsense’ to have 800 business plans per year, if one needs to revise them all. Then 
the whole organization would be evaluating business plans, instead of establishing 
business. That would miss the point of venturing and new product developments in 
his view. Thus, quite naturally, there is a limited capacity for the cost analysis work 
during pre-development. Overall, the available analysis work capacity has to be used 
efficiently. 
156 
4.5 Miro  
4.5.1 Introduction to the case 
Miro is undergoing a strategic change from a product oriented to a customer solution 
oriented company. According to the interviewed head of R&D, the company is 
moving away from a mere industrial company that only supplies products, towards a 
supplier of added (industrial) services. Furthermore he stated that the main 
competitive advantages are seen as mostly connected to the delivery process and 
customer service, not the sold products themselves. The products are only the base for 
the operational excellence with which the company wants to succeed on the market. 
The company used to focus R&D and start innovations with a view on products that 
the company could produce and then tried to find customers for these new product 
developments. However, the new approach starts with market inputs that guide the 
R&D efforts from now on. Thus, the customer base plays a very important role for 
new product developments during idea generation. This customer base has to be taken 
into account as there may be problems with the commercialization of ideas at later 
stages. The company has tried to create new products for totally new customer areas, 
but found it very difficult to convince customers to adapt the new product. Even 
though the performance and value of the new product was described as looking very 
good, the problem was that new customers did not know the company so far. Through 
this, the credibility at the customer interface was not built up and it was hard to get 
into business with the new products. New idea developments usually show a faster 
time to market when the customer base is known. On one hand it is easier to find a 
first customer that is prepared to test the new product development. However, on the 
other hand, a new product development with a ‘waiting’ customer comes faster to 
market, as there is what the interviewed head of one business unit described as ‘some 
pressure’ on R&D. Additionally, the search for a new customer and the above 
mentioned credibility challenge will also slow down the commercialization of a new 
product development idea. Thus one can say that the company finds it easier to 
enlarge its business through new products for already served markets.  
Similar, the location of the customers throughout the world played an important role. 
If the sales channels and logistics were not built up, the company found it more 
difficult to market new ideas. 
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Figure 81: Stage gate model of Miro 
Figure 81 shows the stage gate model of Miro. The interviewed head of one business 
unit explained that gate 1 can be passed without any larger R&D work in order to save 
money. The investment in the initial analysis before the first screen is kept 
intentionally low. The information gathered comes from literature or knowledge 
available inside of the company. The effort of research conducted on a business idea 
increases from gate to gate. 
The second screen involves the same issues checked in the first one, with additional 
criteria to be checked. Furthermore, the interviewed managers stressed that there has 
to be a commitment of the key employees to the business idea. Additionally, an 
entrepreneurial spirit in the front end is seen as important. During the detailed 
investigation in the rear of pre-development (stage 2) the aim is to clear out the 
uncertainty connected to the business case, the targeted customer base and the 
business potential of the idea. As the interviewed head of one business unit explains 
further, the time to market is usually dependent on the products under consideration. 
If the new product development idea can use the existing infrastructure it will be 
potentially faster ramped-up as if the infrastructure and production facilities have to 
be built up first. 
 
Even so, Miro wants to change itself to a more market focused company in the future, 
it is clearly a technology driven company at the time of research (see 3.6.2). Through 
its R&D, Miro also has an institutional idea search and development, yet its idea 
suggestion program is dominant. Most new product development ideas are evaluated 
through this scheme. Thus Miro’s idea initiative is defined as idea suggestion based 
(see 3.6.3). The funnel type of Miro is classified as a few big bets approach (see 
3.6.4). Miro focuses on continuous incremental to complex innovations. For Miro it is 
important to stay within the same sales channels, as it is otherwise too difficult to get 
new business of the ground. Due to the nature of its core business, Miro is classified 
as medium-tech company in terms of the technological uncertainty according to 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see 3.6.5). 
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4.5.2 The cost information analysis process of Miro 
 
Figure 82: First time tool use of Miro 
At the start of its innovation process, Miro uses roadmapping tools during its idea 
generation in the front end. At Miro, ideas that come out of the front end have to pass 
an initial test to be assessed further in the first stage. This is done with the help of a 
scorecard. This check is done by a project team dedicated to innovation, assisted by a 
network of experienced experts. Besides other aspects, Miro also embedded a value 
analysis work in this scorecard.  
If the idea passes this test, it is analyzed in more detail with the help of intelligence 
work, e.g. by using a SWOT analysis to rate potential new ideas in the middle of pre-
development. Miro is doing its first product cost estimations in the middle of pre-
development. These are then carried out in more detail and with a higher 
sophistication in the rear pre-development.  
Generally the interviewed head of the corporate R&D center pointed out that it is very 
important in the evaluation of new product ideas that there will be synergies between 
the newly proposed product idea and currently manufactured products.  
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Figure 83: Miro’s normalized tools use in pre-development 
After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Miro in Figure 83. 
4.5.3 The role of cost information within the found tools 
The evaluation tool that dominates the early evaluation at Miro is the scorecard that 
the company employs to rate new product development ideas. This scorecard was 
developed to reflect the assessment criteria that Miro found useful and wants to be 
evaluated. They span a wide spectrum from strategic fit, over technological and 
marketing issues to the potential financial return and also cost issues.  
In the middle of pre-development the product cost are estimated for the first time. 
Before that, only budget costs for the development are investigated. The cost 
estimations were described as simple, usually based on the bill of materials. 
Additionally logistic costs are included and the investment costs are estimated 
through analogical cost estimations from past experience. The further the new idea 
development proceeds, the more accurate the cost estimations. In cases of rather 
incremental developments that are launched to already served markets and potential 
customers, projects can be evaluated very fast with the help of investment appraisal 
methods, like the net present value and return of capital calculations. Generally, the 
interviewed manager explained that whether or not life cycle costs are calculated 
for a customer solution depends on whether the customers are sensitive to prices 
or not.  
In support of the value analysis work, Miro checks whether a new product 
development idea generates a potential cost advantage for the customer and for 
how long a potential competitive advantage could be held against the competition.  
Miro starts using business intelligence in the middle of pre-development. It depends 
on the business segment and research unit, how much these tools are used and 
whether cost issues are also included in this business intelligence analysis. The 
company also involves experienced managers, technology experts and other 
Intelligence work Unspecific General Middle
Roadmapping Unspecific General Front
Scorecard use Specific General Front
Uncertainty management Specific General -
Cost dynamics analysis Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost database use Unspecific Cost focused -
Cost modeling and estimation Specific Cost focused Middle
Target costing efforts Specific Cost focused -
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experienced experts for this analysis. Generally it is up to the project team that 
follows an idea to choose whether or not to use business intelligence and to which 
degree.  
Similar, Miro starts using roadmapping in the front end, but leaves it up to the 
evaluating employees whether this tool is also used for analyzing cost developments. 
4.5.4 Challenges of product cost analysis during pre-development 
A challenge that Miro faces is that technical oriented employees are not doing cost 
estimations if they are not required to do them and if they do not get any support for 
it. It is difficult to get researchers to do cost estimates, as the managing director of a 
research center at Miro states: 
“We started to do it so that we linked this business person; so we have had 
always somebody from business side involved in the project. So he or she was 
responsible to think that okay; that we have a viable business concept […] and 
[through that] also these cost calculations will be done. Because in practice 
these […researchers] don’t make any cost calculations without somebody 
really pushing them to do that, and they probably not always have the ability 
to do the cost calculations in our […] industry. Because it is not easy to take 
into account how much the production is, raw material availability, and raw 
material cost and production cost and all the marketing and trades and also 
what […] the value of the product to the customers [is].” 
Thus it is very complicated for technical oriented employees to estimate the business 
potential because of uncertainties connected to volumes, costs and markets. 
That is why case company Miro is involving business experts in new product 
development teams. These are either experienced managers involved in innovations or 
networks of experts. Both are used to evaluate ideas as the head of one business unit 
explains: 
“We have also this kind of network where these ideas are evaluated […with] 
experienced persons. For example in our business area we have an R&D 
network through which all the ideas go, or the projects are discussed. And 
their expertise is used to check that okay, it is okay. But not very deeply […]. 
It’s related partly to the process. And also the idea generation is related to 
that […]. We have […] an R&D coordinator who collects all the ideas and 
has a portfolio, project portfolio, and there […] we evaluate them as a whole 
and compare projects and that way try to use this experience to, or expertise 
to evaluate how good they are, what kind of project they are, do the right 
resource allocations, what are the probability of success, and so on.” 
The evaluation has to be done by senior, knowledgeable and experienced persons. The 
involved business experts have a good understanding about the cost structure of 
present products. This should ensure that there are no hidden costs that are discovered 
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in later stages of a new idea development. Furthermore, these experts have a higher 
understanding of what is the value of the product to the customers. 
Thus the used tools have to be familiar to the employees to be used at all and correctly 
during pre-development. If employees are running into troubles of using the tools 
correctly, they are aided by more experienced colleagues in the case of Miro. 
4.6 Van Gogh 
4.6.1 Introduction to the case 
Van Gogh employs five to ten managers that are dedicated to product management 
and that are specialists in a specific business field. Similar to these product managers, 
the case company has employees dedicated to project management in innovations. 
Together, the product and the project manager are guiding new product ideas through 
the innovation process. On one hand, the product managers provide the strategic 
direction and idea, what should be developed. On the other hand, the project managers 
are taking care of the operative development of innovations. This combination 
reminds of a matrix organization, where the product manager has more power in the 
front end and the process manager is more administrating the later development 
stages. The company employs one controller for production and R&D. He is the key 
contact person for product and process managers if they need any cost based 
information. The product managers that ‘own’ the ideas in the front end can contact 
several different departments in a very easy fashion, something that was described as 
“very low barriers between […] departments” by the controller of production and 
R&D. 
Van Gogh has a structured stage gate process approach to manage the different stages 
during innovation. At every gate there is a cross-disciplinary meeting with people 
from manufacturing, software development, quality control, etc. During the meeting 
these participants have to agree that the idea fulfills the criteria for their respective 
field, so that the idea can move on into the next stage.  
The case company Van Gogh distinguishes two different types of R&D projects: 
• Product developments 
• Platform developments 
In the case of product developments several sources of innovations can be 
differentiated before the ideas are taken to the business opportunity check:  
1. Industrial design upgrade and usability improvement  
2. Market feedback 
3. New technology  
• Own research & development 
• Ideas injected by business partners  
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They vary in scope and risk. The first type – industrial design changes – improves an 
existing product by changing the look and feel of a product and/or usability. The 
second type is coming from customers, trade partners, business partners and after-
sales or similar contacts. Most innovations come from market impulses that are 
channeled through the product managers for their respective market and business 
field. These innovations are using known technology or show only incremental 
technology changes. However, new technology based new developments can also 
happen through two origins. New technology based innovation can firstly come from 
own R&D efforts or secondly from outside of the company. For the partnering 
solution they can be either only a rough sketch or a complete pre-engineered module 
that is then overtaken. The director of R&D explained that these kinds of innovations 
usually are caused by a technology push. Yet, there are also cases of radically new 
products coming from a market pull. This can be seen as the most risky innovation 
type as the company is facing uncertainties connected to the technology and the 
market at the same time. 
 
Figure 84: Stage gate model of Van Gogh 
The stage gate model of Van Gogh is shown in Figure 84. The effort about research 
conducted on a business idea increases from gate to gate. For the first formal gate 
(gate 1) where ideas come out of, the front end product manager that is proposing the 
idea, has to sketch the idea and its potential on a one page overview. This analysis is 
still carried out mostly by managers in duty of product lines with the help of the 
marketing department. This changes in the middle of pre-development (stage 1); here, 
the new product idea is taken over by an innovation project manager. The effort 
undertaken rises for the evaluation happening in the second gate (gate 2). The initial 
one page overview is extended into a four page report that is more detailed, e.g. about 
the competition. In some cases market reports from external consultancies can be 
used. These reports are used to identify the competition in the targeted market. 
Furthermore, the total available market (TAM) is analyzed. For feasibility studies the 
company then estimates the market share it could acquire from this total available 
market. 
The front end is a systematical idea generation process, using the technology push or 
market pull approach. However, there is no rigid system set up. This is perceived by 
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the company as constraining creativity and killing ideas too early. Employees that 
have ideas would ideally drop an email to the director of R&D. There is no software 
based, e.g. intranet, solution dedicated especially to introducing and describing new 
ideas so far. The process is more based on informal contacts, e.g. water cooler 
discussions, or official reporting structures, e.g. emailing the director of R&D. 
Another idea generation possibility is the product managers of Van Gogh. They 
provide the strategic direction and idea of what should be developed.  
When an idea goes further into the innovation funnel, it is then handed to project 
managers. These people are taking care of the operative development of innovations. 
They are deciding about make or buy decisions and whether to locate the production 
near the headquarters or in a low wage country. Furthermore they are also doing the 
cost management in early stages of innovation, by analyzing the cost structures of 
new product ideas, according to the planned bill of materials for this product. The 
controller for production and R&D is the key contact person for product and process 
managers if they need any cost based information. 
At Van Gogh most innovations come from market impulses through Van Gogh’s 
product managers and the company has a clear customer focus. Technology lead 
developments are possible. Thus the innovation style definition is that Van Gogh is a 
company with market driven innovation (see 3.6.2). However, this definition is not 
as clear-cut as in the other cases. Furthermore, Van Gogh is classified as a company 
showing an institutional idea search and development innovation initiative (see 
3.6.3). 
The director of R&D described the innovation process as turbulent and iterative up to 
gate 4, but then rather streamlined from stage 4 on. Thus the borderline between 
innovation styles can be seen as the decision at the product development start. The 
new product development funnel of the case company is shaped according to the few 
big bets innovation funnel type. This means that the company has a lot of ideas in 
the front end of innovation, gathered by product managers. However, the first screen 
eliminates many ideas right away. This process might not even be explicit, but tacit. 
The product manager discusses the ideas with his colleagues and evaluates himself 
whether or not to present the idea to the steering group in the first gate. Even though 
the controller for production and R&D pointed out cases where the new product 
developments were stopped at a very late stage, just before market launch, the 
tendency is towards an early screening. 
Due to the nature of its business and its clear focus on core markets, Van Gogh is 
classified as medium-tech company in terms of the technological uncertainty 
according to Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see 3.6.5). 
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4.6.2 The cost information analysis process of Van Gogh 
 
Figure 85: First time tool use of Van Gogh 
As can be seen in Figure 85, Van Gogh uses roadmapping and intelligence work 
already in the front end to identify possible new product ideas. After a first implicit 
screen by the product manager, whether or not the idea could be interesting to the 
company, he will seek opinions from peers that have deeper expertise in different 
fields than him. The intelligence work is multifaceted. It is about new technologies, 
but also about potential market success. Additionally, Van Gogh is already making its 
first cost estimates in the front end. These are then deepened in the next phase. After 
the idea generation in the front end there is a first informal screen with discussions 
with experts. The product manager will use rule of thumb and first guesstimates that 
he then summarizes on one page and presents to a steering group that makes the first 
go/no-go decision. If an idea passes through this gate, the product manager passes the 
idea over to a project manager that will take the idea through the innovation process. 
In stage 1, Van Gogh is starting target costing efforts. Furthermore it uses cost 
databases in that phase. Concluding, one can say that the company is not using too 
many tools but the utilized tools are used already in very early phases for the first 
time.  
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Figure 86: Van Gogh’s normalized tools use in pre-development 
After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Van Gogh in 
Figure 86. 
4.6.3 The role of cost information within the found tools 
Cost information plays a significant role in several tools that Van Gogh is using in 
pre-development phases. Van Gogh starts cost modeling and estimation already in 
the front end, when the company computes the first financial estimations. 
Already in that stage, a product manager is estimating potential sales deducted from 
market data. He uses cost information from running products, taken from cost 
databases that are connected to the company’s ERP system. For that he is assisted by 
the controller of R&D and production, who can retrieve historical information on 
prices of purchased items of several years. The cost modeling of the company is 
based on records of old products for the costs of raw materials, taken out of their 
ERP system. The cost information is then used in parametric and analogous cost 
relationships for the early cost estimations of its new product ideas that are not 
radically new. The cost analysis is intensified when a new product development idea 
moves up the innovation process. 
In the first stage after the front end Van Gogh starts using target costing efforts. 
The company uses a target costing approach by setting a recommended retail price 
already during pre-development and staying with costs and profit margin underneath 
this price target. However, when using this tool the company is not making an 
allowance for any cost erosion that could come from economies of scale and learning. 
With these (target) cost estimations the product manager is also computing first 
profitability calculations to estimate the potential profitability of the new product idea. 
This information is then used to screen the different new product development ideas. 
Van Gogh starts using cost databases in the first stage after the front end. It uses 
cost tables that are built on top of information stored in their ERP system. In this 
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way the company uses always the latest cost information in its cost estimations and 
calculations for the evaluation of new product ideas.  
The innovation process of Van Gogh starts with intelligence work in the front end and 
uses expert opinion during pre-development. Even so, cost issues can be dealt with 
during this intelligence work; the analysis of cost information is not an explicit part of 
this intelligence work. Similar the roadmapping practices of Van Gogh do not 
normally include cost analysis. 
There is a limited capacity for the cost analysis work during pre-development. E.g. it 
was pointed out that the analysis for cost dynamics is not done because of a limitation 
in manpower to do so. Even though there is a need of pre-development cost analysis, 
this analysis faces limited resources. Thus, the available work capacity has to be used 
efficiently overall. 
4.6.4 Cost controller to facility cost analysis 
Van Gogh is using a dedicated cost controller during innovation. This controller for 
R&D and production is the facilitator to use available cost information in pre-
development. He computes historical trends of component costs and passes the 
information further in an aggregated way to other managers. The computation of the 
needed cost information is not straightforward. At the moment, the company has to 
first run a report in their ERP system and then import the figures to a spreadsheet 
where they are processed further. Other managers probably would not have the 
competences and time to transform the raw cost data into the needed information. 
Thus he can be seen as a connecting point and linking pin between the data and the 
project managers that use the data. 
4.7 Warhol  
4.7.1 Introduction to the case  
Due to the nature of Warhol’s business they are facing very long research 
developments. There might be research based on technologies that will result in 
products only in ten to 25 years ahead of time. In these kinds of research efforts, costs 
only play a role as budgets for research spending. The company is challenging the 
market leader on its main operating area and tries to actively gain more market share. 
It operates globally in all continents and the R&D activity is spread over several sites 
internationally. 
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Figure 87: Stage Gate model of Warhol 
In the view of the researcher the stage-gate process of case company Warhol can be 
divided in three different sections compromising of different stages. The first section 
contains the basic research and technological feasibility proofs that are done in the 
front end. The second section contains the stages one and two, where applied research 
and development efforts are undertaken to elaborate and refine the new product 
development ideas. The third section compromises the stages three and four, where 
new product development ideas are developed and made ready for market launch. 
During stage three the uncertainty of the final design is eliminated until the point 
where all specifications are frozen. In stage three the product design and integration is 
done. Furthermore, the manufacturability of the developed product is tested and first 
pilot production runs are made towards the end of stage three. Finally, in stage four 
the production is ramped-up and the product is launched on the market. The following 
analysis of this case focuses on the stages from front end to stage two.  
Regarding basic research and technology transfer, the managing director of a 
corporate research center explains the technology transfer from basic research to the 
development departments as follows: Once the developers are brought into a project 
they are starting to absorb the technology issues, but also the market impulses at the 
same time. They also look at the market needs and address strategic issues. This is 
usually done with the help of technology roadmapping as a portfolio management 
tool. Thus the development teams need people with many different backgrounds in 
economics and technology. This is not the case in the research division, where 
employees usually have a strictly technical background. As the director of the 
research center describes it, the researchers working for him are not interested in the 
economic issues, but mostly in the technical feasibility and reliability of new product 
developments.  
In the rest of pre-development, new product development ideas are elaborated and 
refined. In the middle of pre-development (stage 1) the business potential of a new 
product development idea is evaluated and the first base concepts and main product 
architectures are selected. As the interviewed chief design engineer explains, the 
technical feasibility of the new idea is checked after the technology transfer from the 
research center. In this time employees of both the research center and the 
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development team are working together. With the basic knowledge available by them, 
the economic and technological feasibility of the new product development idea is 
also analyzed and evaluated. Before a new product development idea passes through 
to the next stage it is checked on a plethora of different criteria. These contain if the 
requirements of the new product development idea can be solved by the proposed 
technical solutions and whether they are economically feasible. Furthermore, 
scheduling, timing, resource spending and budgets are checked. At the same time the 
phases of the next stage are planned and prepared.  
At the rear pre-development (stage 2) the uncertainty of the exploitation of a new 
product development idea or technology is further reduced. The business plan is set-
up and the market launch planning is done on the marketing side. Furthermore, the 
resources and requirement specifications are analyzed and set. 
 
Innovations at Warhol are generally technology driven, thus the innovation style is 
classified accordingly (see 3.6.2). Furthermore, Warhol’s idea initiative is clearly 
rooted in institutional idea search and development (see 3.6.3), as innovations are 
based on scientific research and planned well ahead before market introduction. 
Warhol is clearly using a survival of the fittest funnel type for their innovations (see 
3.6.4). 
New product developments at Warhol are targeting radical to disruptive innovations. 
Incremental innovation can also happen, but they would by-pass the pre-development 
and go straight to concept or product development. Thus Warhol is classified as high-
tech to super high-tech company in terms of the technological uncertainty according 
to Shenhar and Dvir (1996) (see 3.6.5). 
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4.7.2 The cost information analysis process of Warhol 
 
Figure 88: First time tool use of Warhol 
During pre-development Warhol uses several human expertise based methods. In the 
front-end, Warhol uses roadmapping to manage its basic research. All other 
identified tools and methods are used in the middle of pre-development (stage 1) for 
the first time in an appreciable amount, as can be seen in Figure 88. In the middle of 
pre-development Warhol uses methods of intelligence work and expert judgments 
together with business intelligence. Furthermore, the company is using scorecards to 
evaluate risks at that stage. Additionally Warhol starts modeling costs and estimating 
the cost capability of new product developments. Through its cost capability 
estimations of new technologies Warhol analyses cost dynamics. This is also when 
Warhol starts using target costing efforts together with value analysis work. Warhol 
is also using cost databases and uncertainty management tools in the nature of 
what-if scenarios for its feasibility studies. This is done to check whether new product 
development ideas should be developed further. And last but not least, the company 
uses cost databases in the form of cost tables already in this early stage of innovation. 
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Figure 89: Warhol’s normalized tools use in pre-development 
After the normalization of the stage gate model according to the scheme presented in 
Figure 64, one can see the different tools and their first time use at Warhol in Figure 
89.  
4.7.3 The role of cost information within the found tools  
Warhol starts using is roadmapping in the front end. Once interesting technologies 
are identified, Warhol tracks these with forecasting and trend analysis. Furthermore, 
market trends are tracked with volume forecasts and scenarios to establish market 
development roadmaps.  
Warhol starts using intelligence work in the middle of pre-development. The 
company is open to new ideas of all kinds, but cost information still plays a minor 
role. 
Furthermore, Warhol is evaluating risks in a scorecard approach with a customized 
list with different risk items. The risks might include items like schedule risks, risk of 
cost overruns, resource risks and risks connected to intellectual property rights, but 
not specifically the (target) costs of a new product development once it is in 
production. 
However, at the same time Warhol starts modeling and estimating costs in the 
middle of pre-development. Managers in Warhol are interested in which kind of cost 
level per functionality can be achieved with a specific technology or technology 
generation. They are doing this by analyzing the trade-off between costs and 
functionality. Whenever possible, managers at Warhol try to quantify the benefits, 
disadvantages and costs of different design solutions as accurately as possible. This 
cost modeling uses the information gathered during the basic research and later R&D 
activities. In pre-development, the cost modeling is seen as a preparation work to 
make the right basic technology choices. However, due to the uncertainties attached to 
it, it resembles cost scenario modeling; mapping out possible cost settings and 
developments. This cost modeling is usually not done by the development engineers 
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themselves, but by the new technology purchasing unit that feeds the cost information 
to the development unit before technology selections are made. 
The company often faces technology choices about which technology to integrate in a 
product under development. One parameter in this selection is the cost level that can 
be reached with a certain technology. In order to estimate how the costs connected to 
certain technologies will develop over time, Warhol starts analyzing cost dynamics 
in the middle of pre-development. Managers of Warhol try to estimate the cost 
potential of competing technologies for several years ahead through expert judgment 
by combining elements from roadmapping and target costing. The costs that are 
roadmapped, are the unit production cost connected to certain technologies. It is used 
in planning purposes in order to hit the targeted price level of the new product that is 
developed. This combined use of tools is described further in subsection 4.7.7. 
Warhol starts using target costing efforts in the middle of pre-development. The first 
rough estimates are then made to analyze the feasibility of a solution. In this effort 
target costing is made down to component level. However, subsequently a gap 
analysis is performed to identify improvement possibilities. Once a proposal passes 
the feasibility analysis the target costing effort is stepped up to get as much 
information as possible for the development phase. 
Additional to their target costing efforts, Warhol starts using value analysis from the 
middle of pre-development on. The analysis is less on costs, but rather whether the 
existing customer base would appreciate new product developments and how much 
the potential market price could be.  
Warhol developed a cost database routine rooted in the concept of cost tables for new 
product development projects to determine and manage costs for several main 
components of the end product. The method uses a detailed model of price/cost 
drivers and a database of old price quotations for deriving price estimates of 
purchased components. The database is constantly updated by requesting virtual 
quotes from several suppliers with a purchasing scope of several years. The base for 
the detailed price/cost driver model was made through modeling the production 
process of the purchased component and thus recognizing the variable parameters 
affecting the production cost. Additionally, Warhol is also using cost databases and 
information for mechanical and electronic components and modules. In these cases 
the different component solutions show a certain degree of standardization and are 
comparable.  
Warhol starts using uncertainty management tools from the middle of pre-
development on. It is done with the help of volume forecasting and scenarios, but 
focuses less on costs. Additionally, Warhol is analyzing different alternatives through 
what-if scenarios from several angles to discuss different development options and 
their impact, e.g. on costs. In these scenarios, cost plays an important role. Besides the 
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required functionality and other specifications, costs are one target that has to be 
balanced with the other ones.  
When asked what the most problematic issues are in the front end, the interviewed 
chief design engineer working in Warhol answered that it is the uncertainty about 
future cost evolvement: 
“Of course the prediction of the future; that is the most problematic. And 
actually it may impact to the decision-making quite a lot that at stage zero [if] 
people say that this is too expensive. And if you don’t have the capability to 
predict how the cost will evolve, you may not get that proposal through. […] 
For people it is very difficult to […understand] on day zero that for example a 
product […] may ramp up after three years or four years from now, and they 
have to make [the] decision […whether this is] worth doing. […] For that it is 
difficult to find correct data.” 
The estimation of the cost situation of a new product development can be a critical 
issue in decision making and has a predictive view on cost evolvement.  
4.7.4 Cost pressure origins, challenges and need of cost 
awareness 
The following quote from the senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol 
shows his opinion that some pressure to design for costs is also essential if costs 
should be optimized:  
 “As long as cost isn’t the pressure, then the design is never optimized for it. 
And that includes the supply base design as well.” 
Regarding the importance of cost analysis in pre-development, the interviewed chief 
design engineer of Warhol explains: 
“We could have three different examples. One is for example this kind of 
mainstream products. And there is a huge cost pressure from the [direct 
business customers] all the time, because of the competition. […] Then there 
is this […special new system development] example, that there is a market 
impulse and it comes through the different […special key technology] 
standards competing again. And there you need to be able to hit the price 
points that the other competing technologies can provide. Then this third 
example, which had, or would have big impact on the […customer’s] OpEx 
and CapEx and implementation expenses, […] there we may have a little bit 
more room for the technology cost. But anyway, the cost awareness is there 
that we always have to compare with the competing solutions for that original 
[…customer] problem. So […] you cannot survive without cost awareness.” 
He also states that:  
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“It may in reality be so that depending on your awareness, you may choose, at 
the beginning you may choose a higher reference point, because you know 
that the slope will be or there may be some disruptions and it may be easy to 
change the technology later on. […] So it is not always the lowest reference 
point that should be targeted, but […] you have to think about the whole 
lifecycle. And this is quite hard for people to understand that the cheapest one 
is not the cheapest one in the long term.” 
Thus there are several cost pressure origins. These are leading in the direction that, 
new product developments – besides certainly many other issues – should be cost 
optimized. Yet, what sounds logical and easy in theory can be problematic in real 
business life. 
4.7.5 Effective technology selection is more important than 
efficient design 
The following quotes show an interesting aspect in the appreciation of cost modeling 
and analysis in the pre-development. The first quote is from the interviewed new 
technology purchasing manager of Warhol:  
“Cost data, […] it is very dynamic and it changes a lot. […] Especially in the 
case with technologies not on the shelf, there is no price for them. The only 
way to really get the cost information is by doing some kind of modeling work 
and estimations based on our know-how of the process and likely cost of such 
a future component. […] At later stages, when there is more information 
available and suppliers, they’ve got products, they’ve got a price tag for them, 
then all kinds of people will get the information from the suppliers.” 
However, one would think that the cost modeling of potential new technologies and 
estimating the costs of ‘such a future component’ would lead to much work and effort 
going to the waste bin. This can be either because this technology is not finally chosen 
or because the new product development would later not sell in high volumes. So why 
is Warhol prepared to spend the effort of modeling the cost of new technologies? One 
possible explanation would be that Warhol could optimize the costs early in the 
development projects. However, this is not the case as the following quote of the 
interviewed chief design engineer from Warhol shows: 
“But there may be also such cases that we just have to develop technology that 
we don’t have. […] And that was only just such case that we looked what is 
technically feasible, and of course having in mind what is feasible from 
economic point of view as well. And we have developed the first generation of 
that solution. It may not be the cost-optimized, but the reason for that can be 
also that the specifications are not so settled yet, so that we […] expect that 
there will be also further development on that side. And that means that you 
cannot choose the cost optimum from the kind of device stand point of view.” 
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Thus the reality for cost optimization seems to be that often it is not practicable as 
there are other constraints that are valued more important. So it seems that the 
development often cannot be fully cost optimized for the first generation development 
at Warhol. Yet, why is Warhol prepared to spend the effort of modeling the cost of 
new technologies, but do not fully optimize the costs during the development stage 
before market launch? It seems that cost modeling work has to be done for several 
alternative technologies before the concluding technology selection. Even though 
much of it goes into the waste basket, the benefit of modeling the costs of new 
technologies in the pre-development is seen greater than the effort spent on it. When it 
comes to the development on the contrary, the cost optimization is left aside as other 
constraints are valued more important. However, if the new product development is 
successfully established at the market, cost redesigns will be made. Also the cost 
modeling before the technology selection will be rougher and more of an estimate of 
magnitude than a precise cost calculation.  
This has to do with the lock-in effect that the technology selection brings with it as the 
quote of the interviewed chief design engineer from Warhol shows: 
“This is the making point when the technology is selected to be designed into 
product, and this means that it is very hard to change it, because it costs 
resources, it costs time.” 
On another occasion he states regarding the cost capability analysis of new 
technologies:  
“Cost capability, yes, at each phase. […] Specifically it is [done] in this front 
end decision-making milestones. When you have in a way passed […the go-
decision for development] or started the development, you don’t follow that 
much, because you have chosen the technology and you are moving ahead. If 
you change your plan in between, you never get ready.” 
So summarizing, one can say that an effective technology selection is felt more 
important than a cost efficient design straight for the first generation of a new 
developed innovation. Even though much of the analysis work done before the 
technology selection is useless after the technology decision; it is seen as a ‘worth 
doing’ effort by the above analyzed companies. They want to choose the right 
technology before lock-ins happen. For later detail design during the development 
phases, these lock-in effects seem not so extreme. These products get redesigned later 
on.  
4.7.6 Roadmapping and trend analysis at Warhol 
Warhol is doing extensive technology roadmapping in pre-development to manage 
their technology portfolio. The time frame for these roadmaps is around three years 
and more into the future. The input comes from research and intelligence work. It can 
originate from external or internal sources. This roadmapping is done for planning 
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purposes and to identify areas that have to be further elaborated or where the 
development has to be accelerated as the interviewed chief design engineer explains: 
 “…in [an] ideal case, the outcome of the applied research projects or 
technology feasibility studies or technology intelligence, […] would provide 
information for our roadmap. Because […] unless there is total disruption in 
[…a targeted market or] technology, […] the research results would create 
something into our roadmaps. Or we could identify from our roadmaps that 
for example for […a certain process or technology] need, we can say that we 
know how the world is evolving until three years from now. […] Then we 
would identify from our roadmaps that now we don’t know what is going to 
happen [after that time period], so […the unit needs to] make some research 
on this and that area. That is how research is mapped into this technology 
[…]. The whole thing is more or less technology management, and this is the 
technology roadmapping and architecture - reference architecture 
management.” 
Furthermore they collect information from different sources and concentrate it into 
internal reports that are shared in the different departments of Warhol, as one chief 
design engineer points out: 
“[For] technology roadmapping […Warhol uses] technology forecasting or 
technology trends analysis and such activities. […] We buy some analyst 
company reports and we do work by ourselves. […] When being in contact 
with our vendors and suppliers, […] we of course gather a lot of information, 
and every now and then we try to […] synthesize that information and create 
[an] understanding for us that where is the market or where is the industry 
going. […] Such activities [are] bundled in the strategic process, […which 
incorporates a] business environment outlook, or kind of prediction of the big 
trends or mega trends. And a lot of that kind of activities happen; so in various 
parts of the organization, whether it is in research or by ourselves [in 
development].” 
Thus Warhol is carrying out forecasting and trend analysis for interesting 
technologies. These activities span over both, technological and business matters. 
Furthermore, managers at Warhol are doing a trend analysis to understand the 
dynamic development of the performance and cost of different technologies. 
Similar, industry trends are analyzed. This information can then be used to compare 
technologies and to position the company compared to the competition. The company 
is analyzing the maturity of technologies to evaluate whether or not it would be better 
to invest into a new technology or remain with the conventional one for the next 
product generation as the interviewed chief design engineer explains: 
“Actually we are doing some trend analysis […] and it feeds our 
understanding of the technology capability […], where the industry is moving, 
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and it helps to […] position ourselves. This is then the key questions on 
technology trends that we try to understand. And it is about the investment, or 
the kind of traditional S curve that we need to know where are we; […] is the 
technology saturating or maturing, and when to invest to the new S curve, and 
always looking [at] the impact of the performance.” 
In the next step technology and market roadmaps are combined. The knowledge about 
new technology developments and the market trend and volume estimates are then 
brought together for further analysis of the new product development proposal case. 
In the case the further development of an important technology is uncertain, research 
projects to explore new technological possibilities are initiated. The findings of these 
projects are then used in further roadmapping and technology choice decisions. 
Similarly, the competences of suppliers are roadmapped and used in supplier selection 
as the chief design engineer further explains: 
 “There [are] still these technology maps and upward research projects and it 
brings significance into our business technology roadmaps. For that we need 
to have this kind of supporting functions, and it means doing technology 
intelligence, feasibility, technology specification evaluation, technology 
selection, and […] we are screening for other vendors. So technology 
selection and vendor selection [is] then based on our supply line management 
strategies; […] who are our recommended suppliers and what is our strategy 
regarding each specific area.” 
4.7.7 Combined use of tools 
In subsection 4.7.3 the novel combination of tool elements is already mentioned. This 
subsection will look closer at this combination. On top of roadmapping and trend 
analysis at Warhol, the company has further developed these tools to include figures 
that are blurry in the beginning, but are to be refined during the R&D process as a 
senior new technology purchasing manager explains: 
“If you’re pitching a technology towards the […] release in three years’ time, 
then you can say that roughly speaking it needs to come at this [cost] level. So 
it is still using target costing […] and it’s more fuzzy, so not so sharp. The 
closer you get to the product launch, the more certain you can be about the 
target costing. But you still use some [estimates] for target costing in the early 
stages as well. You’re using a rough guess, you’re saying the price erosion 
[…] will be roughly […X] % per year.[…] You can do […] a rough cut, then 
you have to structure your architecture and component choices such that it 
will meet that kind of very rigorous target. So I think there is this form of 
target costing as well before […development], but done with a more general 
understanding.” 
In the middle of pre-development, Warhol is using the approach of target cost that can 
be described as follows: Warhol uses estimates from cost roadmapping based on 
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expert knowledge and compares these to target cost estimates. In the case that 
developments might take several years until production ramp-up, it is important for 
Warhol to know how the costs connected to certain technologies will develop over 
that time. The roadmapped costs are the unit production costs that can be achieved 
with a certain technology. In this early stage when the costs are still too high, the 
company estimates the future point on which it could start the development with 
traditional target costing. Like this, Warhol uses estimates and vague figures from 
cost roadmaps and experience curve effect to unite them over a time axis. For further 
discussion this novel tool use combination will be referred to as directional costing 
in this thesis. 
Directional costing is described as a future cost analysis and tracking procedure 
performed before the start of specific new product development procedures, aiming to 
map costs and functionalities that are the base for later target costing when new 
product development programs are started. 
 
Figure 90: The concept of directional costing 
A figurative outline of directional costing is shown in Figure 90. As stated above, 
Warhol is using a tool prior to target costing that is a fusion of several tools. This 
procedure contains elements of forecasting, trend analysis, roadmapping, cost 
estimation, cost capability analysis (analysis of cost dynamics over time) and target 
costing. Directional costing is done to understand the dynamic development of the 
performance and cost of different technologies and to be aware of future development 
possibilities several years before a development process (with target costing) is 
started.  
Furthermore, one point is worth making a note of. In the ongoing debate in literature, 
of which functions target costing teams most commonly represent (see 2.5.4.2), the 
case study of Warhol indicates clearly that directional costing is carried out by 
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engineering team members; however it is also supported by purchasing experts from 
the sourcing department. 
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5 Analysis of general and cost tool use  
Next, an overview of how the different tools are used is given. This chapter presents 
an overview of the different tool usage in the case companies to manage early 
innovation. In the following of this chapter the use of tools found in the case 
companies will be described in more detail. 
5.1 Intelligence work  
5.1.1 Overview 
• Dali uses information from a variety of sources, ranging from consulting 
reports to information stored internally in databases, enriched by expert 
opinion and judgment. 
• Similarly, Duchamp is using business and technology intelligence and 
updates its information and estimations as soon as new information is 
available. Employees of Duchamp can find reports and business evaluations in 
the intranet and also receive support from experts. 
• Kandinsky uses technological intelligence and scouting done by engineers in 
their field of interest, covering mostly technical aspects, but also economic 
ones. 
• Lichtenstein uses intelligence work to support idea creation and evaluation, 
e.g. through analyzing how different market trends can lead to new business. 
• Miro also uses business intelligence, but starts it in the middle of pre-
development. For their business intelligence, Miro uses technology experts 
and experienced managers of the targeted business areas are involved. 
• Van Gogh uses intelligence work that covers both sides: the technological and 
the business related. For the analysis of the potential market success the 
opinions of experts are used. In this way, more information about challenges 
connected to the new product idea is gathered. 
• In the middle of pre-development Warhol uses technological and business 
intelligence work together with expert judgments from experienced employees 
or company external sources. The gained knowledge is usually stored in 
reports and roadmaps, which are then used for the analysis of new product 
developments. 
5.1.2 Intelligence as a base that is readily available 
Intelligence work can be used to map the environment of a company and is a base for 
the analysis during pre-development. Intelligence work is commonly started to be 
used in either front end or middle of pre-development as a base for the further work as 
a quote of the interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol shows:  
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“Business intelligence – yes, certainly that is the fundament. […] It is always 
there; needs to be always there. That is our main bread and butter.” 
He further explains: 
“We do [use intelligence information], so we buy some analyst company 
reports and we do work by ourselves. […] When being in contact with our 
vendors and suppliers, […] we of course gather a lot of information, and 
every now and then we try to put it, kind of synthesize that information and 
create understanding for us that where is the market or where is the industry 
going.”  
The location of the intelligence work material can be spread several locations, as the 
director of concept development at Duchamp makes clear: 
“We do have some type of business market intelligence. […] It is not exactly 
centralized, but there are not many places where that exist, and that 
information will be used, and of course here we do have some universities and 
other partners that provide some information that will be used, depending on 
the case and the part of organization.” 
His colleague, the director of the idea suggestion system, further clarifies: 
“We have a separate unit, big unit, […and] in our intranet we have separate, 
if I call it pages, where they put [intelligence information];  they buy from 
several consultant companies reports on what is happening in the industry. 
Technical reports and evaluations and business evaluations and so on, […] 
We can use those, no problem. […] We can use that information, that is totally 
available for us.” 
However, the use of employees during pre-development depends on the need and 
desire to use it, as one head of a business unit of Miro explains: 
“Of course it depends on the researcher too and this business person who is 
involved, if he uses [the] business intelligence available or not. But it is not so 
that you must utilize these tools.” 
5.1.3 Summary 
All studied companies are using intelligence work in pre-development. Furthermore, 
four of the seven companies are using intelligence work in the front end of 
innovation; the other three start using it in the middle of pre-development. In five of 
the seven cases intelligence work is used together with expert opinion to judge new 
product development ideas and aspects connected to them. The companies are using 
information from a variety of sources. The information gathered is usually stored 
inside the organization, sometimes explicit, sometimes tacit. All companies use a 
balanced mix of business and technology intelligence. However two companies stand 
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out: Kandinsky has a tendency to cover more technical issues through their scouting 
and Duchamp has a tendency to cover more business issues in their intelligence work. 
5.2 Roadmapping  
5.2.1 Overview 
• Kandinsky creates cost roadmaps in order to anticipate the future value of 
different functionalities to their customers. These roadmaps are then used in 
the target cost considerations of Kandinsky. 
• Lichtenstein also uses cost roadmapping in order to meet the needs of the 
target market. For this, the cost development of products and parts are 
analyzed in the middle of pre-development. 
• Miro uses roadmapping to break its business and technology strategy down, to 
communicate it to their employees and guide developments. These roadmaps 
can be enriched by specific development targets set by the top management. 
• Van Gogh uses strategic roadmapping for identifying possible new product 
ideas and to ensure that the developments are leading in the right direction.  
• Warhol has the most sophisticated roadmapping practices. The company uses 
roadmapping to grasp, store and refine technological and market information 
over several years and uses this tool to manage their technology portfolio. In 
their roadmaps, employees of Warhol are carrying out trend analysis to 
understand the dynamic development of performance and cost of different 
technologies. These are compared to market data. If both are different, 
research efforts are conducted to bring the technology costs down to a feasible 
level. Warhol also uses roadmaps for volume forecasts, market development 
scenarios and early supplier involvement. 
5.2.2 Benefits and limitations 
Roadmapping work helps to develop in the right direction. One interviewed head of a 
business unit at Miro says that: 
“But normally we even may have a project and R&D persons nominated to do 
that kind of […] roadmapping, and we have defined the targets that you have 
to innovate something for this. So this comes from strategy.” 
There is also a connection with the intelligence work described above as the quote 
from the interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol shows: 
“And in ideal case, the outcome of the applied research projects or technology 
feasibility studies or technology intelligence […] would provide information 
for our roadmap.” 
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Furthermore, the interviewed cost controller for R&D and production of Van Gogh 
says that the company would like to increase the use of roadmaps for further strategic 
alignment:  
“Yeah, we have those road-mappings to those new areas. […] But I think that 
we are even today […doing] this ad hoc thinking. […] But I think that we have 
to do better those plans and also roadmaps […]. We think that our current 
situation is not the best. But we think that these things run okay, but we think 
that if we want to improve we have to do things different way.” 
The above examples show that roadmapping often has a connection with strategy 
work and intelligence work. During pre-development a multitude of different aspects 
can be roadmapped. The vice president for new technology development at 
Kandinsky describes also a technical performance roadmap: 
“And then for each of these functions; […] each of them is making this kind of 
[…] functional roadmap. Where we are and where they want to go.” 
Additionally, he translates these technical performance roadmaps into business value: 
“Myself, I am thinking and calculating, and euros and dollars are here in 
these roadmaps.” 
And he uses it to communicate possible future developments: 
“I have [a] sort of technology roadmap, where I have the market price for the 
products […]. Market price, [… versus two industry specific and important 
performance indicators], these are the three parameters. [The roadmap 
shows…] what is now the market level, and then […] some kind of price 
erosion. [… It shows that] we won’t survive in five years, because we are 
already in some cases over the sort of bulk market price, but then I show that 
with these innovations, with different kind of technology steps, like optimized 
components, optimized topologies and optimized packaging, with these steps 
actually we can go on to make that 40 % gross margin in this business. This is 
sort of the message I have been giving.” 
The interviewed senior new technology purchasing manager at Warhol states: 
“Normally the way the programs would start is that there is some kind of 
roadmapping that goes on to begin with. […] We’ve got some roadmapping 
activity, and this is typically done at a system level and there might [be] some 
product level done as well, in case some feasibility study is starting. […] And 
you can [have] some various small research projects, which are contributing 
to the information for roadmapping.” 
However, he adds:  
“[In] theory […] you should see a nice cascade of roadmapping proposals, 
then dribbling feasibility studies and once they are looking good, then the 
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project will start. [However,] quite often what happens is that there is a very 
short phase for the feasibility study. There is a certain impulse to make 
something and the guys, more or less, they’re very quick in starting a project. 
And during the program specification stage it stretches and stretches, because 
there is a lot of iterations as they try and find their way to what is really going 
to work.”  
If employees or management want ‘things to get started’ there can be a challenge with 
starting innovations fast - maybe too early. Thus it is a challenge in the front-end of 
innovation that employees might be rushing in the beginning without doing enough 
pre-work to research and evaluate a new product development idea and its 
requirements. In this case, it can come to the above described iterations that could be 
avoided or streamlined with prior roadmapping.  
A limitation described by the vice president for new technology development of 
Kandinsky is that roadmaps have a limited use for them as it is impossible to know 
innovation made outside of the company in advance: 
“It’s very hard to get some not invented here kind of stuff in the roadmaps.” 
So there can be a limited use for roadmaps that deal with new product developments 
outside of the company. 
5.2.3 Summary 
All case companies but Dali and Duchamp are using roadmapping as a tool in the 
front or middle of pre-development. Information is collected from different sources 
and concentrated into internal reports that are shared throughout the company. As 
developments might take several years until market launch, it is important to know 
how the costs connected to certain technologies will develop over that time. A very 
important aspect is the communication of and the alignment with strategy for 
innovation projects. However, roadmapping works best with data from within the 
company or publicly available information (e.g. from conferences). It is less suited to 
anticipate the development of other companies, as the base-information is hardly 
available. 
5.3 Scorecard use  
5.3.1 Overview 
• Dali uses scorecards to evaluate risks of new technologies by checking a list 
of critical issues. Dali’s scorecard is a template that is continuously filled and 
which includes a scoring. First a light version of this risk scorecard is used, but 
once a development proceeds further, the risk study is made in depth. 
• Duchamp checks several points for new product developments with 
scorecards as templates. However, the interviewed managers at Duchamp 
point out that the scoring and ranking of ideas can be problematic. For that 
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qualitative judgment and an extended framework, grasping the big picture, has 
to be used. 
• Miro has centered its entire evaluation of new product ideas on a scorecard 
scheme. With this scorecard it checks several dimensions of strategic fit, 
technology and business feasibility. Miro sees this scorecard as an efficient 
way to screen new product development ideas as it can be used very lightly 
and is suitable to very early phases of innovations. 
• Warhol is using a scorecard to evaluate its risks. It is used from the first stage 
after the front end on and is custom-made for each project from a general list 
with different risk items. 
5.3.2 On the analysis and screening done by submitting 
employees themselves 
Ideas submitted by employees at Miro are screened by the submitting employees 
themselves as the first gate. This gate is described as very light. The reason for this 
kind of screening is the motivational factor for the employees, rather than a strict 
screening as the director of one research center describes it: 
“This first stage is also quite light, not very heavy. […] People are satisfied 
when they have to do something with their ideas, […] when they create [an] 
idea; they get that kind of feedback that they can play around a little; because 
it motivates them to make more ideas. And then here the next stage, […] these 
are still proposals here, not accepted projects into our system. So that acid 
test only, how we call it, it only tells that okay, we have the potential, but we 
don’t know yet how economical it is. So and afterwards we decide that okay, 
you can put here maybe one week’s work to test something. Make first tests, so 
is it viable or not. Then during that second stage here, […] we ask everybody 
to make sales estimates, we ask them to make calculations, like net present 
value calculations, […] you get also gross margin there. And then we can 
evaluate […whether it has the potential to be] profitable for the business.” 
5.3.3 Scorecards as decision aid 
The screening system of new product development ideas at Miro is heavily based on a 
scorecard system in the front and middle of pre-development. However, this in only a 
standardized first step as the director of one research center at Miro further explains: 
“Okay, but the idea is much more than only to check that. We are saying that 
always before we start anything, we have to have two items. One is the 
business commitment, meaning that they are involved and they have evaluated 
what kind of value creation possibilities we have in the new idea, so meaning 
that they must say that okay, there should be some kind of customer value for 
the new idea, otherwise we don’t proceed here.” 
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Similarly, an interviewed director in charge of the concept development at Duchamp 
says that scorecards can only support decision making, but are limited in their power 
to analyze new product development ideas in pre-development: 
 “I don’t believe very much in for example that type of methods that you give 
different measures, you have lots of questions and then you have numbers 
from zero to ten and then you calculate and get a result, for example 67; what 
does it mean for you. […] Of course they help you in decision making, but you 
cannot making decisions directly with those things.” 
5.3.4 Summary 
Four out of seven case companies are using scorecards in pre-development. Out of 
that, two companies (Dali and Warhol) use scorecards mostly for risk analysis to 
check the feasibility of new product developments. On the contrary, two other 
companies (Duchamp and Miro) use scorecards mostly to evaluate the strategic 
alignment and the attractiveness of new proposals. Thus the case companies using 
scorecards do so mostly to get a fast and refined overview of the attractiveness of the 
new proposal or its attached risks. It is important that the scoring dimensions are well 
described and understood similarly by all employees working with the scorecard. The 
earliest use of scorecards found is to employ them directly for the evaluation of new 
product development ideas in the front end (Miro). Already at this stage Miro gathers 
and analyzes cost information.  
The above comments on the limitations (see 5.3.3) show that a scorecard itself is only 
a way to embed other analysis during pre-development. It standardizes the way of 
analysis, but the scoring itself can lead to ambiguity and thus should not be used 
mechanically. 
5.4 Uncertainty management  
5.4.1 Overview 
• Dali is using triple point estimates and Monte Carlo simulations for the 
analysis of their new product developments. Managers estimate the most 
likely, the worst and best case for several critical points and run a simulation 
to analyze the distribution of likely outcomes. 
• Duchamp uses scenarios to analyze possible business strategies and to 
facilitate discussions during innovation phases.  
• Lichtenstein analyzes different scenarios to check the plausibility of their 
estimates. These scenarios contain also triple point estimates for the best, the 
worst and the most likely case. 
• Warhol uses what-if scenarios to discuss different development alternatives. 
Regarding uncertainties attached to costs of new product developments the 
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new technology purchasing unit of Warhol models cost scenarios, mapping 
out possible cost settings and improvements. Furthermore, the company uses 
volume forecasting and scenario thinking during their analysis of factors 
affecting demand. 
5.4.2 Benefits and limitations 
Uncertainty management tools facilitate to get a grip on data. The challenge of the 
uncertainty is present at Lichtenstein, as generally the uncertainty connected to 
venturing is one challenge that management faces in the front end of innovations. The 
senior manager in charge of the business development of the venturing unit worries 
the uncertainty coming from marketing and distribution channels and he sees that 
even more important than the uncertainty of costs. Thus it seems logical that they are 
using uncertainty management tools. Yet, e.g. Kandinsky points out volume 
uncertainty as a challenge in pre-development, but does not use uncertainty 
management tools.  
The director of concept development at Duchamp talks about its use and benefit to 
get a broader understanding in pre-development: 
“You can have different scenarios about its possible success, there may be 
parameters that, about which, [like the] the time schedule, you are not [sure], 
and you have several options, and then of course about the revenue and 
volumes […] Then it could be one way to create the most likely case, and then 
use that as a basic assumption when you’re doing those calculations and 
studies, but still have other alternatives.” 
Similarly, the interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol points out: 
“We may do alternative scenarios for the business case, so the kind of target 
and […] medium, high and low; and that is in a way giving some indication 
that where are we between the decision making points and – but in a way not 
crunching such statistical numbers.” 
Thus the benefit is to evaluate several alternatives when the pre-development analysis 
incorporates too much uncertainty on several aspects. Furthermore, it is described as a 
tool without too much ‘number crunching’, so it is seen as a rather qualitative tool.  
5.4.3 Summary 
Four out of the seven case companies are using tools that can be grouped as 
uncertainty management tools. According to the case studies, uncertainty 
management is not used in the first screen. That means that the companies are not 
concerned towards reducing the uncertainty with these tools in the front-end, but only 
in the later pre-development when it comes to more detailed analysis and decision 
making.  
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Three companies are using scenarios to evaluate business directions to facilitate 
discussions during innovation phases and as a part of their corporate planning. The 
companies using scenarios in pre-development find that the use of scenarios facilitates 
new product developments and their decision making centered on them. Two 
companies are using triple point estimates. Furthermore one company is using Monte 
Carlo simulation additionally.  
5.5 Cost modeling and estimation  
5.5.1 Overview 
• Dali is using parametric cost estimation in its costing templates together with 
either manually entered cost data or cost data out of their ERP system. The 
cost modeling follows the production of their products, but also uses batch and 
product level costs from activity based costing. 
• Kandinsky uses a mix of parametric and analogous cost estimations for 
deducting prices for new product developments. If the development is a 
radical innovation the case company uses mostly parametric cost estimations. 
Furthermore, Kandinsky uses cost driver analysis to investigate the cost 
structure and actual costs of their products and purchased components. 
‘Perfect waste-free’ product cost calculations, which compute the theoretical 
minimum of costs to fulfill a function, are sometimes done in the front end. 
• Lichtenstein uses parametric and analogous cost estimation in the middle of 
pre-development. The company derives component and usual technical 
development costs from the experience with old products. Furthermore, it also 
models life cycle costs and cost benefits for customers in the middle of pre-
development. 
• Miro uses parametric cost estimations in the middle of pre-development that 
are refined later. The first cost estimations are usually based on the planned 
bill of materials of a new product development, but also include product level 
costs. In some cases Miro also models life cycle costs.  
• Van Gogh computes the first cost estimations already in the evaluation for the 
first gate. These are later refined using parametric and analogous cost 
relationships. For the estimation of unit level costs, the company uses ERP 
system records of old products. Additionally, batch and product level costs are 
evaluated. 
• Warhol starts using cost modeling in the middle of pre-development using 
information gathered during basic research and later R&D activities. The cost 
modeling task is carried out by specialists rather than employees specialized in 
technology.  
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5.5.2 Incremental vs. radical innovations  
Modeling and estimation facilitate assessment and quantification of cost issues. The 
following two quotes are about estimating costs of product parts that are integrated 
into new product developments. The first one is from the interviewed chief design 
engineer of Warhol, explaining the cost estimation in an example of a rather radical 
innovation on a system level:  
“In the first example, the research project has gone into the component level: 
so they […] analyzed the main components; so their existing or […] known 
component prices, and also [did a] kind of gap analysis that where are the 
areas we should improve. […] And that analysis is bringing some knowledge 
that where […] is the […] cost of the component. So in this case it has been 
quite precise. Of course I’m certain these […were] not analyzing so 
thoroughly the performance requirements or not going into very details, but 
kind of rough analysis of the requirements. But okay, that has been the 
outcome of the research project. And now the research results have been 
brought into the business unit, […] and there we try to make [the] next step of 
the preciseness of the performance analysis. […] as deep and as precise as 
possible, [...] and depending on the knowledge of the people as well.” 
The second quote is from the interviewed vice president of new technology 
development at Kandinsky. It is about the cost estimation in an example of a rather 
incremental innovation on a component level as supplier for larger clients: 
“The plan is that everything is clear and we have a goal here, but of course 
there is a lot of quotations, you have to give a quotation and then you don’t 
know if it’s accepted or not. Sometimes it happens that we give a quotation 
and then [the] customer rejects us and then we thought that we were too 
expensive and the case is lost, but then after six months they come back and 
actually the other calculated it wrong and could not do it or the solution did 
not work. So this fuzzy front end is a little bit difficult for technical people like 
myself.” 
Thus the challenge of estimating costs is complex in both cases for radical system 
level developments and incremental innovations system component level 
developments. However, the quotes also show that there is a difference in the targeted 
preciseness of the cost estimation. The first cost analysis for the radical innovation is 
described as a ‘rough analysis’ that gives indications for further analysis work in 
additional, following research projects. Yet, the cost analysis for the incremental 
innovation can also be rather difficult, as it has to be more precise and is done in an 
application engineering style.  
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5.5.3 Types, aims and benefits 
The modeling of costs can have quite diverse aims. The managing director of 
Lichtenstein is saying that they are modeling business cases and the cost of their 
solution. Furthermore, they are modeling what the costs of today’s solution is and 
what the savings potentials are, especially to evaluate and show the cost benefit for 
the customer, once he is using their product. 
In long running technology developments, cost modeling in the ideal case and other 
cases can be significantly different as the interviewed senior new technology 
purchasing manager of Warhol explains: 
“So then when we come to the front end, innovations and […that] kind of 
things, then it suits the formal mainstream [research and development] 
process pretty well, because we were trying a lot of the cost modeling and 
things into these early research phases, and then they would help us make the 
right decisions in roadmapping stage and then give some good information for 
the feasibility studies, for the cost estimations, for the product when they put 
all the elements together. It suits that kind of courses. It doesn’t suit so much 
this other process here, which might be pulling new technologies [in an ad hoc 
way…] and there really isn’t any time to do modeling for this. The best you 
can do [in the ad hoc way] is just try to negotiate it in the traditional style and 
hope for the best price. But [that] isn’t a structure that encourages this kind of 
early modeling work.” 
He further adds to the benefit of cost modeling in pre-development:  
“So I think that if we can encourage this kind of early [technology cost] 
modeling approach and get some validity there and even use that to help these 
guys in the informal process to chose the right thing from the beginning and 
find, [and] de-risk it, then it will help their approach as well as the formal 
approach. So I am quite convinced that the more information […] we get 
about the right choices for the technology cost progression, the more flexible 
it is going to be to the business.”  
Thus, there are different approaches to cost modeling in pre-development. 
Furthermore, the cost modeling in pre-development is seen as beneficial for long 
running, well structured development projects that prepare information on different 
alternative technologies in advance, so that this information is then available before 
the final technology selection and lock-in.  
Furthermore the interviewed senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol 
states: 
“So if […] information is fed through, it is already modeled and worked out 
and then we go back to this formal process, where it comes through from the 
beginning, then the engineers do not need to go and bargain about it, because 
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they’ve got good cost models that they can do their decision making about 
their designs in an early stage in a correct way, and there is less hassle 
around the price levels.”  
He continues: 
“And also because the suppliers are being cooperating earlier, everybody 
understands what the real price is, in terms of the end result. So the 
negotiation pressure is reduced and there is more genuine cooperation.” 
Thus additional to the benefits of having information before technology selection, cost 
modeling in pre-development makes client-suppliers cooperation easier.  
As Van Gogh has rather incremental innovations they can use cost data from old 
production records as a base for their modeling. The interviewed cost controller for 
R&D and production of Van Gogh describes their production cost modeling as 
follows: 
“Our cost modeling works in our SAP system, because there is our old history 
data, because SAP, they have so huge those databases. They can take like 
three years in history data, and then we can think that how those material 
costs are going. And then we have one very good tool in SAP, it is like this 
cost estimate, what gives right way the what is our costs. And there is very 
nicely, there is information [about…] material cost in that product and labor 
cost and also in overhead costs. Normally our project managers, the like a lot 
of that SAP information.” 
He continues about the cost modeling and estimation method: 
“We use this activity-based costing, and we use that […] when we direct our 
costs. And this activity-based costing is, it is something like four years old. 
Before that we used only this percent allocation. Then the percent allocation, 
it is not good in all the cases.” 
5.5.4 Intellectual property rights make cost modeling difficult for 
new innovations  
The following quote from the senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol 
has to be seen in the light of a system innovation that also requires integrating several 
new technologies from suppliers into the new product development:  
“So then when you’re doing your cost modeling, there is always some kind of 
estimation about the value of the performance aspect. So you find another line 
creeping in there, which is just generally called IP [(intellectual property)], 
which is know-how or trade secret or whatever of the company, which they are 
trying to put evaluation on. So then that gives a premium on their component 
over another similar but less well performing component. So that is a bit 
tricky. And there really is not any source for that data and the supplier will put 
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their evaluation on it, but the market will determine the real value of that. If 
people buy it, then the suppliers will feel justified, that we put the right price 
tag. If no-one buys it, then they will understand it is not […] and they will 
have to drop it. It is difficult to get the real cost data for that kind of [new 
developments offered by suppliers].” 
The quote of the senior new technology purchasing manager shows his struggle to 
estimate costs of system components that should be purchased from some supplier. 
What he labels as the add-on prices for intellectual property (IP) by suppliers is seen 
as a problem in cost estimation in pre-development.  
5.5.5 Technology communality can override isolated cost 
modeling 
“Then there is some things that we are now struggling with is that […] we try 
to look [at] communality, where it is rational. So it may be that one project 
chooses this technology and other chooses this. And […] somebody could say 
that there would be an even lower entry point with maybe better [cost 
development] curve. But it may be that if you choose this family of technology, 
in the long term the total cost is better than just making individual decisions 
on selecting the technology. So it also comes to this product family thinking 
that what is the technology base; […] would be better if it is more similar […] 
across the products and across product lines. It is like in [the] car industry 
that they are not designing the tire bolt each and every time for each product, 
they take those from standards. But still in our industry our engineers tend to 
invent their own bolts again and again.”  
This quote from the interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol shows that 
technology communality might let you choose technology that is not the cheapest for 
one special case. Instead synergies in technology selection should be used as the 
standardization might not be used enough otherwise. However, this indicates that the 
overall cost optimization is looked for, not a sub-optimization of system parts that 
would lead to higher overall costs. 
5.5.6 Freedom from cost restrictions in research 
Another limitation of the early use of cost modeling in pre-development is mentioned 
by the interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol: 
 “It is maybe two-folded: that one is to research or search for the technical 
solution, and it maybe just technology driven. And then the other, related to 
decision-making, is to predict the cost, cost evolution or the cost of the 
technology. And maybe, in most of the cases we are not […] concentrating our 
research effort on that. It is more concentrated on the technical solution. But 
then, when going into the […business development] milestone phases, then we 
will get more the cost or the economical analysis there. And maybe that is 
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good and intentionally done so that new ideas can come up from research; 
and if those are not put down because of the expected cost or that kind of 
restrictions.” 
Thus there might be an intentional freedom from cost restrictions in research in order 
to allow more creativity. However, there will be a shift after basic research towards 
more cost interest as soon as a new product development idea becomes pre-
development. When this happens, the cost modeling and estimation work is going up 
at Warhol. 
5.5.7 Summary 
All case companies except one (Duchamp) are using some kind of cost estimation or 
modeling in pre-development. One of the analyzed companies (Van Gogh) starts 
formulating its first cost models already in the front-end of innovation. 
In the analyzed companies, the cost modeling is either fully or at least partly done by 
specialists. Furthermore, cost modeling in pre-development is sometimes enriched by 
also including other costs from a total cost of ownership perspective (Lichtenstein) or 
life cycle costs (Lichtenstein and Miro).  
There is a difference between the analysis for incremental and radical innovations in 
the targeted preciseness of the cost estimation of future new product developments. 
The first has to be precise and is done in an application engineering style. The latter is 
described as a ‘rough analysis’ that gives indications for further analysis work and is 
used in technology selection. However, incremental innovations can also use cost data 
from old production records as a base for their modeling, a trait that radical 
innovations do not have. 
The cost modeling in pre-development is seen as more beneficial for long running, 
well structured development projects that prepare information on different alternative 
technologies in advance, especially in front of technology selections.  
However, cost modeling and estimation in pre-development can also have constraints. 
Uncertainties of future costs of processes can be a limitation. They can be a hindering 
point to cost modeling and estimation in pre-development as the case of Duchamp 
shows. Intellectual property rights can also make cost modeling difficult for new 
product developments. Cost modeling in pre-development can also be limited in use if 
there is a technology communality that has to be taken into account. In addition there 
might be an intentional freedom from cost restrictions in basic research to allow more 
creativity.  
5.6 Target costing efforts  
5.6.1 Overview 
• Dali has incorporated a system of value analysis work, allowable costs, ‘back-
costing’ and target profit calculations similar to the paradigm of target costing 
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in the second stage after the front end. First the company analyses what the 
value of a solution is to their customer or to the end customer. From that the 
allowable market price is deducted. They then calculate the estimated 
manufacturing costs and add a profit margin. In a final step allowable costs 
and estimated costs (including the targeted profit margin) are compared to 
each other. If the targeted price is unlikely to be reached by the new solution, 
it has to be altered or it is dropped.  
• Kandinsky tries to find out how much the customer is willing to pay in the 
future for this function. In the next step costs and targeted profit margins are 
added and compared to the allowable market price. 
• Van Gogh has different end-customer price level for different products under 
development. During development and design the costs of a product are 
estimated and must stay below a target price minus a targeted profit margin. 
• Warhol is using target costing efforts already in the middle of pre-
development. The company investigates the acceptable market price for new 
product developments as early as possible with the help of market intelligence 
and/or market strategy. Warhol then uses cost roadmapping together with the 
analysis of cost dynamics which are compared to cost target estimates. If these 
estimated costs are too high Warhol uses gap analysis to identify improvement 
possibilities to align its development to the target costs. In some cases Warhol 
analyses which kind of cost level per functionality can be achieved with a 
specific technology or technology generation for planning and decision 
making. This information can then be transferred to different kinds of 
roadmaps of a company.  
5.6.2 Benefits, limitations and connection to roadmapping 
Target costing efforts help to develop for the market. The chief design engineer of 
Warhol gives details on a radical development example and how it was processed:  
“For such products we know that what is the kind of price point or the price 
target of the end user market, so that what would be the retail price. Then 
from there we calculate backwards, what is the […gross] price [to the 
merchant or wholesaler], and backwards what is the price that we should hit. 
And actually it goes even further, because […] we know the component prices, 
so what is the component price of the vendors. And that is exactly what 
happens that we have analyzed the current state of the technology and 
calculated the cost. And for example in this case we have noted that we cannot 
hit the price point with the current technology. Then, the next step has been 
that we are considering that can we reduce some functionality, or can we 
somehow optimize the performance of the products, so that we would not be 
obliged to use such high-performance process, high-performance engines 
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inside that product. And so, that is exactly what happens. It has happened in 
this case in the very early phases of the research as well, and that has been 
[…] one of the research topics that where […] and how to find the technology 
or what is the technology that satisfies that cost target. […] In this example 
[…] we gathered the understanding that we cannot [meet] the price point with 
[…] today’s technology, and now […] we are predicting that what happens 
when the Moore’s Law goes ahead.” 
Thus Warhol uses target costing efforts and cost modeling to analyze the feasibility of 
technology developments. Target costing can lead to the insight that the aimed-at cost 
level cannot be reached. That triggers a process of evaluating what can be done if 
these cost are not feasible. In that case it was functionality reduction or performance 
optimization. 
The target costing approach in pre-development is described as more uncertain as in 
other later innovation phases after development project kick-off by the interviewed 
senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol: 
“Then the other thing which is coming up is the actual technology 
possibilities, what cost level can be achieved with the coming technologies.” 
Furthermore he states: 
“So you’ve got to start looking at those things and saying okay, well, how will 
the available technology position in the actual price. Well, then that has 
become into play with the target costing and the strategy and the business 
model feature, so there is an interaction here [in pre-development], which is a 
lot more vigorous than what goes on later in the [product development] 
programs, because there the target costing is done rather saying okay, we 
must bring the product here and we will design such a product that we will get 
a price. Well, it is not that clear in the early stages. We can say, this is the 
general target and we’ve got to find a business model that will give us the 
possibility to make it business with this level of payment and how do we 
structure that. It might be that the technologies coming through do not give the 
answer, it is not possible to do it by that route and it will have to be done by 
another route. So there is, I would say, [a] more complex discussion going 
on.” 
Also for Warhol the target costing efforts are connected to business models and 
strategy in more radical innovations. 
For less radical innovations, the vice president new technology development of 
Kandinsky explains:  
“In the roadmaps the development time for [a special custom made 
product…] should go down to four months and then again it should be based 
on these platforms. And then we just modify them and test that everything is 
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okay. Then when it goes to […] new technologies, I think again it is based on 
this what we assume the cost will be and then […] when we pick these 
technology alternatives we are trying to beat this cost target. And then we sort 
of identify […] this kind of newer alternatives to get the costs down. […But] of 
course not the whole production technology; it does not have to change over 
one night.”  
Thus there might be a limited use for target costing approaches for incremental 
developments as the development time is short and developments should be platform 
based. However, for less incremental developments, target costing efforts in pre-
development might lead to new technological opportunity seeking. In that case 
technology alternatives are taken to reduce costs. However, more radical changes 
need also more time. 
Besides these described benefits and limitations, target costing efforts can also lead to 
contra-productive situations. There can be damages to supplier relationships through 
unrealistic negotiations as the interviewed senior new technology purchasing manager 
of Warhol describes: 
“In some cases engineers get very obsessed about cost management, because 
in the business case the project does not survive without the cost being at a 
certain level. And rather than try and find clever engineering solutions to get 
the cost down, they’ll spend a lot of time bargaining with the suppliers, often 
unreasonably so. To the point, you know, they are asking for prices, which are 
not practical and which might cause damage to the supplier relationship, if 
they continue that way. […] It is kind of out of control in that case.”  
5.6.3 Summary 
Four out of the seven case companies are using target costing efforts to manage their 
pre-development. Generally the sample companies using this approach see target 
costs as an important factor that has to be evaluated relatively to the potential market 
price of an innovation. Besides feasible costs of the market (target costs) the found 
practices all circle around product and production technologies. One further 
interesting practice found (at Warhol) is a cost and functionality trade-off analysis that 
is later used for target costing.  
5.7 Value analysis work  
5.7.1 Overview 
• Dali is using value analysis work to estimate allowable costs as a base for 
target costing efforts. Before the appraisal of new product developments at the 
rear of pre-development the company analyses what the value of a solution is 
to their customer or to the end customer. In radical new product developments 
196 
Dali sometimes analyzes the total cost of ownership for the end customer for 
products, where the new solution could be used.  
• Duchamp starts doing customer value analysis in middle of pre-development. 
The customer value of new product developments is seen as crucial for 
Duchamp. If no additional value to the customer can be seen, an idea will not 
be developed further.  
• Lichtenstein investigates the value for customers through a total cost of 
ownership analysis in the middle of pre-development. Even though cost 
budgets play a short term role in the new product developments of 
Lichtenstein, the company focuses on the cost benefits for the customer.  
• At Miro, ideas that come out of the front end are assessed with the help of a 
scorecard in which besides other aspects also a value analysis is embedded. 
Unique or at least very valuable benefits to their customer are essential for a 
new product development idea to pass the first gate. 
• Warhol uses value analysis work in its roadmapping and target costing efforts 
in the middle of pre-development. The value of certain developments is 
analyzed through market intelligence and through analysis if there is already 
an existing customer base that would appreciate the new product development 
and be prepared to pay for it.  
5.7.2 Benefits and application of value analysis work 
The director of the idea suggestion system at Duchamp says: 
“I think the most important thing […] in ideas is the customer. What is the 
value for [the] customer and what is the customer need, and how to evaluate 
that. That is one thing. And then the other thing is that we would like to get 
ideas which might be big from [a] business point of view. […] They might be 
very difficult to implement from technical point of views, but then they would 
really bring value to customers; so not incremental steps to our existing 
services, but really looking something totally differently, which means that we 
would maybe have to change our processes to make it happen, but then it 
would bring value to customers.” 
For him the customer need and the value of a new product development are very 
important and thus the analysis of this customer value is essential. 
Also at other companies value analysis work is done. The interviewed head of one 
business unit of Miro states: 
“So that there are a couple of people evaluating and trying to find, what is the 
value to customer. Mainly business people [are analyzing…] that kind of 
issues.” 
He explains also:  
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“We have […] these business persons who [… have an] understanding of 
what kind of cost structure we have with present products, and also they 
should have [an] understanding what is the value of the product to the 
customer, and what is the pricing methodology. And also what problem has 
been that many business people also easily think that okay, price of product is 
the cost of, production cost of product plus something, and not thinking about 
value to the customer. But that has been changed, I hope.” 
Thus also for Miro the value analysis work is important. However, the interviewed 
manager sees it also as a possibility to ask for a market price according to the 
customer value that might be higher than just the production cost plus some premium.  
Yet also a strong connection to costing can exist as the following both quotes from 
managers working at Warhol show. The interviewed chief design engineer of Warhol 
points in the direction of life cycle costing and low life cycle costs a value to the 
customer:  
“If it is a group of many different things we can have […], which part is […] 
gonna bring added value to the customer. So we really try and think carefully 
and […] put ourselves in their shoes and try and do the kind of calculation 
that they will have to do internally […] and so you could say that we do in that 
sense some kind of lifecycle costing.” 
Similar the interviewed senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol sees a 
connection to a total cost of ownership analysis: 
 “Yeah, that comes then to this total cost of ownership, like basically you are 
looking at the total benefit for the customer, so that seems to be the driving 
[theme …]; value to customer analysis basically. You’re trying to do that.” 
5.7.3 Summary 
All except two companies (Kandinsky and Van Gogh) are using value analysis. In 
three cases this is done as a preliminary effort towards target costing in order to stay 
below the allowable costs of the market. In all cases it is started to be done during the 
middle of pre-development. Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that Miro used to 
start innovations with a view on products that the company could produce and then 
tried to find customers for these new product developments. However, they found out 
that this leads into many problems that can be avoided if one focuses straight away on 
potential customers. Thus Miro incorporated a value analysis. According to managers 
at Warhol there are connections between value analysis work and life cycle cost and 
total cost of ownership analysis. 
5.8 Analysis of cost dynamics  
5.8.1 Overview 
Only two companies are using the analysis of cost dynamics in pre-development. 
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• Lichtenstein is evaluating cost dynamics through analyzing and estimating 
future cost erosion for different new product development ideas. Lichtenstein 
sees it as critical to investigate the cost capability in order not to develop past 
the market. 
• Warhol traces the cost dynamics by carrying out trend analysis to understand 
the dynamic development of the performance and cost of technologies that 
could be used for new product developments. This tool that they are calling 
cost capability analysis is investigating the slope of the cost development and 
projects these against the market requirements. Beside other issues, this is 
done in order to not miss the right market entry time. This tool is part of what 
is called directional costing in this thesis – a fusion of forecasting, 
roadmapping and target costing. 
5.8.2 Reasons for analyzing cost dynamics in pre-development  
The chief design engineer of Warhol sees the benefit in using the analysis of cost 
dynamics in pre-development on knowing what kind of (cost) drivers have an effect 
on the cost reduction gradient for which technology:  
 “One interesting issue is that, now that if we think that we have that entry 
[cost] level, then the awareness of that for a certain technology [would be to 
know] which are the drivers that are affecting […] this slope. That would be 
important to understand when making that technology selection. Part of the 
modeling is or should be to […] find out the key drivers in each of the 
technologies and try to understand the differences as well.” 
He further continues:  
“The slope is important, and then also the prediction that if this is a totally 
new disruptive thing; normally it is very high cost, but then you need to have 
the kind of estimate that where does it end when the time goes on and where is 
it when we are here. This is also challenging. […] It is again about this that if 
some technology have different curves that they make [a] decision based on 
today’s thing and they say that we are not using this technology; although if 
you were aware that all the time when you are ramping up you would be with 
this technology, you would be here [at lower cost]. And that is the challenge, 
how to get these long-term predictions on the technology cost capability; and 
making this visible to people, and that would affect a lot on decision making.” 
Thus he sees it as important to know the cost decrease potential before technology 
selection, especially in the case of technology enabling radical developments. As also 
the quote of his colleague in section 4.7.7 shows. 
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5.8.3 On importance, position and limitations in the innovation 
phases 
In the view of the senior new technology purchasing manager of Warhol, it is vital in 
the pre-development to choose the right technology with a cost decrease potential as 
you are out of the market otherwise due to long developments (caused e.g. by longer 
software development times):  
 “The hardware resources are very stable or in declining [relative 
importance] and the software resources are becoming extremely important, 
more and more so. Yeah, so I think the world is changing and one of the issues 
is that if you have, if you use a relevant form of approach here and it kind of 
gets stalled by the software availability, and you have not really thought about 
what is going on with price development and the things that you are choosing, 
then you might find yourself stuck [with the problem] that the market has 
moved on. You have developed a certain idea in mind and a certain price 
level, but by the time you get to deliver it, it’s changed. And if you have not 
chosen or carefully chosen technologies such that you know that the prices 
will go down to follow the market, then you might find out that you have [to] 
go through the whole hardware development again, because the […] product 
you developed it is no longer any good, it is not competitive.” 
The following quote of the interviewed chief design engineer from Warhol is 
interesting to become aware of the position in the innovation phases in respect to the 
question about the arrangement of tools: 
In subsection 4.7.5 the quote of the interviewed chief design engineer from Warhol is 
interesting to become aware of the position of the analysis of cost dynamics in the 
innovation phases. He sees this analysis as most important in pre-development before 
technology selections. Once technologies are chosen the analysis gets less important 
as changing technologies would mean losing development time. He continues about 
the impact of cost awareness in technology selection: 
“It is exactly that if you have that increased awareness or awareness that 
which are the drivers and which are the predicted slopes, then in the early 
phase you can make a lot difference, and the difference comes through the 
technology selection.” 
Thus the cost capability analysis work is done at Warhol mostly in pre-development 
and less after technology lock-ins. The information is valuable especially before the 
technology selection and it is needed up-front of that. The information has a lower 
value after the technology selection, as a change in underlying technology would 
endanger the innovation time table. 
Another quote is from the interviewed cost controller for R&D and production of Van 
Gogh. He states regarding the analysis of future cost erosion (that the company is not 
practicing): 
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“We are so small that we don’t have so many persons to analyze all of those 
things.” 
Warhol is classified as a very large company, while Van Gogh is classified as medium 
sized company. Even so the interviewed cost engineer for R&D and production states 
that it is the size of the company that is the limiting factor, another possible 
explanation could be the newness of the innovation. In the quotes of Warhol cost 
modeling of new technologies is seen especially important for technologies that are 
either new-to-the-world or where there is no cost for these technologies available so 
far. Yet on the contrary, Van Gogh does not deal with such radical innovations.  
5.8.4 Summary 
The analysis of cost dynamics is done only by two case companies (Lichtenstein and 
Warhol). Both use it to look ahead and anticipate whether a development idea might 
be cost wise feasible after a certain development time.  
Out of the situation found at Warhol one can say that the analysis of cost dynamics is 
a task that is done by experts on this field. This restricts the earliest possible use if 
there are many different new product development ideas to be evaluated. Furthermore 
it is more beneficial for radical than for incremental innovations. Also cost capability 
estimates are less interesting and important once the design of a new product 
development idea is locked, as specification changes would mean that parts have to be 
redesigned, leading to higher costs and/or that the development delays. This could be 
one explanation why it is used only by two case companies. 
5.9 Cost database use  
5.9.1 Overview 
• The cost database used by Dali is based on their ERP system. It is a database 
of tabulated costs linked to an investment appraisal calculation program. On 
unit cost level it contains the purchasing prices of raw materials and moving 
averages of direct costs. On batch level the cost table contains assembly costs 
and on product level it includes machinery investment costs. Besides it 
function to store information, the cost table can be used for the analysis of 
different scenarios. 
• Kandinsky has intranet-accessible cost databases for component and material 
costs. Additionally the company maintains a cost database derived from 
former quotations made. During pre-development the company uses 
information from these cost databases to analyze and evaluate new product 
development possibilities. 
• Van Gogh is another company that uses their ERP system as cost database. 
The cost information is aggregated manually before its use in the feasibility 
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studies of new products. Additionally historical price information of purchased 
items can be used to analyze price trends. 
• Besides cost data being stored in several ways in the organization, Warhol 
developed a method based on the concept of cost tables especially for new 
product development projects. It is based on an auction system and is carried 
out for special development project or to scout new technological possibilities 
on the market. The method uses a detailed model of price/cost drivers and a 
database of old price quotations for deriving price estimates of purchased 
components and is constantly updated. 
5.9.2 Benefits and limitations 
Cost databases help using existing knowledge. The opposite of using cost databases is 
that designers ask ad-hoc quotations during the development activity. However, this 
can be difficult and can lead to bloated cost structures by not cost aware employees as 
the following quotes show and is thus not recommended by the quoted managers. 
Kandinsky has a culture of open communication about costs as the interviewed chief 
design engineer says: 
“We have very open information on the cost. Everybody [inside the company] 
can know, [and] download the cost development [of our] materials.” 
However, for new material that is different. The chief design engineer thinks that the 
cost information for new components should go through the purchasing department 
otherwise experience has shown that the estimates are too low between decision made 
and later purchases: 
“I think that we have [a] problem with new components. We do not know 
exactly what is the volume price. And then the buyer is [a] very important 
person. He can ask [the] price from [a] supplier and he can think is this price 
exactly good. Typically component suppliers say to the designers some sum, 
some price. Typically the price is too low. Very good components and very low 
price and you can take it. [… However] typically designers do not have 
experience in the price level […] some people have it, but I think that young 
guys do not have it.” 
The situation is similarly seen by the interviewed senior new technology purchasing 
manager of Warhol: 
“Engineers will be approaching suppliers directly, discussing the pricing and 
so on. So […] it can be quite out of control, because of course the suppliers 
can offer something with a higher price, and if you accept it, then they’ll do it. 
And if the people, who are asking for this are not very discerning about the 
price level and are more interested in the technical things, then they just take 
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the given price and put it into their spreadsheets. Then you end up with a cost 
structure much higher than it ought to be.” 
Thus Warhol prefers to have specialists getting costs for new product developments 
and store these in cost databases. Like this technical employees can focus on technical 
issues and use cost data provided by other functions, as he also states: 
“The technical guys will be looking at the […] efficiency and meeting a 
standard requirement, all of the technical items. They won’t necessarily have 
their eye on that cost and price erosion thing, but that is one of the reasons for 
having a sourcing function.” 
However, this approach has also a setback. The senior new technology purchasing 
manager of Warhol also states as a limitation that this can collide with some internal 
power play in the start, but for the smoothness of the project advancement it will help 
in the long run: 
“If you talk to these business units, they will say oh, we think it is more 
flexible, if we are not tied down to your earlier choices of suppliers and 
technologies. We want the flexibility to choose whatever we want. But it does 
not give necessarily the benefits that they think they get. It comes more down 
to a question of who is in charge and who decides and all of the social 
parameters that actually dictate the starting phases of the program, rather 
than the durational ones that engineers like to talk about.” 
5.9.3 Summary 
Cost databases are used by four out of the seven case companies. In general cost 
estimation and the codification of costs go hand in hand. This can also be seen by the 
fact that all companies using cost databases are also doing cost estimation and 
modeling work in pre-development. Two of the companies are using cost databases 
built on their ERP system and thus are using old records to estimate cost trends. Also 
old quotes are stored as cost information and a further going approach is taken by 
Warhol that evaluates the potential cost of new technologies by receiving and using 
quotes that are valid in the future. 
As already stated above in the section dealing with cost estimation, the engineering 
cost estimation method can be used well if the bill of materials of a new product 
development idea is similar to the one of an existing product. In this case a cost 
database built on top of the EPR system (like the ones used by Dali and Van Gogh) 
allow cost records of similar running products to be used. 
5.10 Aggregated first use of tools per pre-development stage  
During pre-development, a new product development idea is evaluated and analyzed 
with several tools. In this section these tools and their use in the different companies 
are presented.  
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Figure 91: First use of tools per normalized pre-development stages 
Figure 91 shows at which point of time during pre-development how many companies 
are using which tool for the first time. The values in the ‘front’ column indicate the 
aggregated tool use in the front end of pre-development. The ‘middle’ column shows 
the amount of tools used for the first time in the middle of pre-development. Along 
with this scheme, the ‘rear’ column shows this for the rear end of pre-development. 
Thus Figure 91 shows the popularity of the different tools used for product cost 
analysis during pre-development. The tool use of all companies together is shown 
according to the normalized pre-development tool use (see methodology in subsection 
3.5.2 on page 124). 
The most popular tool is intelligence work; it is done by all case companies. Five 
companies are using roadmapping to present and analyze technical, market and cost 
information in pre-development. Four out of seven case companies use scorecards to 
get an overview of the attractiveness of the new proposal and its risks. Similarly, four 
case companies use uncertainty management tools - scenarios, triple point estimates 
and Monte Carlo simulations. However, only two case companies are doing an 
analysis of cost dynamics in pre-development. Cost databases are used by four 
companies to handle and store cost data in pre-development. All but one case 
company use cost modeling and estimation in pre-development. Four companies see 
target costs as such an important factor during innovation that they start using target 
costing efforts in pre-development. And last but not least, value analysis work is put 
into use in pre-development by five case companies. 
Intelligence work, roadmapping and scorecards tend to be started to be used rather 
early in pre-development. Uncertainty management and target costing efforts tend to 
be started to be used rather later in pre-development. 
Front Middle Rear Sum
Intelligence work Unspecific General 4 3 - 7 / 7
Roadmapping work Unspecific General 4 1 - 5 / 7
Scorecards Specific General 1 3 - 4 / 7
Uncertainty mgmt Specific General - 3 1 4 / 7
Cost dynamics analysis Unspecific Cost focused - 2 - 2 / 7
Cost database use Unspecific Cost focused 1 2 1 4 / 7
Cost modeling & estimation Specific Cost focused 2 3 1 6 / 7
Target costing efforts Specific Cost focused - 2 2 4 / 7
Value analysis Specific Cost focused 1 3 1 5 / 7
Sum 13 22 6
Cumulative sum 13 35 41
Avg. 4,56 / 7
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Concluding one can say that cost modeling and estimation is the most popular cost 
tool in pre-development. The least popular cost tool in pre-development is the cost 
dynamics analysis. The cost tools used by the companies in the front end are cost 
modeling and estimation, cost databases, and value analysis work. Target costing 
efforts in pre-development are found in four out of the seven case companies in pre-
development stages. This means that target costing, which is a long-established cost 
management tool used in development phases, is used by some companies already to 
some extent in pre-development phases.  
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6 Cost analysis approaches and patterns  
This chapter looks at the tool use during the cost information analysis in pre-
development. Compared to the chapters before, this chapter looks particularly at cost 
focused tools. It takes a cross-case perspective to indicate why companies are shaping 
the analysis process the way they do. This is done in order to expose patterns relevant 
for the cost information analysis process during pre-development. 
6.1 Cost tool use per company  
This section looks at how the cost analysis during pre-development is made. It 
investigates the cost tool use per company in more detail. The first subsection looks at 
the amount of different tools that the companies are using in the pre-development 
phases. Subsequently, the first time use of cost tools is aggregated and studied for all 
seven case companies. Then a short summary of the found cost analysis approaches 
for the different cases is made. Following this, the tool use is analyzed for steps in 
intensity for each company.  
6.1.1 Amount of tools found per company 
This subsection looks at the number of different tools that the companies are using in 
the pre-development phases.  
 
Figure 92: Overview of the amount of tools found per company 
The found tools are counted for each company and shown in Figure 92. There the 
amount of tools is compared to the maximum amount. For all tools the maximum 
amount is nine, for cost tools the maximum amount is five. The higher the amounts 
stated in Figure 92, the broader the analysis of a company in pre-development. This is 
due to the fact that the analysis will be broader as different additional categories are 
covered. A company with broader tool use will look at the analysis during pre-
development from several angles.  
As one can see, the overall amount of tools used and the amount of cost tools used 
follow a similar pattern in Figure 92. The maximum number of analysis tools is used 
by Warhol. Warhol is using tools in every category (nine out of nine) and thus also all 
cost tools (five out of five). Therefore Warhol is carrying out the broadest analysis in 
the sample. Following, Dali uses overall seven tools and four cost tools in pre-
Warhol 9 / 9 5 / 5
Dali 7 / 9 4 / 5
Lichtenstein 6 / 9 3 / 5
Kandinsky 5 / 9 3 / 5
Van Gogh 5 / 9 3 / 5
Miro 5 / 9 2 / 5
Duchamp 4 / 9 1 / 5
Avg. 5,9 / 9 3,0 / 5
Cost tools onlyAmount of tools
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development. Lichtenstein deploys six tools, out of which three are cost tools. In total 
three companies (Kandinsky, Van Gogh and Miro) are using tools that span five 
categories. Yet, Kandinsky and Van Gogh use three cost tools, while Miro is using 
only two cost tools in pre-development. Overall, Duchamp uses tools in four 
categories, out of which one is a cost tool. The average tool use during pre-
development is overall 5,9 tools per company. For the cost tools the average tool use 
during pre-development is three cost tools per company. None of the companies are 
using tools in less than four different categories. One company (Warhol) stands out 
from the other case companies, as it covers all nine analysis angles. 
6.1.2 Overview of general and cost focused tool use 
Figure 92 in section 6.1.1 shows the amount of general and cost focused tools found 
per company. This section shows a detailed full overview of the found first time use 
of general and cost focused tools. 
 
Figure 93: First time use of general and cost focused tools per case company 
Figure 93 shows when which case company is using which tool for the first time in 
pre-development. It gives a cross-case overview of the tool use derived from the 
findings presented within case description of chapter 4. It provides the full overview 
of the first time use of general and cost focused tools for the different case companies, 
and serves as a starting point for the next subsections in this chapter. 
The cost focused tools and their starting during pre-development are shown in bold 
in Figure 93. Next, the use of these cost focused tools in the different case companies 
is summarized briefly. 
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Dali Front - Middle Rear - Rear Rear Rear Rear
Duchamp Middle - Middle Middle - - - - Middle
Kandinsky Front Front - - - Front Front Rear -
Lichtenstein Front Middle - Middle Middle - Middle - Middle
Miro Middle Front Front - - - Middle - Front
Van Gogh Front Front - - - Middle Front Middle -
Warhol Middle Front Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle
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Dali uses cost tools only in the rear pre-development. At this stage Dali has a high 
focus on costs in their new product development idea analysis. The company uses cost 
modeling and estimation in their cost templates. The latter are connected to cost 
databases. Furthermore, Dali starts target costing activities by estimating allowable 
costs and making target profit calculations. Additionally, Dali is using value analysis 
work. 
Duchamp starts using value analysis work in middle of pre-development. However, 
the analysis does not include cost modeling and estimation. The given reason is that 
Duchamp finds it very hard to estimate its costs. Thus managers at Duchamp state that 
it rather focuses on estimating costs relative to the value to the customer.  
Kandinsky is starting to use cost modeling and estimation in the front end of 
innovation. Also the use of cost databases is started in the front end. Cost analysis 
work is further increased with target costing efforts. Kandinsky’s analysis has two 
major aims. First, finding out the feasible market price for its innovations and second, 
evaluating innovation alternatives in the search of a cheaper and more efficient 
solution of customer demands. 
Lichtenstein starts estimating and modeling costs in the first stage after the front end. 
It uses parametric and analogous methods and models life cycle costs. In this stage 
Lichtenstein also starts value analysis. In the same stage the analysis of cost dynamics 
is begun. The aim of this analysis is to be cost aware and take cost erosion into 
account. 
Miro starts with a value to customer analysis in the front end. At Miro the product 
cost are estimated in the first stage after the front end for the first time. The cost 
estimations are usually based on expected bill of materials, logistic costs and 
investment costs.  
Van Gogh has a very prompt approach towards cost information analysis. Already in 
the front end, Van Gogh starts cost information analysis with first cost modeling and 
estimation. This is done for their feasibility and profitability estimations of new 
product development ideas. The company uses cost records of previous products for 
their cost modeling in the first stage after the front-end. These cost records can be 
seen as a cost database. The cost information is then used in parametric and analogous 
cost relationships for the early cost estimations. The cost information analysis is also 
the base for Van Gogh’s target costing routines that are started in the first stage after 
the front end. 
Warhol starts analyzing cost information actively from the middle of pre-
development on. Warhol is modeling and estimating costs to find out which kind of 
cost level per functionality can be achieved with a specific technology or design. In 
the pre-development phases, the cost modeling is seen as a preparation work to make 
the right basic technology choices. Thus Warhol analyses the cost level that can be 
reached with a certain technology. Furthermore, Warhol starts analyzing the dynamics 
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of costs in order to be able to estimate the cost potential competing technologies for 
several years ahead. Also, target costing efforts down to the component level are 
started in the first stage after the front end. Later a gap analysis is made to further 
identify improvement possibilities. Value analysis is also started in the first stage after 
the front-end. Furthermore, Warhol uses cost databases to analyze and manage costs 
for several main components of new product developments.  
 
Figure 94: Start of cost tool use during pre-development 
Figure 94 shows that three companies are starting to use cost tools in the front end. 
Similar, three companies are starting to use cost tools in the middle of pre-
development. And finally, one company starts using cost tools in the rear pre-
development. 
 
Figure 95: Location of the biggest cost focused tool use step for each company 
Figure 95 shows when how much cost focused tools are starting to be used. The last 
column indicates where the biggest quantity of new tools is started to be used. One 
can distinguish four approaches by the companies. The first approach has the biggest 
step in tool use in the front end. Kandinsky is doing so. Secondly, for Miro the steps 
are by one tool in the front and one tool in the middle of pre-development. The third 
approach has the biggest step in the middle of pre-development. This is done by the 
largest group of four companies (i.e., Van Gogh, Warhol, Lichtenstein and 
Duchamp). The forth group contains only of Dali. It has the biggest step in the rear of 
pre-development.  
The biggest step in absolute figures is made by Warhol in the middle of pre-
development. This can be traced back to the pre-development stage gate approach 
used by Warhol. In the front end the focus is on technology development, where 
employees usually have a strictly technical background. After the first gate it changes 
to more business analysis. These analysis are carried out by development teams with 
backgrounds in technology and economics. With this knowledge available, the cost 
tools are used. Thus in the case of Warhol the big step in tool use can be explained by 
Companies starting cost tool use in 
Front 3 / 7 43%
Middle 3 / 7 43%
Rear 1 / 7 14%
Front Middle Rear Biggest step in
Kandinsky 2 - + 1 Front
Miro 1 + 1 + 0 Front/Middle
Van Gogh 1 + 2 + 0 Middle
Warhol 0 + 5 + 0 Middle
Lichtenstein 0 + 3 + 0 Middle
Duchamp 0 + 1 + 0 Middle
Dali 0 + 0 + 4 Rear
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the changing background of the employees working on the new product development 
idea.  
6.2 Cost tool use and organizational contingencies  
This section looks at possible clues why the cost analysis during pre-development is 
done the way it is. It investigates the relation between cost tool use and company in 
more detail. 
6.2.1 Number of cost tools used  
It is interesting to analyze whether company characteristics are governing the number 
of cost tools used for the cost information analysis during pre-development. If there is 
a connection, this could answer the second research question of ‘why cost information 
analysis is done the way it is’.  
 
Figure 96: Number of cost tools used vs. company characteristics 
A first overview of cost tool use against the company characteristics is presented in 
Figure 96. The companies with medium sized turnover all use three cost tools in pre-
development. Yet, the group with a very large turnover is split in two with Warhol 
using five and Duchamp using one cost tool during pre-development. Thus the 
turnover is not linearly interrelated to the pre-development cost tool use of the 
different found tools. Furthermore, the turnover is an indicator for the size of a 
company. Thus it follows that the cost tool use in pre-development is not dependable 
on the company size in the studied cases.  
Also, neither the R&D spending per turnover, nor the EBIT per turnover 
demonstrate any strict relationship with the total number of studied tools used in 
the predevelopment. The P/E ratio shows a negative association with the use of cost 
tools in pre-development. The higher the P/E ratio, the lower the amount of cost tools 
used. However, in total, only four data points are available for this analysis. The 
business-to-consumer indication shows little kind of order relative to the number of 
tools found, but it is tentative in the lower range. If a company is in the service 
business indicates tentatively that the amount of tools found is lower than for 
companies selling goods.  
Cost tools 
used Turnover
R&D 
spending 
per turnover
EBIT/ 
turnover 
(%) P/E ratio B2B/B2C
Goods 
vs. 
Service
Warhol 5 Very large >10% >10% n/a B2B G
Dali 4 Large 0-1% 0-5% 0-15 B2B G
Kandinsky 3 Medium 5-10% neg 0-15 B2B G
Lichtenstein 3 Medium >10% neg n/a B2B G
Van Gogh 3 Medium >10% 0-5% n/a B2C G
Miro 2 Very large 1-5% 5-10% 15-30 B2B G/S
Duchamp 1 Very large 1-5% >10% 15-30 B2B&B2C S
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Figure 97: Number of cost tools used vs. organizational contingencies 
Figure 97 shows the cost tool use against further organizational contingencies.  
The third row of Figure 97 shows the innovation style of the different cases. 
Companies with a technology driven innovation style tend to use more cost tools in 
pre-development. However, Miro which also has a technology driven innovation 
style, uses less cost tools in pre-development than other companies with market 
driven innovation style. Thus, there is no clear indication that the innovation 
styles influences the amount of cost tools used in pre-development. 
Similarly, the last row of Figure 97, displaying the technological uncertainty, 
indicates no clear connection between the technological uncertainty and the 
amount of cost tools used in pre-development. The technological uncertainty does 
not influence the number of cost tools used in pre-development, as there is clearly no 
pattern to be seen in Figure 97. 
On the contrary, when analyzing the idea initiative, a clear sorting can be seen in 
Figure 97. All companies using an institutional search and development approach use 
more cost analysis tools in pre-development than companies using an idea suggestion 
program based initiative. Both companies with the idea suggestion style (Miro and 
Duchamp) have the lowest cost tool use. 
Similarly, a clear sorting can be seen regarding the innovation funnel type of the 
different case companies cost tool use (see Figure 97). Thus the funnel type seems to 
affect tool use. This is a finding towards the question ‘why cost information analysis 
is done the way it is’. The approach to innovation, expressed through a different 
development funnel style, impacts the cost information analysis process in pre-
development. Companies using the few big bets funnel type create a multitude of 
ideas that are then sharply reduced to a few in the first screen. In contrast, companies 
using the survival of the fittest funnel type keep many ideas running parallel to each 
Cost tools 
used
Innovation 
style Idea initiative Funnel type
Technological 
uncertainty
Warhol 5 Technology 
driven
Institutional Survival of the 
fittest
High-tech to 
super high-tech
Dali 4 Technology 
driven
Institutional Survival of the 
fittest
Medium tech
Kandinsky 3 Technology 
driven
Institutional Few big bets Medium tech
Lichtenstein 3 Market driven Institutional Few big bets High-tech
Van Gogh 3 Market driven Institutional Few big bets Medium tech
Miro 2 Technology 
driven
Idea 
suggestion
Few big bets Medium tech
Duchamp 1 Market driven
Idea 
suggestion Few big bets High-tech
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other and then select at later stages the most promising ones. The latter approach 
seems to correlate with a higher amount of cost tools used during pre-development. 
6.2.2 The relative cost tool importance  
As a next study step the relative cost tool importance is calculated for all cases. It can 
be used to analyze how the different companies organize their future product cost 
analysis in pre-development relative to the overall number of tools used.  
 
Figure 98: Relative cost focus of tools vs. company characteristics 
Figure 98 shows the calculated relative cost tool importance of the different case 
companies. Furthermore, Figure 98 looks at whether company characteristics are 
governing the relative cost focus in tool use. The relative cost tool importance is not 
linked to the turnover and thus the size of the company. Neither is the R&D spending 
per turnover as an indication for the relative innovation intensity. Also the 
profitability measure of EBIT per turnover does not show a relationship with the 
relative cost tool importance in the found tools. There is some kind of order in the 
P/E ratio compared to the relative cost tool importance. The companies with a 
lower relative cost tool importance have a higher P/E ratio than the others. Yet due to 
the limited data it is hard to tell how significant this order is. 
The relative cost focus measure is not linked to whether a company is selling mainly 
to other businesses (B2B) or directly to consumers (B2C). However, the relative cost 
focus ratio is linked to whether a company is in the service business or produces 
mostly goods. The goods focused companies do show a clearly higher relative cost 
tool importance percentage. 
Total 
tools 
used
Cost 
tools 
used
Rel. cost 
tool 
importance
Turnover
R&D 
spending 
per turnover
EBIT/ 
turnover 
(%)
P/E 
ratio B2B/B2C
Goods 
vs. 
Service
Van Gogh 5 3 60% Medium >10% 0-5% n/a B2C G
Kandinsky 5 3 60% Medium 5-10% neg 0-15 B2B G
Dali 7 4 57% Large 0-1% 0-5% 0-15 B2B G
Warhol 9 5 56% Very large >10% >10% n/a B2B G
Lichtenstein 6 3 50% Medium >10% neg n/a B2B G
Miro 5 2 40% Very large 1-5% 5-10% 15-30 B2B G/S
Duchamp 4 1 25% Very large 1-5% >10% 15-30 B2B&B2C S
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Figure 99: Relative cost focus of tools vs. organizational contingencies 
Figure 99 shows the calculated relative cost tool importance of the different case 
companies. The case companies are arranged in an ascending order of the relative cost 
tool importance figures.  
The third row shows the innovation style of the different case companies. There is no 
connection between innovation style and relative cost tool importance in pre-
development, as the different case companies are mixed.  
Similarly, the last row in Figure 99, presenting the values for the technical 
uncertainty, does not show a connection between technical uncertainty and 
relative cost tool importance. 
However, the fourth row of Figure 99, illustrating the idea initiative as a potential 
organizational contingency against the relative cost tool importance, shows a clear 
division between the case companies. Similar to Figure 97, the two companies with 
the idea suggestion approach also have the lowest relative cost tool importance. On 
the contrary, the companies having the institutional search and development idea 
initiative paradigm show a higher relative cost tool importance in their product cost 
analysis during pre-development. Thus there is a tendency for the idea suggestion 
program initiative to have a lower cost focus in the pre-development analysis; 
relative cost tool importance and idea initiative seem to be connected.  
The next row in Figure 99 shows the potential connection between the calculated 
relative cost focus and funnel type. For this analysis the companies have to be 
grouped in three clusters. The cluster I contains the companies Van Gogh and 
Kandinsky. Both companies have a few big bets innovation funnel type and tend to 
focus strongly on costs during its analysis in the pre-development phases, as the 
relative cost tool importance is 60% in both cases. Cluster II includes the companies 
Dali and Warhol, both having a survival of the fittest innovation funnel type. Dali has 
Rel. cost 
tool 
importance
Innovation 
style Idea initiative Funnel type
Technological 
uncertainty
Van Gogh 60% Market driven Institutional Few big bets Medium tech
Kandinsky 60% Technology driven
Institutional Few big bets Medium tech
Dali 57% Technology driven
Institutional Survival of the 
fittest
Medium tech
Warhol 56% Technology driven Institutional
Survival of the 
fittest
High-tech to 
super high-tech
Lichtenstein 50% Market driven Institutional Few big bets High-tech
Miro 40% Technology driven
Idea 
suggestion
Few big bets Medium tech
Duchamp 25% Market driven
Idea 
suggestion Few big bets High-tech
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a relative cost tool importance of 57%, as it uses four cost focused tools out of its 
seven tools in the pre-development phases. Warhol is using all nine tools and thus has 
a relative cost tool importance of 56%. Their focus on costs is balanced in the 
analysis. Finally, cluster III is made of the companies Duchamp, Lichtenstein and 
Miro, all again having a few big bets innovation funnel type and a rather low cost 
focus in their analysis. Lichtenstein uses three cost focused tools out of six tools in 
total, equaling 50% relative cost tool importance. Miro shows a relative cost tool 
importance of 40% and thus also has a lower than average focus on costs for its 
analysis during pre-development phases. Duchamp has a value of 25%. Thus, in this 
analysis Duchamp ranges on the lowest place in the overview. As stated in the 
methodology in subsection 3.5.3, if all possible tools are found, the relative cost tool 
importance is 56%. Thus a balanced relative cost tool use is around this value of 56%. 
If the percentage is higher, costs are stressed more; if the percentage is lower, costs 
are stressed less in the analysis during pre-development. Therefore, cluster I 
companies tend to focus more on costs in their product cost analysis during pre-
development than cluster II companies. On the contrary, cluster III companies tend to 
focus less on costs in their product cost analysis during pre-development than the 
balanced cluster II companies. Thus one can say that companies with a survival of 
the fittest innovation funnel type tend to have a balanced relative cost tool 
importance. Yet, the position of the companies having a few big bets innovation 
funnel type cannot be explained so far. Thus one has to look further for explanation, 
which will be done in the next subsection.  
6.2.3 Pricing approaches and cost analysis during pre-
development  
This subsection looks at the question whether different approaches regarding 
customer’s cost sensitivity guide the cost analysis during pre-development.  
At Miro the role of cost analysis during pre-development is dependent on the 
customer as the head of one business unit explains:  
“We try to evaluate in quite early stages what is the role of our product in the 
customer’s costs. And if it is very important, then we evaluate that in early 
stages. If it is only minor, […than] that it is not really an issue.” 
On the contrary Warhol is not distinguishing the price sensitivity of customers. All 
customers benefit from cost decreases according to the senior new technology 
purchasing manager of Warhol:  
“I think all the customers are price sensitive. […] You know anyway that the 
[cost] curve will continue to go down just from a general market condition. So 
it is not really about pitching it to customers who are paying more to start 
with and then [others…] a little bit later. Everybody is gonna be paying 
around the same amount here and everybody will be migrating to lower prices 
later.” 
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Similar to Warhol, Dali also has cost sensitive customers, as the director for New 
Concept Development and IPR of Dali explains:  
“We have a certain kind of erosion, yes. We think that the price is coming 
down and also our learning curve and cost is coming down. So that is some 
kind of estimate […] We need to know exactly how to improve the learning 
curve. […] And of course we can first start to sell a little bit by loss or try to 
get some better price, but why should [our] customer be willing to pay [… for] 
our learning in very beginning. [One major customer…] is not that kind of 
company. So it means that we need to calculate a little bit loss to that total 
investment first.” 
Furthermore, when deriving target costs for products based on new technologies Dali 
is orienting itself on the current market price of similar solutions:  
 “The current market price is for very high volumes. It means that the cost 
target needs […] to be equal. […] We can see how near we can come [to the 
market price].” 
The situation of Kandinsky was described very similar to the one of Dali. Thus these 
cases are comparable. 
Yet, companies can deliberately have different end customer prices targets. According 
to the R&D director of Van Gogh, the company designs the different developments 
for all their business areas according to three different, but clearly defined final 
customer price segments. The first area targets the premium customers, the second 
one the middle and the third one the beginner and low price customers. This 
distinction is already made in the front end. 
Quite different to that, Duchamp sets its end customer prices only very late in new 
product development process, as the Director of concept development of innovations 
at Duchamp says: 
“In a way in each phase you have to update […] your latest view […]. With 
the information that is available and with assumptions you have, you have a 
certain revenue estimate. And the more you go towards that direction, the 
more you should have information and then it will be updated […], but the 
pricing decisions will be done quite late in exact prices.” 
Thus there are several pricing approaches that could influence the tool use during cost 
analysis during pre-development. 
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Figure 100: Tool use vs. customer cost sensitivity and point of pricing decision 
These above mentioned cases are brought in an order in Figure 100, starting with Van 
Gogh, as the company structures its developments according to clearly defined final 
customer price segments right from the start. Then comes Kandinsky and Dali that 
acknowledge that their customers are cost sensitive. Additionally Kandinsky and 
Dali are under strong market pressure, as similar solutions exist on the market. They 
are both setting up target costs based on the current market price of similar solutions. 
Warhol and Lichtenstein also acknowledge that their customers are cost sensitive. 
However, both are targeting at rather radical innovations. Different to this, at Miro 
the cost evaluation is done dependent on the cost sensitivity of the customer. They 
have customers that are seen as rather cost sensitive, while costs play a minor role for 
other customers. And finally Duchamp is not establishing the end customer prices 
until late in the new product development process.  
As can be seen in Figure 100, this order also shows a relationship with the relative 
cost tool importance figure and the use of target costing efforts in the pre-
development. Also in this overview, the two companies with the idea suggestion 
system approach show the lowest values. 
Through the approach of target price segments that Van Gogh is taking, the use of 
target costing efforts in pre-development is understandable, as it can be seen as an 
extension of this approach. Also, it is apparent that Duchamp is not using target 
costing efforts during pre-development, as the customer prices are only set later and 
would be a requirement for a target cost approach.  
The pair of Dali and Warhol is distinct from Miro, even though it is not so clear cut 
as for Van Gogh and Duchamp. The first two acknowledge having price sensitive 
Relative 
cost tool 
importance 
Using target 
costing efforts 
in pre-
development
Description
Van Gogh 60% yes Target price segments are fixed right from innovation start
Kandinsky 60% yes Cost sensitive customers; market price can be derived by similar products on the market
Dali 57% yes Cost sensitive customers; market price can be derived by similar products on the market
Warhol 56% yes Cost sensitive customers, aiming at radical innovations
Lichtenstein 50% no Generally cost sensitive customers, aiming at rather radical innovations
Miro 40% no Some customers are not cost sensitive, while some are
Duchamp 25% no Customer prices are set very late in development process
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customers and thus are using target costing efforts in the pre-development. On the 
contrary, Miro has at least partly customers that are not very cost sensitive. For these 
customers, cost issues are not checked thoroughly during pre-development. 
Furthermore, Miro is not using target costing efforts in the pre-development.  
Summarizing one can say that: 
1. If a company is using an approach of target prices segments, it is likely to use 
target costing efforts for analysis in the pre-development. Yet, if a company is 
not establishing price targets in the pre-development, target costing efforts 
cannot be used in the cost analysis during pre-development.  
2. Furthermore there seems to be an effect of the customer’s cost sensitivity on 
the cost analysis during pre-development. The more sensitive a customer is, 
the higher the relative cost tool importance will be and the more likely it is to 
find target cost efforts during pre-development.  
6.2.4 Organizational contingencies and cost analysis  
There are several company characteristics that give clues why the cost analysis during 
pre-development is done like it is. Miro and Duchamp both show a low cost tool use 
during pre-development. There are several company characteristics that set them apart 
from the other companies. Miro has partly a service business approach; Duchamp is 
mostly in the service business. Duchamp and Miro both also have an idea suggestion 
approach to innovation. Thus there is a tendency for service business and idea 
suggestion approach innovation style companies to have a lower cost focus in the pre-
development analysis. 
Furthermore, the development funnel type a company uses can have an impact on the 
cost analysis in pre-development. The patterns regarding the innovation funnel type in 
Figure 97 and Figure 99 suggest that the style of the development funnel and the style 
of the tool use go hand in hand. If a company has a ‘survival of the fittest’ funnel 
approach it is more likely to implement more cost analysis tools in pre-development. 
On the contrary, a company with a ‘few bets’ approach is more likely to use less cost 
tools in average in pre-development. 
Moreover, pricing approach and customer’s cost sensitivity can play a role in the use 
of target costing efforts during pre-development. On the contrary, companies that 
determine prices only very late in the new product development process are likely to 
not apply target costing efforts in pre-development. Overall, the more cost sensitive 
the final customer is and the more the market competition is based on cost, the more 
likely it is that a company uses target costing efforts already in pre-development. 
6.3 Technological uncertainty and analysis  
This section studies whether the tool use for cost analysis in pre-development is 
guided by the technological uncertainty of the case companies. The classification 
scheme for technological uncertainty of Shenhar and Dvir (1996) described in 2.1.2.2 
217 
is used to classify the different case companies according to their prevailing type of 
innovation. 
6.3.1 Technological uncertainty and tool use 
New product developments are connected to environmental uncertainty that is 
reduced step-by-step before market launch. Yet the different case company’s start 
from different levels of uncertainty depending on their business. 
 
Figure 101: Case company classification according to technological uncertainty 
Different types of innovations are distinguished in the case analysis. Figure 101 
shows an overview of the classification of the different case companies according to 
their technological uncertainty following the scheme of Shenhar and Dvir (1996).  
 
Figure 102: Type of innovation vs. tool use of the case companies 
Figure 102 shows a tabulated overview of the different case companies. On the left 
hand side the case companies are brought into order according to the newness level of 
the targeted new product developments. Next to that, the prevailing paradigm of the 
A, low-tech B, medium-tech C, high-tech D, super high-tech
No new technology Some new technology Integrating new, but 
existing, technologies
Key technologies do not 
exist at project’s initiation
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Warhol C-D 1. High-tech to super high-tech as some key technologies do not exist in the front end 9 1. 5 1. 56% 4.
Lichtenstein C 2. Venturing company that integrates new, but existing technologies for first of its kind uses 6 3. 3 3. 50% 5.
Duchamp C 2. Building complex and information intensive new system within state-of-the-art 4 7. 1 7. 25% 7.
Dali B 4.
Open for new ideas and even radical 
technologies, but staying in defined applications 7 2. 4 2. 57% 3.
Van Gogh B 4. Open for new ideas and technologies, but need to stay in defined markets 5 4. 3 3. 60% 1.
Miro B 4. Open for some new technology but trying to stick to the same sales channels / market 5 4. 2 6. 40% 6.
Kandinsky B 4.
Would like to have new products, but ideas ‘get 
stuck’ if too radical 5 4. 3 3. 60% 1.
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company is given as an illustration of the innovation approach and type. On the right 
hand side key figures about the analysis during pre-development are given.  
When comparing the innovation types (B vs. C and C-D), one can see that there is no 
strict relationship. Neither with the absolute number of tools found in each case, nor 
with the amount of cost tools used or the relative cost tool importance in pre-
development. However, the next subsection looks one level deeper on tool use level. 
6.3.2 Technological uncertainty and uncertainty management tool 
use  
The last subsection has looked at the possible relationship of technological 
uncertainty with analysis style key figures. However, this section looks specifically at 
the link of the technological uncertainties of the case companies and their first time 
use of management of uncertainty tools.  
 
Figure 103: Technological uncertainty vs. uncertainty management tool use in pre-development 
In Figure 103 the classification of technological uncertainty and the first time use of 
uncertainty management tools are compared. Warhol, Duchamp and Lichtenstein 
have the highest technological uncertainty and are also all starting to use uncertainty 
management tools in the middle of pre-development.  
It is also interesting that Dali starts using uncertainty management tools in the last 
pre-development stage before the actual development start. Managers at Dali have 
stressed their perceived uncertainty towards market assumptions, cost estimates and 
future sales volumes in the interviews. That could be one reason why they are also 
using uncertainty management tools before deciding whether an idea should go to 
development or not. However, Kandinsky worries that the uncertainties connected to 
future production methods, production volumes and future component prices, is not 
using uncertainty management tools in pre-development phases. 
Overall, one clue of why the pre-development analysis is done the way it is, is the 
connection between technological uncertainty and the use of management of 
uncertainty tools. The companies that operate in a business setting with higher 
technological uncertainty react by using special tools to deal with this uncertainty in 
the pre-development. 
Technological 
uncertainty
Uncertainty 
management
Warhol C-D Middle
Duchamp C Middle
Lichtenstein C Middle
Dali B Rear
Kandinsky B -
Miro B -
Van Gogh B -
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6.4 Tool evolution and specificity  
Tool evolution patterns could answer the question why the product cost analysis 
during pre-development is done the way it is. Tool evolution patterns emerge over the 
different stages in the pre-development. If they are guided by regularities this could 
explain analysis styles. 
This section focuses on possible tool evolution patterns by looking at the change of 
the relative use of specific and unspecific tools during pre-development. For this 
study of tool evolution patterns, both general and cost focused tools are considered. 
Specific tools analyze information primarily regarding one particular new product 
development idea, while unspecific tools analyze information for an array of new 
product development ideas. 
6.4.1 Tool evolution connected to the cases 
As noted in the within-case analysis, the tool use of Dali shows a pattern from using 
unspecific tools in the front-end and specific tools more frequently later. To 
investigate this, the tools used by all case companies are looked at together. Maybe an 
evolutionary pattern for the future product cost analysis during pre-development 
phases can be uncovered. 
 
Figure 104: The specific tool use relative to total tool use during pre-development 
The evolution of tool usage during pre-development is shown in Figure 104. A low 
percentage indicates an unspecific tool use, while a high percentage indicates a 
specific tool use: 
• Dali starts the analysis with general business intelligence as a tool and no 
specific tool use. In the middle of pre-development Dali starts increasing the 
proportion of specific tools by rating the new ideas with a scorecard (to 1 out 
of 2). At the rear of pre-development the ratio increases even more (to 5 out of 
7) in the last pre-development stage. Thus Dali’s first time tool use evolution 
is from unspecific tool use in the front end to a relatively specific tool use at 
the rear end of pre-development.  
Front Middle Rear Pattern
Dali 0% 50% 71% Unspecific to specific
Duchamp n/a 75% 75% No trend, highly specific
Kandinsky 25% 25% 40% Unspecific to specific
Lichtenstein 0% 50% 50% Unspecific to specific
Miro 67% 60% 60% Specific to unspecific
Van Gogh 33% 40% 40% Unspecific to specific
Warhol 0% 56% 56% Unspecific to specific
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• Duchamp’s first time tool use does not show any pattern, as all tools used are 
used for the first time in the middle of pre-development.  
• Kandinsky’s first use of tools starts with roadmapping, intelligence work and 
the use of cost databases (which are classified as unspecific), but also first cost 
estimation (which is classified as specific) in the front-end. This results in a 1 
out of 4 used tools to be specific. At the rear of pre-development, Kandinsky 
starts using target costing efforts, leading to 2 out of 5 being specific. The 
general pattern of the first time use of tools is from unspecific to specific ones.  
• Lichtenstein starts its analysis in the front end with intelligence work 
(unspecific). In the middle of pre-development the tools used get more specific 
and the half of the used tools are specific (3 out of 6). Thus for Lichtenstein, 
the overall direction of tool use evolution is from unspecific to specific tool 
first time use.  
• Miro’s tool use starts in the front end with one tool that is classified as 
unspecific (roadmapping) and two tools that are classified as specific 
(scorecard use and value analysis work). That gives a quota of 2 out of 3 being 
specific, equaling 67% specific tool use in the front end of pre-development. 
In the middle of pre-development, the analysis is enriched by intelligence 
work (unspecific) and cost estimation (specific). The quota is lowered to 3 out 
of 5 being specific (60%). This leads to the fact that the indicator of specific 
tool use is higher in the front end than in the middle and back end of pre-
development. Thus, at Miro, the overall direction of evolution of the first 
time use of tools is from specific towards more unspecific tool use. This is 
a contradiction to the other cases. 
• The first tools that Van Gogh is using are intelligence work and roadmapping 
(unspecific). However, at the same time Van Gogh uses cost modeling and 
estimation (specific) already in the front end. This results in a quota of 1 out of 
3 tools being specific, equaling to 33% specific tool use in the front end. In the 
middle of pre-development Van Gogh also starts using cost databases 
(unspecific) and target costing efforts (specific). This results in a share of 2 out 
of 5 being specific (40%). Thus the pattern points to a first time use that 
evolves from unspecific to specific. 
• Warhol starts with roadmapping that is classified as unspecific tool in the 
front end. However, after the first feasibility screen the analysis starts 
immediately involving much more tools. Five out of nine are classified as 
specific in the middle of pre-development. Thus the overall direction of tool 
use evolution is from unspecific to specific tool first time use.  
For Duchamp the pattern cannot be analyzed as all tools are used in one stage for the 
first time. Out of the other six cases, all but Miro show the tendency to start with 
unspecific tools and then increase the share of specific tools the further one goes in 
the development phases. However, the case of Miro demonstrates that a strict 
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interpretation of the proposition cannot be supported. So why it is that Miro has a 
higher specific tool ratio in the front end rather than in later stages?  
At Miro, ideas that come out of the front end have to pass an initial test to be assessed 
further in the first stage. This is done with the help of a scorecard. A manager stated 
that Miro is facing the challenge that there are risks connected to innovations and new 
product development ideas. Thus one question to be addressed is who will take these 
risks and how to evaluate them. To answer this challenge the company has developed 
a standardized way to deal with estimations – a pre-defined scorecard. This scorecard 
already rates an idea very specifically. Thus, what sets Miro apart from its other cases 
is that it uses the scorecard as a rigid framework to rate and select ideas right away. 
However, in the case of Miro, the use of their rating scorecard shows a clear pattern 
from lighter tool use to a more intense one. During the first evaluation in the front 
end, some qualitative checkpoints are left out. Only one stage later these are then 
estimated or computed. Thus Miro uses a specific scorecard, but in a light version in 
the front end idea selection process. 
So except this aforementioned case of Miro’s scorecard and the case of Duchamp, the 
overall tendency of tool use evolution during pre-development phases is generally 
from unspecific to specific tools down the innovation phases. 
6.4.2 Explaining the outlier 
Miro’s tool use is pre-dominantly specific in the front-end. Thus Miro has a 
significantly different approach as the others cases. However, the first check is not 
very profound in the front end. 
There are at least two factors explaining this difference. Firstly, Miro has an idea 
suggestion system approach. For Miro’s idea suggestion system approach a fast 
screening is targeted. Its aim is the selection and reduction to the best ideas from 
many. Here, a specific tool use is appropriate. 
On the contrary, all other cases besides Duchamp have an idea development approach. 
In the idea development approach some development precedes selection. The 
selection is eventually not that critical in the front-end, but starts later, in the middle 
of pre-development. Thus, in order to not waste too many resources, unspecific tools 
are used at the start. This is also reflected in the tool use. 
Eventually all companies want to save resources. Miro does it by a specific screening 
at first. The other companies do it by starting with more general analysis. In the 
middle of pre-development Miro uses more tools on the remaining ideas. The other 
companies (except Warhol and Dali) then do the screening. Yet, Dali and Warhol do 
it only in the rear end of pre-development. 
Secondly, one further reason for the approach taken by Miro is derived from 
motivational issues. It is seen as very important by the interviewed head of one 
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business unit that employees are not only submitting, but also evaluating their 
proposed new product development ideas. The employee that suggested an idea might 
be given some free time to work out the idea further or test it already on a small scale. 
This employee-rated first gate was described as very light and letting several ideas 
through to the next evaluation. The employees have to use the scorecard system that 
provides the final measure in a form of points. There is an openly known minimum of 
how many points an idea needs to get into the next stage. When asked by the 
interviewer if this would not lead to the employees polishing the figures up, so that 
their proposal would reach the minimum needed score, the interviewed manager 
answered that usually one can see that a new business idea either lies significantly 
over or under the minimum score. Furthermore, he stated that it is only the first 
evaluation and a polishing up of figures which would be discovered quickly in the 
next stage. Also, in this first evaluation stage, the ideas are still seen as company 
internal proposals. However, in the view of the interviewed manager, this approach 
motivates the employees to submit more ideas; even though one idea might not 
be developed further. 
Overall, there is a tendency of tool use evolution during pre-development phases. 
Summarizing, one can say that there is a general pattern from unspecific to specific 
tool use during pre-development. Yet, this logic can be overruled in specific cases as 
Miro shows. For employee motivation, Miro reverses this approach during idea 
screening. Yet, the tool use is kept light in order to not waste too much effort on this 
first specific analysis. 
6.5 Tool evolution and tool families  
This section looks at the second research question by focusing on the tools and their 
relation to each other. It looks for more universal connection logics in the tool use that 
lead to a tool evolution patterns explaining why the product cost analysis during pre-
development is done the way it is. 
6.5.1 Parallel and sequential tool use prior to target costing efforts 
As can be seen in the different case descriptions, most companies start their future 
product cost analysis during pre-development with some kind of intelligence work. 
Thus intelligence work is a base tool for the analysis during pre-development phases. 
The finding that intelligence work is starting to be used early is an indication towards 
the second research question of ‘why cost information analysis is done the way it is’. 
Intelligence work can be seen as the base for future product cost analysis during pre-
development. 
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Figure 105: Tool use in relation to target costing efforts 
However, when analyzing the tool use as it is shown in Figure 105, a further 
connection of several tools can be seen. Every company deploying target costing 
efforts in pre-development is using information gathered through intelligence work 
and gained through cost modeling and estimations. Or stated differently: one can say 
that intelligence work and cost modeling always precede target costing efforts in 
the investigated cases. This seems logical, as target costing efforts build up on the 
information of these tools. However, on the contrary not every company using 
intelligence work and cost estimation is also carrying out target costing efforts.  
Yet, there is another tool connection with target costing efforts – the use of cost 
databases. Interestingly, all companies using cost databases also use target costing 
efforts. The cost information used for the target costing efforts is maintained in cost 
databases. Cost databases are used by four case companies. In general cost estimation 
and the codification of costs go hand in hand. This can also be seen by the fact that all 
companies using cost databases are also doing cost estimation and modeling work in 
pre-development. This connected tool use is represented in Figure 106.  
 
Figure 106: Connection between different tools through parallel and sequential tool use 
Figure 106 illustrates that target costing efforts is a central tool with several other 
tools preceding it. Additionally, a connection between cost estimation and the use of 
cost databases is found (the cost databases provide figures for the cost estimation). 
This suggests a connection between the different tool types. Through the cost 
management use of the tools there is a logical connection between the different tool 
types. They belong to similar sets of tools, one way or another culminating in target 
costing efforts. The connection indicates a necessary condition. I.e. there is a clear 
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Cost 
modeling 
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estimation
Cost 
database 
use
Target 
costing 
efforts
Dali Front Rear Rear Rear
Duchamp Middle - - -
Kandinsky Front Front Front Rear
Lichtenstein Front Middle - -
Miro Middle Middle - -
Van Gogh Front Front Middle Middle
Warhol Middle Middle Middle Middle
Target costing efforts
Use of cost
databases
Cost estimation
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Intelligence 
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connection as target costing efforts build on (1) the market information gathered 
through intelligence work, (2) the information gained through cost modeling and 
estimations, and (3) cost information stored in some cost database.  
This necessary condition is an indication towards the second research question of 
‘why cost information analysis is done the way it is’. The ‘rule’ is that if target 
costing efforts are found to be used in the future product cost analysis during pre-
development, also intelligence work, cost estimations and information storage in cost 
databases are likely to be used at that time or earlier. This comes from the nature of 
target costing. 
6.5.2 Combining technology, cost and market information  
A further parallel tool use is found in company Warhol (see 4.7.7). Roadmapping 
plays a significant role in the very early phases of the innovation process. As the time 
to market at Warhol is usually several years, the information available at the 
beginning of a new product development effort is very vague. However, managers at 
Warhol are compiling the information and updating it as soon as more certain 
information is found through internal or external research.  
 
Figure 107: Combining the gathered information 
This gathered information is then combined, as shown in Figure 107. Firstly, Warhol 
is doing extensive technology roadmapping in pre-development to manage their 
technology portfolio. Secondly, Warhol is carrying out forecasting, trend analysis and 
cost dynamics analysis through cost capability estimations for promising technologies 
and they collect information from different sources and concentrate it into internal 
reports. Thirdly, target costing efforts, market trends and volume estimates are 
brought together for further analysis of the new product development idea. 
Furthermore, the results of cost dynamics analysis and cost databases are also used. 
6.5.3 Tool attributes and cost analysis 
Regarding tool evolution and tool families, two patterns guide the tool use throughout 
the cost analysis during pre-development.  
Time
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Firstly, target costing efforts are central and building on several other tools preceding 
it. These tools are intelligence work, cost modeling and estimation, and cost 
databases. The connection is a necessary condition. Target costing efforts cannot start 
earlier than these preceding tools. 
Secondly, Warhol uses directional costing as a further parallel tool use. Directional 
costing is the combination of target costing efforts, market and volume estimates, 
technology roadmapping and cost dynamics analysis through cost capability 
estimations for a deeper analysis of the new product development idea in pre-
development. 
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7 Discussion of results, literature and constructs  
The preceding chapters have identified and describe how new product development 
ideas are analyzed with cost information gathered in the pre-development of the case 
companies. According to Eisenhardt (1989) the next step towards theorizing after the 
within and cross-case analysis is to shape propositions using the insights of the 
analysis findings. She points out that it is important to get a ‘sharpening of constructs’ 
with a refining of the construct definition. Thus, while the last chapters have focused 
on the within and cross-case analysis and turned up several findings, this chapter will 
merge these findings to constructs and compare them with the body of knowledge 
(BoK). 
According to the methodology of Eisenhardt (1989) the found data should be 
compared with possible theoretical ideas. In that phase emerging impressions and 
relationships of the within- and the cross-case analysis are compared systematically in 
an iterative process to assess how well or poorly these impressions and relationships 
fit with case data.  
Besides this ‘constant comparison between data and constructs’, the construct 
definition is also checked against the existing literature. This check of literature 
statements exposes similarities, but maybe also contradictions. In the cases that 
contradictions are found, it has to be analyzed why these contradictions are existent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). Thus, the function of this section is also to establish the link 
between previous literature and the findings of the within and cross-case analysis 
done in the last two chapters. 
Following that, this chapter presents the results of this research and deals with the 
results of the preceding analysis regarding the research questions. In the next step the 
validity of the research and its limitations are discussed, before a conclusion is drawn. 
7.1 First time tool use for cost analysis in pre-development  
This section contributes to the answer of the first, descriptive research question of 
how product cost analysis is done during pre-development. 
7.1.1 Finding summary  
The findings of this work are overviews on (1) what kind of tools, (2) how many tools 
and (3) how these tools are used. This is shown on the one hand in a company setting 
for each company (chapter 4), but also in an aggregated view in the cross-case 
analysis (section 6.1). 
The within-case and the cross-case analyses show the cost information analysis 
processes of the case companies during pre-development. It is e.g. shown that all but 
one case company use cost estimation and modeling in pre-development.  
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This work also studies the first time use of the different analysis tools. Through the 
aggregated cross-case analysis general patters can be uncovered. Concluding one can 
say that there are some tools that are starting to be used by many companies in the 
front end. E.g. all case companies start using intelligence work either in the front end 
or in the middle of pre-development, indicating that intelligence work is commonly 
used in early stages of innovation. Yet, there are other tools that are mostly used later 
for the first time (e.g. cost estimation and modeling). On top of that some tools are 
used less frequently, but always at the same point of time during pre-development 
phases. E.g. dynamic analysis of costs during pre-development is only performed by 
two out of seven companies, but both companies start using it in the middle of pre-
development. 
One finding of this analysis is an overview, at which point in time the different case 
companies are using which kind of tools for the first time in their future product cost 
analysis during pre-development. This can be seen in the different case descriptions in 
the within-company analysis in Figure 91 on page 203 in section 5.10 and in section 
6.1. This finding contributes to the answer of the descriptive, first research question of 
how the cost information analysis is done. Additionally, the analyzed first time use 
offers an indication towards the second research question. It partly answers why the 
cost information analysis is done the way it is, as some tools are generally used earlier 
and some are generally used later for the first time. 
The average tool use during pre-development is overall approximately six out of nine 
tools per company. Looking at the cost tools only, the average cost tool use during 
pre-development is three cost tools out of five per company. 
Three companies are starting to use cost tools in the front end. Three companies are 
starting to use cost tools in the middle of pre-development. And one company starts 
using cost tools in the rear of pre-development. Yet, the biggest step in first time cost 
tool use is in the middle of pre-development. Four companies increase their cost tool 
use most significantly then. 
Cost modeling and estimation is the most popular tool for product cost analysis during 
pre-development, as six out of seven case companies use it in pre-development. Two 
companies start this tool already in the front end. Furthermore, three companies start 
its use in the middle and one company in the rear of pre-development. 
The second most often used tool for product cost analysis during pre-development is 
value analysis work, followed by the use of cost databases in pre-development. Both 
tools are started in some cases to be used in the front end.  
On the contrary, target costing efforts and cost dynamics analysis are only started in 
the middle of pre-development. 
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7.1.2 Enfolding pre-development process literature 
Overall the trend of growing cost importance in innovations over generations 
according Rothwell (1994) has also translated in the use of product cost analysis in 
pre-development. The found tool use is generally in line with the literature review of 
Ernst (2002). Yet, the work of Ernst (2002), Cooper and Kleinschmidt (1986) and 
Cooper (1988) focus on general analysis and this study focuses more on cost analysis. 
Cooper (1990) describes Gate 1 as a ‘gentle screen’ where the newly proposed idea is 
checked against a few key criteria such as strategic alignment, project feasibility, 
magnitude of the opportunity, differential advantage, synergy with the firm’s core 
business and resources, and market attractiveness. The information gathered for these 
parameters can all be validated by using intelligence work. Thus one would expect 
that all companies use intelligence work before the first screen in gate 1. However, as 
Figure 91 on page 203 shows, only four of the seven case companies use intelligence 
work in the front end. The other three companies start using intelligence work only in 
the middle of pre-development. Two of these three companies (Warhol and Miro) use 
roadmapping instead as a first tool. I.e. there the strategic planning aspect is higher 
valued as a direct evaluation.  
According to Cooper (1990) several rather inexpensive research activities are carried 
out before gate 1 in order to find out the potential of the idea, its total available 
market, and its likely market acceptance. In the case companies, most tools can be 
categorized as rather inexpensive activities as the information used is usually non-
specific to a development and gathered anyway. 
Another interesting finding is the financial and cost focus some case companies show 
right from the start. According to Cooper (1990) financial and cost criteria are not part 
of this first screen. Nevertheless, two of the seven case companies (Kandinsky and 
Van Gogh) already carry out cost estimations before the first screen (see Figure 91 on 
page 203).  
The second screen in gate 2 is very similar to the one of gate 1 according to Cooper 
(1990). According to Cooper’s (1990) experience, the idea is re-evaluated with the 
help of the additional information gained since its last check. Additionally, new 
evaluation criteria around marketing and financial issues are also used. In line with 
the finding that some case companies show a financial and cost focus right from the 
start, the financial focus is also increased in all case companies. Some case companies 
(Van Gogh and Warhol) already start target costing efforts in the middle of pre-
development.  
Overall, the case companies show a pattern to more cost analysis work before the first 
two gates than reported two decades ago by Cooper (1990).  
In their time sequenced classification, Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) state that the idea 
creation in the front end (= stage 0. Planning) is supported by strategic reflections and 
R&D activities. According to Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) business and technology 
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intelligence are typically starting to be used in the first stage after the front end. In 
contrast, the case studies show that intelligence work is used by four case companies 
right away from the front end on. This indicates that intelligence work is started 
earlier (nowadays) than stated by Ulrich and Eppinger (2000). However, the other 
three case companies start using intelligence work in the first stage after the front end 
(stage 1) as stated by Ulrich and Eppinger (2000).  
Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) state that the first time that costs are estimated is usually 
in the middle of pre-development (in their model, stage 1, the first stage after the front 
end). The case studies show that two companies start it in the front end; three start it 
in the middle and one in the rear of pre-development. Thus there is a range when the 
companies start using cost estimation with the mean being in middle of pre-
development as Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) state it. 
In total one can say that the first time tool use found in the case companies is similar 
to the one stated by Ulrich and Eppinger (2000), but slightly shifted towards the front 
end. 
According to Kotler and Armstrong (2008) the innovation process starts with an idea 
generation stage that is immediately followed by a screening stage. The purpose is to 
reduce the number of ideas significantly and to drop poor ideas as soon as possible. 
The checked parameters include manufacturing costs and rate of return (Kotler and 
Armstrong, 2008). Such an early check of future costs and financial return was not 
found in the studied case companies.  
According to Schmitt-Grohe (1972) a two gate approach of idea screening should be 
used. The first gate is a coarse screen of new product development ideas to eliminate 
ineffective new product development ideas as soon as possible. The second gate is an 
economical analysis that should select the most promising ones from the remaining 
new product development ideas. This approach mirrors the found screening of Miro 
very well. Also the general tendency that specific cost focused tools are starting to be 
used predominantly in the middle of pre-development (see Figure 91 on page 203) is 
in line with the statement of Schmitt-Grohe (1972).  
7.2 Organizational contingencies and tool use approaches  
Regarding the second research question of ‘why cost information analysis is done the 
way it is’, it is interesting to analyze whether organizational contingencies are 
governing the cost analysis during pre-development.  
7.2.1 Findings regarding company characteristics  
In section 6.1 the analysis approach of the different case companies is compared to 
the different characteristics of the case companies. The finding is that the style of the 
different case companies is not significantly interrelated with the analyzed company 
characteristics like (1) the turnover, (2) the size, (3) profitability, (4) ratio of R&D 
spending per turnover, or whether the case company (5) operates in a business-to-
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business (B2B) or a business-to-consumer (B2C) environment. Furthermore, (6) 
whether a company is market or technology driven (the innovation style) does not 
correlate with the found patterns of cost analysis during pre-development. Thus the 
research question ‘why cost information analysis is done the way it is’ cannot be 
answered by looking at these company characteristics, as these company 
characteristics are not applicable contingency factors. For the (7) P/E ratio some 
correlation could be found but statements should be limited as only four data points 
are available. 
7.2.2 Findings regarding other organizational contingencies  
However, there are contingency factors for the cost analysis during pre-development 
that indicate ‘why cost information analysis is done the way it is’. Figure 97 on page 
210 and Figure 99 on page 212, show that all companies using an institutional 
search and development approach have a higher relative cost tool importance and 
use more cost analysis tools in pre-development than companies using an idea 
suggestion program based idea initiative. Both companies with the idea suggestion 
style (Miro and Duchamp) have the lowest cost tool use. Yet, these two companies 
are also in the service business, while the goods focused companies do show a 
significantly higher relative cost tool importance percentage. 
The innovation funnel style impacts the number of cost tools used for the cost 
information analysis process in pre-development (see Figure 97 on page 210). The 
few big bets approach is driven by choosing a single development project quite early 
during innovation and taking it all the way to a successful market introduction. This 
approach will lead to a more intense use of different tools right from the start of an 
innovation project. The other approach is driven by the notion of survival of the 
fittest of concurring innovation projects. This approach will lead to a slower step up 
of first time tool use during pre-development. Furthermore, companies with a survival 
of the fittest innovation funnel type tend to have a balanced relative cost tool 
importance. Also, companies with a survival of the fittest innovation funnel type use 
on average more tools in the cost analysis during pre-development.  
Also, the more cost sensitive a company’s customers are, the higher the relative cost 
tool importance will be and the more likely it is to find target cost efforts during pre-
development (see Figure 100 on page 215). If a company is using an approach of 
target prices segments, it is likely to use target costing efforts for analysis in the pre-
development. On the contrary, companies that are not establishing price targets in the 
pre-development cannot use target costing efforts for the cost analysis during pre-
development.  
7.2.3 Findings regarding technological uncertainty  
There are three major observations that can be combined regarding technological 
uncertainty and cost analysis during pre-development. The first observation is the 
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finding that organizational contingencies do not govern the first time use of 
uncertainty management tools (see section 6.2). The other two observations are found 
in Figure 103 on page 218, where the classification of technological uncertainty and 
the first time use of uncertainty management tools are compared. The second 
observation is that all companies with the highest technological uncertainty are also 
all starting to use uncertainty management tools in the middle of pre-development. 
The third observation is that two companies that have a lower objective uncertainty, 
but still worry uncertainties subjectively show two different approaches. One of them 
uses uncertainty management tools, while the other does not. From these two 
observations one can deduct that it is the objective technological uncertainty (as 
defined by Shenhar and Dvir, 1996), rather than a subjective uncertainty, that guides 
the use of uncertainty management tools in pre-development.  
7.2.4 Enfolding literature 
Some of the studied organizational contingencies are also reflected by other authors 
in articles and books. However, comparable literature regarding the organizational 
contingencies and first time tool use is found only fragmented.  
Schmitt-Grohe (1972) states on a more general basis that companies operating in 
markets with a low innovation activity are likely to also have a lower analysis activity 
during pre-development due to data needs and complexity. Yet, this is not supported 
by the finding that the ratio of R&D spending per turnover is not significantly 
interrelated with the found first time tool use. However, Schmitt-Grohe (1972) 
mentions the amount of new products per year in this context and not explicitly the 
R&D spending per turnover. 
The literature dealing with screening approaches of new product development ideas 
like Schmitt-Grohe (1972), De Brentani and Droege (1988), Bösch (2008) do not 
distinguish the above mentioned idea initiative. Thus, it is not directly stated that 
companies using an institutional search and development approach have a higher 
relative cost tool importance and use more cost analysis tools in pre-development than 
companies using an idea suggestion program based idea initiative. Yet, Hauschildt 
and Salomo (2007) state on the case of Bayer that the institutional search and 
development approach looks ahead to discover trends in advance. This is done to 
ramp up research and development already before the eminent market introduction is 
needed. Yet, this approach also implies that more analysis is done in pre-development 
and thus also explains that more cost analysis tools are used in pre-development with 
this approach. 
The few big bets funnel builds on a single development project and rather makes 
adjustments than kills the new development idea. A company using this kind of funnel 
will consider quite a broad range of ideas in the start. However, they rapidly screen 
and merge them into a single project aimed at meeting specific market needs 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Furthermore they state that even at the outset market 
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potential and financial expectations are the primary criteria for the project selection in 
this type of funnel approach. The other development funnel is driven by the notion of 
survival of the fittest and has many ideas in the funnel (‘in petto’), out of which the 
most promising are selected quite late during innovation. There the key approach is to 
identify the most promising new development ideas (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). 
The screening is arranged accordingly: Companies using the few big bets funnel type 
create a multitude of ideas that are then sharply reduced to a few in the first screen. In 
contrast, companies using the survival of the fittest funnel type keep many ideas 
running parallel to each other and then select at later stages the most promising ones 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). The findings indicate that the survival of the fittest 
innovation funnel type goes hand in hand with a balanced relative cost tool 
importance and use on average more tools in the cost analysis during pre-
development. These points are reflected by Wheelwright and Clark (1992). They state 
that the survival of the fittest innovation funnel is characterized by a selection process 
based on broader peer review and formal authorization. They also state that the few 
big bets innovation funnel is characterized rather by senior management selection 
based on informal processes and gut feeling (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Thus 
these findings are in line with literature. Yet, this also means that when a company is 
trying to migrate from one funnel type to the other, the future product cost analysis 
during pre-development phases will also change accordingly. 
Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) deal with the cost sensitivity of customers and its 
connection to target costing, however, not precisely with target costing efforts in pre-
development. Instead they look at the use of target costing during development 
phases. The target costing process is internalizing market needs and cost pressure to 
new product development (Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997). According to Cooper and 
Slagmulder (1997) companies are operating in so-called survival zones that are 
determined by the minimum feasible and the maximum allowable price of new 
product developments. From this price the allowable future costs for new product 
developments can be derived. Further dimensions of the survival zone are quality and 
functionality. Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) state that generally target costing is 
particularly valuable for companies that compete in environments with narrow 
margins and price levels that change location rapidly but are relatively predictable. 
The findings in this thesis are in line with this statement. The companies that used 
target costing efforts in pre-development could predict price levels, while a company 
that could not do it, did not use target costing efforts. Furthermore, three of the four 
companies using target costing efforts in pre-development are in situations where the 
customer has considerable power. 
Survey results from Dekker and Smidt (2003) somehow contradict the findings of 
Cooper and Slagmulder (1997) about the contingency of predictable environments. 
Dekker and Smidt (2003) found that (1) a perceived intensive competition and (2) an 
unpredictable environment lead to a use of target costing. Regarding (1) the findings 
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of this research, they are in line with the study of Dekker and Smidt (2003). For (2) 
this research found that technological uncertainty is not relevant for the use of target 
costing efforts during pre-development. If using this technological uncertainty as a 
proxy for an unpredictable environment, the findings somehow contradict Dekker and 
Smidt (2003). Yet, the technological uncertainty of Shenhar and Dvir (1996) is not 
identical to the notion of an unpredictable environment of Dekker and Smidt (2003). 
This could also explain the contradiction in the findings of Cooper and Slagmulder 
(1997) and Dekker and Smidt (2003).  
Hibbets et al. (2003) found that product differentiators in situations of high company 
rivalry in their industry are likely to use target costing in development. The findings 
of this research are not directly comparable as the focus lies on pre-development. 
However, the findings add a notion to the results of Hibbets et al. (2003). This 
research found that the use of target prices segments increases the likelihood of using 
target costing efforts in pre-development.  
It is found that the technological uncertainty is guiding the use of uncertainty 
management tools in pre-development. Yet, Ax et al. (2008) articulate that it is not the 
objective subjectivity, but the perceived uncertainty that drives the efforts of 
managers. However, that is not the case in these findings; the studied cases move 
along the objective technological uncertainty defined by Shenhar and Dvir (1996). 
The higher the objective technological uncertainty the more likely it is that 
uncertainty management tools are used with the cost analysis during pre-development. 
7.3 Tool evolution in pre-development  
The second research question of ‘why cost information analysis is done the way it is’ 
is also guided by an inherent nature of the tools used for the cost analysis during pre-
development. Several patterns guide the first time tool use throughout the cost 
analysis during pre-development.  
7.3.1 Finding summary on tool evolution and specificity 
There is a general pattern from unspecific to specific first time cost tool use during 
pre-development. It is based on the overview of all but one case shown in the different 
subsections of the cases in chapter 4 and the detailed cross-case analysis in section 6.4 
that both illustrate this overall pattern. However, this pattern can be overruled if a 
company values other aspects more as the outlier shows. Still in this case, the tool use 
is kept light in order to not waste too much effort on a first specific analysis. 
The implication is that if a tool is classified as specific, it is likely to be used later for 
the first time in the cost analysis during pre-development, while an unspecific tool is 
likely to be found to be used for the first time earlier in the cost analysis during pre-
development.  
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7.3.2 Enfolding literature on tool evolution and specificity 
The characteristics of the tools used for the first time in the analysis change as the 
new product development idea proceeds in the innovation process. The first time use 
migrates from unspecific tool use towards more specific tools. This was not found in 
literature in this detail, but it is in line with general statements in the innovation 
literature that companies arrange their tools with a rising evaluation effort 
(Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Hauschildt and Salomo, 2007). The findings follow 
the statement of these authors that the effort spent on analyzing one idea goes 
constantly up the further the idea proceeds. The goal of innovation management is to 
create, define and select a set of promising development projects that lead to new 
products with a competitive advantage and that advance the company in the planned 
business direction (Wheelwright and Clark, 1992). Yet, innovation management has 
to be designed efficiently and has to justify its expenses (Hauschildt and Salomo, 
2007). This means that the knowledge gained with the unspecific tools has reached its 
limits at some point and that the companies are prepared to spend more effort on 
analyzing the new product development ideas in detail with different tools to ‘define 
and select a set of promising development projects’ (in the words of Wheelwright and 
Clark, 1992). Also Bösch (2008) recommends using screening with increasing depths, 
where the detailing of investigation per category increases for each gate. 
7.3.3 Finding summary on tool evolution and tool families 
There are families of tools that have interconnections, dependencies and preceding 
tools that are necessary before another tool can be used. E.g. target costing efforts are 
central and build upon several other tools preceding it. These tools are intelligence 
work, cost modeling and estimation, and cost databases. The connection is a 
necessary condition. Target costing efforts cannot start earlier than these preceding 
tools. 
As Figure 105 on page 223 and the analysis in subsection 6.5.1 show, intelligence 
work and cost estimation always precede target costing efforts in the investigated 
cases. Additionally, cost databases are always used with target costing effort. This is 
inevitable through the connection of target costing with these tools: First, target 
costing builds upon the information gained through intelligence work and this 
explains why intelligence work has to lead target costing efforts. Second, cost 
estimations are a crucial part of target costing and explains why cost estimations are 
starting to be used earlier or with target costing. Third, cost databases are used to store 
cost information and as this cost information storage is essential during carrying out 
target costing efforts this explains the connection of these two tools.  
This means that different tools are interconnected. They build on each other by using 
the results of one tool as the input of the other tool. The rule is that if interconnections 
and dependencies exist for tools generally, they will also exist during the cost 
information analysis process in the pre-development. In the example of the use of 
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target costing during pre-development phases, one can see a ‘target costing family’. 
Target costing efforts build on the results of other tools as input. However, the other 
tools can also stand alone. The overview of Figure 105 in 6.5.1 also shows that target 
costing is not routinely done when a company uses intelligence work and cost 
estimation. Thus target costing is a culmination of different other tools and lies on a 
path that necessitates other tools, but this path can be left earlier when target costing is 
not done in pre-development phases.  
7.3.4 Enfolding literature on tool evolution and tool families 
The finding of how target costing efforts are used and that they are usually preceded 
by the use of intelligence work, cost estimation and cost databases is in line with the 
target costing literature. Yet it was not stated for pre-development so far. Target 
costing literature (e.g. Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998; 
Kaplan and Cooper, 1998; Ewert and Ernst, 1999; Ellram, 2006) notices the 
importance of cost estimation in the cost breakdowns to investigate the estimated 
costs against the allowable cost level. Furthermore, the current state of the art survey 
of Tani et al. (1994) showed that 88,1% of the surveyed companies also use cost 
databases together with target costing.  
The statement that there are families of tools, with interconnections and dependencies 
in the future product cost analysis during pre-development has also not been stated 
clearly in the innovation management literature so far. Even though Wheelwright and 
Clark (1992) describe different sets of tools and activities that have interconnections 
and dependencies, these tools and activities lack the focus on costs. Furthermore, 
these authors do not draw attention to the fact of the interconnections and 
dependencies. Similar Ulrich and Eppinger (2000) do not explicitly point out 
interconnections and dependencies between tools and methods in their description of 
actions in the pre-development phases. 
7.4 Directional costing in pre-development 
The findings of tool evolution and tool families show that there are interconnections 
and dependencies between tools in the product cost analysis during pre-development. 
This section deals with directional costing that also incorporates these traits of tool 
evolution and tool family groups. 
7.4.1 Finding summary on directional costing 
Directional costing is a future cost analysis and tracking procedure performed before 
the start of specific new product development procedures, aiming to map costs and 
functionalities that are the base for later target costing (see subsections 4.7.7 and 
6.5.2). Directional costing uses estimates from cost roadmaps and experience curve 
effects over the time. It analyses what unit production costs can be achieved with a 
certain technology in the future. 
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Information available on the beginning of a new product development effort is often 
very vague and blurry. Yet, directional costing compiles this kind of information in 
pre-development based on technology roadmapping, forecasting, trend analysis, and 
cost dynamics analysis through cost capability estimations, target costing efforts, 
market trends, and volume estimates. 
7.4.2 Comparing directional costing to the body of knowledge  
Directional costing incorporates several traits of future novel development 
roadmapping. Wheelwright and Clark (1992) present roadmapping of relative 
performance and Groenveld (1997) and Grossman (2004) report roadmapping in 
different companies. Groenveld (1997) states that roadmapping is a process that helps 
integrating future technology developments with the business needs of new product 
development. Directional costing is doing this as well. Also the time horizon reported 
by Groenveld (1997) and the one of directional costing found in the case analysis are 
similar. Groenveld (1997) states that for products with short product life cycles these 
are often not more than three-to-four years, but can extend up to ten years for other 
more generic product categories. Similarly, directional costing is used for planning 
ahead in a range of three and more years (before market launch) as it is carried out 
before the actual development start.  
What is different is the cost focus that directional costing has. Even though 
Groenveld (1997) points out that roadmaps require a good understanding of markets 
and future functionality, the roadmapping he reports of (made at Philips) focuses on 
technical issues and not costs. Also the roadmapping reported by Grossman (2004) 
(made at General Motors) looks mostly at technology and project management 
controls, but also at marketing and purchasing. He reports that the costs of projects are 
mapped against the budgeted resources. However, the expected costs of new product 
developments are not roadmapped and it misses the target costing idea that the cost 
have to fall below a certain limit to become economically feasible. 
Directional costing incorporates several traits of cost roadmapping. Albright and 
Kappel (2003) have reported a roadmapping approach that they labeled ‘forward cost 
model’. This forward cost model shows cost developments over time. These 
approaches are also used to analyze the cost evolution of new technologies. The 
forward cost model does so by using an experience curve trend that it extends into the 
future. Similar to the case of Warhol, this practice is embedded in a multitude of 
different other roadmaps that show how a quantity of parameters develop over time.  
What is different is the innovation focus that directional costing has. However, 
these concepts are different to directional costing, as the ‘forward cost model’ of 
Albright and Kappel (2003) is not used for innovation evaluation, but as a general 
roadmapping tool and it is missing the target costing idea that the costs have to fall 
below a certain limit to make innovations economically feasible. 
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Directional costing incorporates several traits of product-platform planning. 
Davila and Wouters (2004) have reported a roadmapping approach that is used in 
product-platform planning. Product-platform planning is an approach that 
incorporates future cost saving possibilities into design decisions, by allowing 
components, processes, and knowledge to be shared across a set of products. Similar 
to this study, Davila and Wouters (2004) found this approach in a company they 
studied. 
What is different is the scope that directional costing has and the time when both 
tools are used. Even though the reported product-platform planning also incorporates 
roadmapping, the decision making is focused on whether to modularize parts of the 
development to simplify and streamline future developments (Davila and Wouters, 
2004). Contrary to this, directional costing looks at the cost level of new technologies 
and their feasibility in the market - independent whether these new technologies are 
used singularly or as product-platform. Furthermore, directional costing is done 
strictly before development start and thus usually precedes platform planning. 
However, both tools complement each other. The information gained in directional 
costing can be used in product-platform planning in later stages of the innovation 
process. 
Directional costing also incorporates several traits of target costing. It 
incorporates the analysis of estimated future product costs of new product 
development once these are in the market (in contrast to the budget costs of a 
development project) (Tani et al., 1994, Cooper and Slagmulder, 1997, Kaplan and 
Atkinson, 1998, Ellram 2006). Furthermore, it assists in analyzing the trade-off 
between (target) cost and functionality in respect to the market demands. That 
companies develop target costing methods on their own is known in literature. Dekker 
and Smidt (2003) found that Dutch companies had independently developed practices 
that resemble target costing, through the pressures of the competitive and volatile 
environment they are operating in. Most of the analyzed companies claimed to use 
target-costing-like methods, but used different names for them. Similar findings are 
stated by Boer and Ettlie (1999) for U.S. companies.  
What is new is the earliness at which directional costing is used. In the literature 
review, target costing is defined as a set of activities during the planning cycle, aiming 
to reach a cost target through activities that assist the planning, development and 
detailed design of new products. Target costing is used for choosing product and 
process designs that will result in a product that can be produced at a cost that will 
allow an acceptable level of profit, given the product’s estimated market price, selling 
volume, and target functionality. Even though Tani et al. (1994) report a connection to 
long-range planning, the classical approach to target costing is to begin using it during 
the planning cycle when a specific development is kicked-off (Cooper and 
Slagmulder, 1997; Kaplan and Atkinson, 1998). The difference to target costing is 
that directional costing starts earlier, almost during basic research and before specific 
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new product developments are started. Through that earliness the figures used for 
directional costing are fuzzy and less clear than in traditional target costing. It is a 
forerunner to traditional target costing in a stage when the costs are still too high to 
start a development program. However, directional costing helps to keep a potential 
development on the radar screen until the cost of a technology come down to a level 
that is near to reach the allowable costs of the market. At this point in time 
development activities are ramped up, so that the new product development is ready 
once the actual cost of a new product development and the allowable costs meet each 
other. 
Davila and Wouters (2004) state four large limitations of target costing when there 
are no clearly established price points, the understanding of new technologies is 
limited and when product costs are essential to profitability. (1) In these cases a focus 
merely on costs distracts from revenue drivers. Furthermore, (2) target costing is too 
time consuming if time-to-market and technology are essential to profitable new 
product developments. Additionally, (3) target costing requires formal procedures that 
are too bureaucratic and linear and are thus not used during new product 
developments; and last but not least (4) target costing is too detailed and may not 
reflect future processes for product development decisions in fast moving 
environments.  
However, these statements show to be misleading to some extend when contrasted to 
the case study of Warhol. Warhol is operating in a high technology setting and 
regularly carries out developments without clearly established price points and a 
limited understanding of new technologies to be applied. It should thus be objected to 
the limitations stated by Davila and Wouters (2004). However, as shown in subsection 
4.7.1 Warhol starts target costing efforts already in the first stage after the front-end.  
One reason could be that directional costing responds to two of these limitations: 
As for the limitation that (2) target costing is too time consuming, the analysis with 
directional costing provides information in advance that can then easily be summoned 
up during the development process. Some part of traditional target costing is moved 
ahead of the detailed development and thus is not extending the time to market. 
Additionally, directional costing can be used to map future processes and thus 
answers to the stated limitation that (4) target costing may not reflect these future 
processes. 
Summarizing, one can say that directional costing is based on several other 
approaches like roadmapping and target costing. However, the combination to a 
specific tool for the future product cost analysis during pre-development is novel to 
literature. None of the tools found in literature incorporates all three characteristics of 
directional costing at once. These characteristics are (1) the analysis of future 
developments for novel technologies, (2) a future product cost focus, and (3) its use in 
pre-development. Furthermore, directional costing can be an answer to two limits of 
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target costing. It can be kept low on time consumption and thus does not extend the 
time to market. Also, it uses and provides information about future processes, another 
limit of target costing according to Davila and Wouters (2004). 
7.5 Sharpening of construct and synthesis 
The preceding chapters show that product cost analysis during pre-development is 
based on several regularities through contingencies. These regularities shape the 
actual cost analysis first time tool use during pre-development and answer the second 
research question of why the product cost analysis during pre-development is done the 
way it is. Also, along the approach of managerial choice, these regularities are not a 
must, written in stone. Managers can choose to not follow these regularities; however, 
at a penalty in form of cost, inefficiency or new knowledge deficit. In that case, this 
penalty can be seen as a trade-off for another, desired effect. 
The regularities are:  
• There is a general pattern from unspecific to specific first time cost tool use 
during pre-development.  
• The innovation funnel type impacts the cost analysis process in pre-
development. A few big bets approach will lead to an intense start, but use less 
tools overall than a survival of the fittest approach. The latter will lead to a 
slower step up of first time tool use during pre-development, but is likely to 
have a balanced relative cost tool importance and above-average tool use 
during pre-development.  
• Idea initiative and service intensity affect the cost analysis during pre-
development. Companies developing goods and using an institutional search 
and development approach have a higher relative cost tool importance and use 
more cost analysis tools in pre-development than companies using an idea 
suggestion program based idea initiative in the service business. 
• Intelligence work is a base for the cost analysis during pre-development as it is 
commonly and early used in pre-development.  
• Relative cost tool importance will be higher and target costing efforts are more 
likely to be found during pre-development if customers are cost sensitive and 
price targets can be established for the market. 
• Yet, if a company cannot establish price targets in the pre-development, target 
costing efforts will not be used in the cost analysis during pre-development. 
• The higher the objective technological uncertainty the more likely it is that 
uncertainty management tools are used with the cost analysis during pre-
development. 
7.6 Contribution table as overview of findings  
This research looks at the circumstances of development preparation of cost-
competitive products and focuses especially on the future product cost analysis during 
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pre-development phases. Using the research methodology explained in chapter 3, a 
seven case company study is used to derive the above mentioned research results. In 
order to investigate how new product development ideas are analyzed with cost 
information gathered in these early innovation phases, the main research questions of 
this study are: 
RQ I: How is product cost analysis done during pre-development?  
RQ II: Why is the product cost analysis during pre-development done the way it 
is?  
 
Figure 108: Summarizing contribution table and classification of findings 
Figure 108 gives an overview of the different findings of this research. Behind each 
finding a cross specifies which research question is mainly addressed by which 
finding. The last row of Figure 108 states the degree that the literature has explicitly 
addressed the finding so far.  
7.7 Theoretical contributions and managerial implications  
One contribution to the body of knowledge is the detailed description of tools used for 
future product cost analysis during pre-development phases, answering the first 
research question and thus about ‘how the analysis is done’. This is done for seven 
case companies and provides insights and inspiration to interested managers that 
want to build up, structure or enlarge their future product cost analysis during pre-
development. Applying versions of tools that are easier to handle could shorten the 
analysis time and increase the utility during pre-development. Using further, not so far 
known tools could help managers to avoid pitfalls during the innovation process. Also 
from a theoretical point of view, the tool overview and description of the managerial 
use is interesting. It shows a qualitative impression of what kind of tools are used 
nowadays in companies for the future product cost analysis during pre-development. 
Furthermore, it shows also the limits where companies see the marginal use of tools 
against the efforts that they have to spend.  
Overview of finding RQ I RQ II Addressed in literature so far
Tool overview and managerial use X to some extent
First time use of tools in pre-development X to a small extent
Company characteristics and cost tool use X to a small extent
Different funnels - different approaches on analysis X to a small extent
Idea initiative affecting tool use X to a small extent
Cost sensitivity and target price affecting cost tool use X to a small extent
Tool use from unspecific to specific X to a small extent
Parallel and sequential tool use X X to some extent
Directional costing X not so far
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Another finding answering the first descriptive research question is the presentation of 
when tools are used for the first time during pre-development. The different case 
descriptions in chapter 4 show at which point in time how many companies are using 
which tool for the first time during pre-development. This gives managers a 
benchmarking possibility for their company and directions for the new design of the 
future product cost analysis during pre-development. The theoretical implication is 
two-folded. Firstly, it shows when which kinds of tools are used in companies 
nowadays. Secondly, it shows for specific tools that they are used already in pre-
development phases. E.g. target costing efforts, classified as specific, are shown to be 
used already from the middle of pre-development on and thus this finding contributes 
to the body of knowledge.  
A further contribution of this work is the presentation of directional costing. In the 
case of directional costing the theoretical contribution and the managerial use are 
similar; a novel arrangement of known tools that fits the needs and framework of 
future product cost analysis during pre-development. Managers can use that tool to 
understand the dynamic development of the performance and cost of different 
technologies faster than the competition not using directional costing. It provides 
managers the possibility to be aware of future development possibilities several years 
before a development process (with target costing) is started.  
Yet, the second research question asking ‘why the analysis is done the way it is’, is 
answered in the theorizing part of this work that is located in the chapters 6 and 7 and 
culminates in the section 7.5. Several regularities answering this research question 
were found. Thus, according to this research, the future product cost analysis during 
pre-development phases is typically arranged according to certain regularities.  
From a theoretic point of view this is in line with the innovation management 
research, but was so far not studied under the aspect of first time tool use for the 
future product cost analysis during pre-development phases. The managerial 
implication is that the approach on innovation of a company has to be taken into 
consideration when designing the process for future product cost analysis during pre-
development. Furthermore, a change in this approach on innovation will also lead to 
the need to change the tool use for this cost information analysis.  
All in all, this work presents several situations that the case companies and managers 
are facing in real business life in the pre-development. It integrates these with 
organizational issues and provides seven major findings that contain, on the one hand, 
theoretical propositions and on the other hand have managerial implications.  
7.8 Evaluation of the research and limitations  
The validity of these findings will be discussed in this section. Validity issues have 
already been touched upon when discussing different methodological possibilities in 
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chapter 3. The following subsections emphasize three major quality criteria of this 
research, the reliability, the validity and the generalizability of the findings. 
7.8.1 Reliability 
The value of research stands and falls with the validity of findings. However, for a 
finding to be valid it has to be measured first of all by a reliable measure. “Unless a 
measure is reliable, it cannot be valid” (Robson, 2002, p. 101). Reliability is the 
consistency or stability of a measure and a key question is that if the research were to 
be repeated, would the same result be obtained? (Robson, 2002, p. 93). 
Unreliability might have several basic causes in this research. One source of 
unreliability in this research might be observer error and observer bias. In order to 
avoid this, the case study approach of this work followed the approach of Eisenhardt 
(1989) to let relationships emerge and then test these emerging constructs with the 
evidence in each case. Furthermore, a case study database was maintained, following 
the recommendation of Yin (1989). Furthermore, the research was carried out by 
using a conceptually clustered matrix (Robson, 2002) which focuses the analysis on 
different aspects next to each other and not case-by-case.  
Another possible source of unreliability in this research is the other participants of this 
research. The interviewees can be wrong in their statements (participant error) and/or 
interviewees can also be biased (participant bias). To avoid participant error in this 
study of future product cost analysis during pre-development phases, the procedures 
were asked for each case company from several employees individually. Furthermore, 
if possible, written statements, corporate charts and presentations were asked for, as 
well as the company pre-development procedures as a basis for the further interviews 
and discussions. This research followed the recommendation of Eisenhardt (1989) to 
be opportunistic and to use all material that is available, i.e. not to restrict the data 
gathering on specific types of information. This increases the likelihood of 
discovering participant error. In contrast, a participant bias might be incorporated in 
the findings. The strength of qualitative research is to incorporate some kind of 
intuition, beliefs and values to yield findings that quantitative research would 
probably not uncover. However, this openness to these ‘soft factors’ makes qualitative 
research potentially subject to participant bias. In this research the participant bias 
was handled by working with several people and discussing issues repeatedly. Also, 
the participants did not have any motivation to distort their answers. Discretion was 
guaranteed by researcher and senior faculty staff, none-disclosure agreements were 
signed before starting data collection and the (masked) data used for this research was 
subjected to company internal checks before being released for the research.  
7.8.2 Validity  
Not only has the research to be carried out in a reliable way, but the findings that 
research yields also have to be valid. “Validity is concerned with whether the findings 
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are ‘really’ about what they appear to be about” (Robson, 2002, p. 93). Yin (1989) 
distinguishes three types of validity: The first one is construct validity, the second one 
internal validity and the third one external validity.  
Construct validity is about whether the measures used in the study achieve a correct 
measurement for the issue under study (Yin, 1989; Robson, 2002). E.g. it can be 
delicate to judge whether a tool is unspecific or specific, as a company can use an 
unspecific tool for a very specific analysis. However, there is a clear general 
inclination for each of the different tools and the impression that the cases gave were 
quite clear.  
According to Yin (1989) construct validity is an often criticized point in case-study 
research. This work follows the recommendation of Yin (1989) and Eisenhardt (1989) 
to use multiple sources of evidence to enhance the construct validity. Furthermore, 
Yin (1989) recommends maintaining chains of evidence in the case study reports. 
This thesis displays chains of evidence by following the methodological steps given 
by Eisenhardt (1989) also in the way the research is reported (from how the field is 
entered, the analysis is conducted up to reaching the conclusions and enfolding 
literature). 
Internal validity is about whether the causal relationships presented in a study are 
sound (Yin, 1989; Robson, 2002). Generally in research, a pointed out relationship 
might well be only a spurious correlation or may be a misinterpretation of the impact 
of some other variable (Yin, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1989). This is irrelevant to the 
descriptive part of this work, but very important to the theorizing findings. In order to 
also ensure internal validity, several patterns have been followed in this work. First 
and foremost, the methodology used in this research provides a sound base for the 
internal validity of findings. When Eisenhardt developed the case study research 
methodology that is used in this work, she incorporated recommendations of Yin on 
how to increase the internal validity of findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). Additionally, this 
work followed Yin’s (1989) recommendation to use explanation building, i.e. to build 
a causal explanation about the case study data analyzed. Furthermore, pattern-
matching was carried out with all findings presented in this study. The pattern 
matching logic compares an empirically based pattern with a predicted one to 
strengthen its internal validity (Yin, 1989). This was done with every finding, by 
comparing it to similar findings stated in literature, an internal testing procedure built 
into the followed research methodology of Eisenhardt (1989). 
External validity stands for the fact that the findings of a study can be generalized 
beyond the immediate case study (Yin, 1989; Robson, 2002) and is dealt with in a 
separate subsection.  
7.8.3 Generalizability 
Generalizability or external validity refers to the extent to which the findings of case 
study research are more generally applicable beyond the specifics of the setting 
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studied (Yin, 1989; Robson, 2002). According to Yin (1989), generalizability or 
external validity is often criticized for case studies, especially for single case studies. 
For this reason, a multiple case study approach was chosen. Also, the research 
methodology presented by Eisenhardt (1989) ties the research closely to existing 
literature and that “enhances the internal validity, generalizability, and theoretical 
level of theory building from case study research” (Eisenhardt, 1989, p. 545). 
As already mentioned above, the research underlying this study is about tools that 
might be unfamiliar to managers. Also the sophistication of use will be different in 
different companies. Therefore the validity of the results of a less deep qualitative 
research (e.g. a survey) would be doubtful from a reliability point of view. This study 
used the strength of the case study research approach and brought up issues that 
quantitative research would have hardly been able to identify. In the words of Yin 
(1989), this case study research approach brought up findings from analytical 
generalization, rather than statistical generalization (as quantitative research would 
yield).  
Yet, there are also points that may reduce the generalizability of this research. Caution 
should be exercised in generalizing the results to industries with patterns very 
different than the ones of the case companies. As many of the studied companies are 
operating in the telecommunications or electronics industry, there might be a bias in 
the findings towards these kinds of industries. The case companies were not selected 
randomly, but according to Eisenhardt (1984) guided by the requirements stated in 
3.4.2.1. However, no case company was dropped because it did not fit other findings, 
thus there is no reason to suspect that the sample is biased though selective fact 
preference. 
Furthermore, the scope of this thesis is deliberately restricted to the area of pre-
development. Many presented tools are or could also be used in later phases of the 
product life cycle. Also, some findings valid in the pre-development could be not 
valid in these later phases anymore. Thus, in addition to the research made, the use of 
the found tools in later phases of the product life cycle could also have been studied. 
However, this would go beyond the capacity of this thesis. 
7.9 Conclusion and possibilities of further research 
This study set out to identify, classify and describe how new product development 
ideas are analyzed with cost information gathered in pre-development. The focus of 
this research is the circumstances of development preparation of cost-competitive 
products through future product cost analysis during pre-development phases. This 
work contributes to the answers in several directions of research requested by other 
academics: Foster and Young (1997) call for finding relatively unexplored areas in 
management accounting. Deszca et al. (1999) call for research on how companies can 
assess technologies and new product development ideas for breakthrough innovations 
in an efficient way. Shields and Young (1994) call for research on how R&D 
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professionals make decisions that affect product life-cycle and target costs. And last 
but not least Dekker and Smidt (2003) call for the study of the actual processes and 
methods of cost management during innovations by firms.  
To discover general patterns, this thesis uses a seven-company case study with a 
contingency theory approach that looks at the different conditions attached to a 
specific situation in which some cost management tools are used by some companies 
while others do not so. Besides the descriptive part, this research takes the 
contingency approach that there is not only one right way to arrange the analysis of 
cost information during pre-development phases. It rather depends on several 
characteristics of the specific company and environment in which it is operating in. 
This research provides contingent variables of the new product development idea 
nature, organizational characteristics, and innovation approach which are important to 
understand why new product development ideas are analyzed with cost information 
gathered in pre-development as they are. The case studies and its reflection show that 
product cost analysis during pre-development has to follow several regularities to fit 
contingencies of the company and situation of the innovation.  
This thesis shows that industry sees a need for future product cost analysis during pre-
development, as most companies are using different tools for it. It shows how cost 
information is collected and processed in business and provides descriptions for their 
use and indicates the arrangement parameters of the analysis of new product 
development ideas with cost information in pre-development. Through that, it 
contributes to both business research and also the improvement of industry practices.  
Furthermore, this thesis identifies regularities as contingency factors for the product 
cost analysis during pre-development. These sketch the framework that the studied 
case companies are operating in. Yet, this research uses only a one time snap-shot. It 
would be interesting to also study the development of the product cost analysis during 
pre-development over the time in a longitudinal study. This would add a further 
interesting dimension by analyzing how the product cost analysis during pre-
development alters, as companies and their competitive environment change. Similar 
as in the model of Khurana and Rosenthal (1997), companies could move in three 
categories over time according to their product cost analysis during pre-development 
based on the aforementioned regularities. The first category (awareness) would 
contain tools that are seen as a basis for the cost analysis during pre-development. The 
second category (islands of capabilities) would progress towards cost modeling and 
estimation during pre-development. Yet, if a company is developing its cost analysis 
during pre-development even further it can advance to the third category (integrated 
capability) and use directional costing. 
Directional costing has only been found to be used in one case company . Even 
though it is novel to academic literature; it could be used by other companies. It 
would be interesting to identify these companies and study their use of directional 
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costing. Also, the actual application of directional costing in business could be 
researched further to acquire a deeper understanding of its use, benefits and 
limitations. 
This thesis looks deliberately on the narrow spot of product cost analysis during pre-
development. However, this research also shows that many approaches used in 
business utilize target prices and look for profit estimates. For this analysis, product 
cost is only one side of the coin. It would surely also be very interesting to study the 
marketing point of view of the analysis during pre-development. This would allow not 
only looking at the future cost, but also at the future sales. Together this would make 
it possible to obtain the full picture of the business potential of new product 
development ideas in pre-development. 
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